Special to WorldTribune.com

By Brian M Downing

The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) offensive in Iraq of last June continues to cause alarm around the world, even though it stalled shortly thereafter.

It has been unable to regain the offensive and is being driven out of northern Iraq and the approaches to Baghdad, albeit very slowly. It is also taking heavy casualties from daily engagements and coalition airstrikes.

ISIL troops have a decided qualitative advantage over their enemies in Iraq. Indeed, ISIL cohesion, discipline, and efficacy are truly remarkable.

However, it is badly outnumbered inside Iraq by as many as twenty-five to one, and being worn down further everyday. In coming months, ISIL will have to rethink its ambitions of acquiring further territory in Iraq. It may also have to rethink its entire position there.

The Iraqi Army

It is a mistake to assess the Iraqi army by its poor showing last summer when it showed its heels to ISIL troops. That is no more a gauge of its ability today than were the early battles of World War Two when American ground and sea forces did not fare well against German and Japanese foes.

The forces that fled the battlefields of northern Iraq were in hostile Sunni lands. Many officers had no loyalty to the Shia government in Baghdad and were unwilling to fight for it.

Iraqi soldiers were deeply embarrassed by the showing and have resolved to perform more honorably and effectively. Over the last few months, they have improved significantly and shown a willingness to fight and take casualties.

No, Iraqi army troops are not ready to face equal numbers of ISIL troops, but this is irrelevant. A German division of WW II was superior to almost any allied equivalent, but it was almost always engaged with greatly superior numbers, and the German army was ground to dust.

The Iraqi army is vastly larger than ISIL and it has benefited in the last year from foreign trainers. It also enjoys air support on most operations, which inflicts relentless casualties on ISIL convoys and troop concentrations.

Associated Militias

Shia militias are playing important roles in the battle of Tikrit, a Sunni town about ninety miles northwest of Baghdad. These forces are not the rapidly assembled bands they are often depicted as.

Many go back to the insurgency against the U.S. and coalition forces of the post-Saddam years, and even earlier to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) during which Tehran trained fellow Shia to wreak havoc behind Saddam’s lines.

Drawn from neighborhood networks, Shia militias have fewer of the inter-tribal tensions which plague the regular army (and which plague most armies of the Middle East). Further, the Shia identity of shared oppression serves as a basis for unit cohesion, especially in battle with Sunni jihadis who view them as heretics and make hideous examples out of them as a matter of routine governance.

To the north of Tikrit, preparing for the battle of Mosul, are Kurdish militias, or peshmergas. These troops are making the difficult transition from hit-and-run guerrillas to disciplined infantry able to deploy effectively, engage in small-unit tactics, and hold areas instead of retiring to the hills to fight another day.

Like the Shia militias, they have established histories and enjoy cohesion based on ties among local men and women – ties that are lacking in national conscripts or volunteers with little if any preexisting trust. Such local units – peshmerga and Shia – have drawbacks: uncles and friends may be trusted neighbors yet be less than ideal leaders; and personal ties can conflict with strict compliance in battle. Nonetheless, they are spirited and numerous.

Iraqi and Kurdish militias benefit from tactical advisers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. IRGC officers compensate at least partially for the shortcomings of militia commanders who owe their positions to connections rather than to professionalism.

IRGC officers have played important behind the scenes roles across the region, training effective fighters in Lebanon back in the eighties and more recently in turning ragtag Shia and Alawi fighters into competent militias.

ISIL’s Situation Today

The once seemingly invincible forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant are now badly outnumbered and they see their qualitative edge in steady and probably irreversible decline. Religious fervor and warrior creed may convince the leadership that it can turn the tide in Iraq and perhaps even take the old imperial capital of Baghdad by next winter. Military realities, however, will suggest a retreat to western Iraq and even eastern Syria.

Such a move, however, would be an embarrassment to a messianic group which believes it is preparing the way for a Mahdi and a restored caliphate. It could hurt recruitment at a time when it is suffering appreciable casualties. ISIL would become just another warlord army preening atop the ruins of towns abandoned by Baghdad and Damascus.

ISIL and Iraqi Sunnis

An alternative would be redefining itself as an ally and protector of Sunni Iraqis who were, in their view, wrongfully ousted from their place atop the Iraqi state and society, and as the defender of Sunni honor against rising Iranian-Shia power.

Such sentiment has dwelled among indigenous Sunnis for several years. Many locals tacitly approved ISIL’s bombings of Shia targets over the last several years and in some places welcomed ISIL troops as liberators. Iraqi troops, peshmergas, and Shia militias have strengthened that sentiment by destroying Sunni residences and expelling their residences from towns retaken from ISIL.

ISIL would find considerable support from the Sunni public, tribal fighters, former Baath Party officials, and former army officers. Such indigenous support would make it more difficult for Iraqi and Kurdish troops to push deeper into Sunni lands. This in turn would give ISIL the time and sanctuary to rebuild for another offensive in the region.

ISIL breaks apart

Indigenous Sunni support may be more pragmatic and short-term than ISIL – and most observers – know. Support for ISIL may shift to opposition. Locals may weary of ISIL’s heavy-handed governance, which even though primarily focused on Shias, is still crueler than anything from Baghdad over the decades.

Former army officers and local fighters, who have been important to ISIL’s offensive operations, may prefer an autonomous region to a caliphate and break away from ISIL, leading to savage fighting.

Sunni states in the region may offer Sunni Iraqis incentives to break from ISIL and form an autonomous part of Iraq similar to the arrangement presently enjoyed by the Kurds. This would of course be opposed by Baghdad as it would entail the further breakup of the country and place western Iraq in an anti-Shia, anti-Iran camp under Saudi influence.

From Riyadh’s perspective, however, it would be a tremendous diplomatic achievement that would build a potentially powerful Sunni buffer between the Shia of Lebanon and Syria and the Shia of Iraq and Iran.

Brian M Downing is a Contributing Editor at WorldTribune.com. A political-military analyst, he is author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam, and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.

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