Credit where credit is due: The Carter Administration and Iran’s fall to militant Islam

Special to WorldTribune.com

By Dario de Persis

The question of whose actions — or inactions — contributed to the downfall of the Shah of Iran in and by extension, the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978-79, is again relevant.

As was the case then, the U.S. and Israel are again preoccupied with the issue of Iranian power.

President Jimmy Carter and wife Rosalynn with the Shah of Iran at a state dinner in the White House. / www.corbis.com
President Jimmy Carter and wife Rosalynn with the Shah of Iran at a state dinner in the White House. / www.corbis.com

To be sure, the Shah had his share of shortcomings. But he was a reformer, secular, inclusive, and more importantly, a solid ally of the West and a stabilizing factor in the Middle Eastern region.

Thirty-five years later, one wonders if what was billed at the time as a genuine social revolution actually benefited the Iranian people and regional stability.

Many domestic as well as international factors led to the overthrow of the Shah. But the most important of all were the roles American leaders played in precipitating the outcome.

President Jimmy Carter and all his left-leaning advisers and officials, with the exception of Zbigniew Brzezinski favored or advocated the removal of the Shah. So were many ‘moralist’ politicians and members of Congress of all stripes — mostly out of sheer ignorance of geopolitics and lack of understanding of Middle Eastern history and culture.

Carter could not have chosen a more astute National Security Adviser than Brzezinski. But unfortunately for Iran as well as for long-term U.S. national interests, his counsel fell on deaf ears.

U.S. Air Force Gen. Robert E. ‘Dutch’ Huyser was dispatched to Iran on Jan. 4, 1979 to restrain the Iranian generals from mounting a coup d’état. His role and that of Gen. Al Haig was detailed in a column by the late William Safire for the New York Times on Jan. 18, 1980. He left Tehran on Feb. 11, having completed his mission.

In his memoir ‘Mission to Tehran’ he writes that in a subsequent telephone call with U.S. officials, he was asked by the Under Secretary of Defense if he would be willing to go back and supervise a military takeover.

By that time it was too late. Gen. Huyser maintains that he consistently advised his superiors that the result of the departure of senior Iranian leadership would be the collapse of the Iranian Armed Forces. He adds that before their collapse, the Royal Guard alone could have mounted a successful military take over.

The Carter Administration’s lack of understanding of the consequences of radical change in a volatile region and disregard for the possible effects that such a sudden change would have on the balance of power, contributed greatly to the prolongation of instability and hostility in the region.

To this day, the U.S. continues to cope with its direct and indirect consequences and is still paying in blood and treasure.

The writer is a well-informed, longtime observer of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

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