"While Saddam did not plan for a protracted guerrilla conflict, Iraqi
actions before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF] helped facilitate and shape the insurgency
that followed," the report said. "The desertion of Iraqi military and
governmental structures in April 2003 released into the countryside numerous
persons with the skills, resources, and potential motivation to mount a
resistance and deprived coalition commanders of the indigenous military
forces they had counted on to help stabilize Iraq."
"U.S. decision-makers should be careful not to draw unwarranted lessons
from OIF , particularly the notion that high-tech
weaponry and communications will inevitably enable smaller ground forces to
be decisive against larger, but less high-tech, enemy forces," the report
said. "The extraordinary advantages that coalition forces enjoyed in Iraq
during March and April 2003 may not be replicated in future conflicts."
In 2003, the U.S. military, joined by Britain and other countries,
toppled the Saddam regime in less than three weeks. The Rand Project Air
Force said Saddam, preoccupied with internal threats, committed a series of
blunders that prevented the adoption of an effective defense strategy.
"Iraq's military strategy and operations were poorly designed and
executed," the report, released on July 11, said. "The defensive scheme
failed to exploit potential options for prolonging the conflict and
maximizing coalition casualties."
The report said the rapid collapse of the Iraqi military also stemmed
from poor motivation and morale. Rand determined that most Iraqi units
concluded that resistance was futile and chose to flee.
"Superior military capabilities gave coalition forces an overwhelming
advantage," the report said. "Coalition ground and air forces were able to
deliver accurate, lethal fire on Iraqi targets at long ranges and at night.
The coalition's ability to maneuver ground forces rapidly and to sustain
them over long distances also undermined the Iraqi ability to mount a
coherent defense."
The report said adversaries of the United States, including Iran, have
studied the war in Iraq. Rand said these adversaries could choose
unconventional means to overcome U.S. conventional military superiority.
"Enemies might seek to fend off or counter threats from superior U.S.
military forces by acquiring nuclear weapons and/or adopting strategies that
emphasize urban and guerrilla warfare," the report said.