Special to WorldTribune.com

By Brian M Downing

The Assad government, having lost control of large swathes of the country and deemed near collapse only a few months ago, has put together a surprising counteroffensive. The operation seeks to reestablish the ground route between the capital Damascus and the Mediterranean coast, where the regime’s Alawi and Shia supporters are concentrated. The counteroffensive started off reasonably well but has bogged down in recent days.

Qusayr, a town of thirty-thousand, is in the unenviable position of lying between Damascus and the Shia heartland, and an important battle is being waged there. Rebel forces are reinforcing the town; the Army is determined to take it. The Battle of Qusayr will be the first large, protracted battle of the war.

The Army wishes to inflict a serious defeat on the rebel forces in Qusayr, leading the way to reasserting control over the country – or at least large portions of it. This isn’t likely.

Rebel forces are ill-trained, often poorly armed, and as disunited as any substantive force can be, but three things make decisive defeat unlikely: the rebels are able to replenish their ranks from the Sunni majority and from foreign fighters; rebels operate in many parts of Syria and are unlikely to over commit forces to a city that holds far less import for them than it does to the Assad regime; rebels, in the event of imminent defeat, can blend into the population or exfiltrate the town in order to fight another day.

Assad may have a more limited objective in Qusayr. By reestablishing communication between Damascus and the coast, he may be preparing for the possibility of abandoning most of Syria and retrenching in the Alawi-Shia region, where he can retain control of part of the country and await the opportunity to retake the rest someday. The disunity of parts of the opposition, and the extremism of others, suggest this might not be the forlorn hope of an isolated dictator.

Rebel forces will be looking at Qusayr as an opportunity to wear down the Army, attrit it, push it toward the breaking point. This could best be accomplished in conjunction with rebel attacks elsewhere that would divert government forces from Qusayr and attrit them as well. It must be noted, though, that coherent command is not a rebel forte and that jealousies may cloud strategic vision.

Comparison to the battle of Misrata in the Libyan civil war might serve as inspiration. It was at that port city where inexperienced rebels engaged the Khamis Brigade for several months, learned military skills, and against all expectations, ground the elite unit down. Its best troops in disarray, the Gadhafi regime fell astonishingly quickly thereafter.

The Syrian Army, however, is much larger and more professional than that of Col. Gadhafi. The Libyan dictator, after all, mistrusted the army and kept it small and unprofessional. The Assads, by comparison, had to brace for possible war with Israel or with Iraq under Saddam Hussein, so they devoted considerable resources to a large regular army, though much of it is Sunni and of dubious reliability.

The Shia portions of Assad’s army have been fighting for a year and half now and have seen little on the battlefield to cheer them. It is possible that their better units are, as the rebels hope, nearing exhaustion. Qusayr will be a test.

Of great interest will be the actions of the al Nusra Front which holds a considerable amount of territory, including the city of Raqqah. Its forces are the most disciplined and best equipped currently arrayed against the regime. Recognizing al Nusra’s efficacy, fighters are deserting Free Syrian Army units and coming over to its bands, despite ties to Al Qaida. The Front has an appreciable contingent in Qusayr and their discipline and cohesion, which may rival that of the regular army, may be critical.

Victory could solidify al Nusra’s preeminence in the opposition camp and bring it more recruits.

Despite the world’s focus, the Battle of Qusayr may not prove decisive at all. It may simply lead to protracted stalemate, with neither side achieving strategic advantage – no matter who, if anyone, controls the town. Stalemate will further the fragmenting of Syria: one area under Assad control (Damascus and the Mediterranean coast); and numerous other areas in the hands of a miscellany of warlords, Salafi leaders, Al Qaida commanders, tribal councils, and Kurdish factions. Most of them will be rivalrous, some to the point of fighting one another over crossroads, bridges, commanding heights, power stations, pipelines, and hapless populations to conscript and tax.

Paradoxically, outside aid organizations may play a hand in fragmenting Syria, albeit unwittingly. By delivering food, clothing, shelter, and medical resources into the country, such organizations – well-intentioned and impartial though they may be – will help transform seemingly transient powerholders into enduring local governments, many with allegiances to various foreign powers including Turkey, Hizbullah, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Sunni Iraq, Shia Iraq, Kurdistan, Russia, and Iran.

These smaller states-in-the-making and vassals of numerous foreign overlords may well supplant central authority in the foreseeable future, if not permanently. Syria, as it has existed since its creation after the First World War and its independence after the Second, has almost certainly vanished from the Middle East.

Brian M Downing served with indigenous forces in the Vietnam War and is the author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.

  Al Nusra Front, Bashar Assad, Khamis Brigade, Shia heartland, The battle for Qusayr and the likely breakup of post-WWI Syria