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Tuesday, July 24, 2007

Rand: Saddam blew it; But dispersion of his best and brightest sabotaged U.S. occupation

WASHINGTON — The rapid U.S. defeat of Iraq in 2003 was due to mistakes by Saddam Hussein rather than American weapons superiority, a report said.

The Rand Corp., a leading consultant to the Defense Department, said the U.S. victory in Iraq stemmed from Saddam's strategic miscalculations. The report, based on interviews with former senior Iraqi officials, asserted that Saddam believed that a war with the United States could be avoided, Middle East Newsline reported.

Rand debunked theories that Saddam ordered his forces to leave the battle in preparation of a guerrilla war. But the report said the desertion of Iraqi military commanders robbed the United States of an opportunity to coopt them into stabilizing Iraq after the fall of Saddam.

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"While Saddam did not plan for a protracted guerrilla conflict, Iraqi actions before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF] helped facilitate and shape the insurgency that followed," the report said. "The desertion of Iraqi military and governmental structures in April 2003 released into the countryside numerous persons with the skills, resources, and potential motivation to mount a resistance and deprived coalition commanders of the indigenous military forces they had counted on to help stabilize Iraq."

"U.S. decision-makers should be careful not to draw unwarranted lessons from OIF , particularly the notion that high-tech weaponry and communications will inevitably enable smaller ground forces to be decisive against larger, but less high-tech, enemy forces," the report said. "The extraordinary advantages that coalition forces enjoyed in Iraq during March and April 2003 may not be replicated in future conflicts."

In 2003, the U.S. military, joined by Britain and other countries, toppled the Saddam regime in less than three weeks. The Rand Project Air Force said Saddam, preoccupied with internal threats, committed a series of blunders that prevented the adoption of an effective defense strategy.

"Iraq's military strategy and operations were poorly designed and executed," the report, released on July 11, said. "The defensive scheme failed to exploit potential options for prolonging the conflict and maximizing coalition casualties."

The report said the rapid collapse of the Iraqi military also stemmed from poor motivation and morale. Rand determined that most Iraqi units concluded that resistance was futile and chose to flee.

"Superior military capabilities gave coalition forces an overwhelming advantage," the report said. "Coalition ground and air forces were able to deliver accurate, lethal fire on Iraqi targets at long ranges and at night. The coalition's ability to maneuver ground forces rapidly and to sustain them over long distances also undermined the Iraqi ability to mount a coherent defense."

The report said adversaries of the United States, including Iran, have studied the war in Iraq. Rand said these adversaries could choose unconventional means to overcome U.S. conventional military superiority.

"Enemies might seek to fend off or counter threats from superior U.S. military forces by acquiring nuclear weapons and/or adopting strategies that emphasize urban and guerrilla warfare," the report said.

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