Memoir of Iran under a relatively tolerant Shah before the Left paved the way for revolution

Special to WorldTribune.com

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs

The original volume of [former Foreign Minister of Iran under the late Shah] Ardeshir Zahedi’s memoirs, … forced a recalibration of 20th Century Iranian history and the role of the international community in Iran. …

Subsequent reporting has vindicated Amb. Zahedi’s revelation that Iranians themselves were responsible for the removal of the discredited Government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, not the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Britain’s MI-6. This was of profound significance because it overturned decades of thinking, both internationally and inside Iran, that Iran’s fate was determined by outside powers.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Shah of Iran and Amb. Ardeshir Zahedi in 1973.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Shah of Iran and Amb. Ardeshir Zahedi in 1973.

Indeed, it was Ardeshir Zahedi’s father, Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, who — aided ably by his son — mobilized the counter-coup against Mosaddegh’s illegal seizure of power. In many respects it refuted the myth that Washington and London could so easily manipulate the fate of Iran which, although weakened by World War II, was such an historically great power.

Those who have read Amb. Zahedi’s first volume of Memoirs, … are aware that he knew perhaps more world leaders than almost any other statesman of his era. And played a decisive role in the great endeavors of his day.

[Related: Zahedi memoir taps archives, corrects record on the Iranian people’s rejection of Mossadegh, Jan. 16, 2013]

The second volume (of a proposed four-volume series) of the Memoirs gives incredible granularity to many of the historical events of the 12-year time frame covered. In it, as well as in his first volume, Zahedi’s only flaw (if it can be considered that) is his great generosity toward so many of the people he knew and discusses. But perhaps that was the key to his success as a strategic diplomat: he thought the best of people and often brought out the best in them.

Even U.S. Pres. Jimmy Carter is treated kindly in Zahedi’s writings, despite the fact that he was responsible for undermining Iran and the Shah in 1978-79, actions which led to the great polarization between Western powers and much of Islamic society today.

This second edition of the Memoirs seems, in some ways, more intimate than the first, which makes it even more readable. Amb. Zahedi does not gloss over his early mistakes or impetuous youthful nature, but in all of this he shows the tolerant nature, too, of the Shah, and the ways of Iranian society at all levels.

There can be no question that, had such an intimate understanding of the society been more readily available to (or understood by) the international community in the period of the Shah’s rule, then the outcomes could have been far different.

Even today, there is a tendency of outsiders to view Iran in simplistic terms, and for Iranians to view the outside world similarly. So Zahedi’s second volume of Memoirs adds real texture to the evolution of Iranian society and is critical to any modern understanding of clerical Iran today.

The readability of the volume is enhanced by the fact that it appears conversational, which disguises the incredible attention to detail which has resulted from Zahedi’s meticulous record-keeping and the time spent to retrieve archival documents to support his writings. It appears conversational in large part because it is: Ahmad Ahrar acts as an interviewer, in a sense, and it is a question from him which starts each chapter. Often there are questions interspersed in the chapters.

The book’s detailing of actions around the coup d’etat in Iraq on July 14, 1958, remains important today, not least for the consequences still evident. But Zahedi outlines the lessons of that event, largely re-counting his father’s rapid and wise advise to the Shah.

Similarly, his complete account — with much new information — of the 1965 assassination attempt against the Shah, initiated by Maoist students, highlights how the international populist movements of the left began to be mobilized against the Iranian Government.

The assassination attempt failed, of course, but the student movement abroad began to receive significant backing, not just from Beijing, but from the Soviets.

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