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In a candid report to the fifteen member Council, Ban Ki-moon recounted that Afghanistan’s flawed presidential election process was only part of the problem; he stressed, “together with the deteriorating security situation, the protracted electoral process has contributed to a gloomy atmosphere. If negative trends are not corrected, there is a risk that the deteriorating overall situation will become irreversible.”
“To reverse negative trends, a more focused and better-coordinated international effort is urgently needed. “ he opined. Ban added warily, “There is a need for a change of mindset in the international community as well as the government of Afghanistan. Without that change, prospects of success will diminish further.”
Another international conference on Afghanistan is set for London at the end of the month. Here major donor states, such as the United States, European Union and Japan will once again pledge reconstruction resources and cite the tired mantra of having to try harder to surmount the near-Herculean difficulties facing this South Asian land. Ironically, London will also later host a similar gathering dealing with the deteriorating security situation in Yemen, which I see as the re-discovered crisis de jour, long overlooked by the West, but now confronting us.
Despite massive foreign humanitarian assistance and a large commitment of American and European military forces to stem the tide of Taliban and Al-Qaida terror, the entrenched problems in the country remain as a corrupt and ineffective central government, if you could charitably call it that, a massive narcotics trade, and the undertow of Islamic fundamentalism to thwart the “modernizing trends” of the West.
Though the Al-Qaida elements pose a clear and present danger to Europe and America, it’s not entirely certain that and current troop levels or more significantly the military rules of engagement confronting the terrorists, are really up to the threat level. Pursuing a successful counter-insurgency with the Obama Administration’s politically correct constraints is in itself a recipe for disaster on the installment plan.
The recent killings of seven CIA operatives by an Al Qaida double agent, the deaths of four Canadian soldiers and a newspaper correspondent, and the steady attrition of American and British forces, illustrates the depths of ongoing violence. The fanaticism which we confront will not disappear by persuasion of the enemy but by defeating him.
While the international community pours massive resources into Afghanistan, it is ultimately up to the Afghans themselves—that tribal quilt of often disunited factions, clans, disparate provincial warlords, and seemingly “westernized” politicians to effectively confront the Taliban. The power of the government does not extend far beyond the capital, Kabul.
Kai Eide, the UN’s controversial Special Representative told the Security Council that a working civilian government, civil structures and a capable Afghan national army are keys to success. “If we do not take the civilian components of the transition strategy as seriously as the military component, then we will fail. What we need is a strategy that is politically and not militarily driven.” To a point.
He called for “A politically-driven strategy where Afghan-ownership and capacity stand at the center of our activities...the military surge must not be allowed to undermine equally important civilian objectives and the development of a politically driven strategy.” Stated another way, President Karzai’s Kabul government, not Obama must “own” the problem.
In a land where 80 percent of the population is dependent on agriculture (farming is often defined as opium production), where infrastructure is lacking or always being attacked by the Taliban terrorists, and where nearly the entire Kabul government budget comes from foreign aid, the very concept of a normal civil society seems at stunningly glaring odds with reality.
For example, Eide cites significant improvement in education where primary and secondary students (not mentioning girls that are in school too) have reached an impressive seven million students. Excellent. Yet he laments there is only room for 60,000 university students! While many talented Afghans are in university abroad, I wonder if he is hinting the international community should be offering a college education as part of the international reconstruction package?
Ban Ki-moon stressed, “Ultimately the main obstacle is not the lack of structures or even a shortage of resources…rather, the main problem is a question of political will.” Indeed, there’s plenty of blame to go around, but there’s a particular responsibility for the Afghans themselves to solve their own problems. We can help, we have helped, and we will continue to help, but there clearly comes a point where the international conferences and global aid programs can go just so far. If we are promoting the proverbial “soft power,” approach it may come with a hard knock price-tag.
John J. Metzler is a U.N. correspondent covering diplomatic and defense
issues. He writes weekly for WorldTribune.com.
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