Special to WorldTribune.com

By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, Global Information System /Defense & Foreign Affairs

On Friday, Sept. 13, the United States and the Russian Federation signed an agreement aimed to bring to an end the political fiasco engendered by the Barack Obama administration in the aftermath of the Aug. 21, chemical attack in Damascus.

The broad framework agreement avoided addressing the ostensible root cause for the sudden preoccupation with the Syrian chemical arsenal, and only set general guidelines for the eventual removal and/or destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons (CW) sometime in mid-2014, provided the fratricidal violence and civil war permit such an undertaking.

Significantly, the agreement applies to both the Assad administration and the opposition.

In return for this agreement, the Obama administration foreswore the use of force in Syria, thus ending any chance for a U.S.-led international intervention in Syria. While Assad’s government promised to try and abide by the agreement even if the first reporting deadline is impractical, the Free Syrian Army’s (FSA’s) Brig. Gen. Salim Idriss called the agreement “just a lie” and announced that the opposition would ignore it.

Simply put, the CW interlude only accelerated the emergence of an old-new greater Middle East from the ashes of the “Arab Spring”. The crisis in and around Syria is thus returning to being dominated by the regional mega-trends.

The CW interlude has a lingering impact, but in the context of the U.S. intrusion into the regional dynamics which the CW incident sought to amplify. Inside Syria, the legacy of the CW interlude is the acceleration and intensification of the existing trends.

This acceleration is made easy by the bursting of the opposition’s expectations once the U.S. military intervention failed to materialize. The morale devastation of the Syrian opposition — particularly the Turkey-based forces — is worse than anything the Syrian military has been capable of inflicting in more than two years of harsh war. It is probable that no amount of U.S.-supplied weapons and funds could reverse the sense of despair and defeat.

Syria, in May 2013, entered the final phase of the war. Both sides realized that barring a major Western military intervention in the summer, Assad’s Damascus would become the irreversibly dominant power in Syria and the war would subside by autumn/winter (except for jihadist terrorism which would continue indefinitely).

The clairvoyant old sheikhs of rural Syria have made the trend more pronounced for they predict that winter will be longer and colder than usual. Eid-al-Adha –the Feast of the Sacrifice — is both the indicator of the well-being or destitution of the community (through the availability of lambs for slaughter and other quality foodstuff) and the start of the cold season. This year, Eid-al-Adha is in mid-October. This means that the destitute grassroots population will soon need even greater help in food, medicine, fuel and shelter, help which only Assad’s Damascus is currently providing unconditionally.

In contrast, the Islamists-jihadists provide limited help only to the Sunni communities along the central Euphrates valley and on condition that they adopt Islamist ruling and governance. Hence, the slide of the population into the fold of the Assad Administration is accelerating, as anticipated.

Assad’s administration is cognizant of this trend. Now that the threat of a game-changing U.S.-led intervention has all but evaporated, the Syrian military has to face two major strategic threats:

1. The lingering Islamist-jihadist cells in the urban slums and rural townships of the economic engine of Syria: the populated zone around the Damascus-Aleppo road, and weapons stockpiles they recently received from Turkey; and

2. The possibility of a U.S.-Jordanian-Saudi sponsored surge from the south to try and capture Damascus (tailored after the U.S.-sponsored surge on Tripoli from Tunisia).

Hence, Syrian military activities are focused on addressing these two challenges. The Syrian military launched a major offensive to the south of Damascus. The military enjoys active support from local Sunni Bedouin and Druze militias, while the local jihadist forces stay away from the advancing forces. Hence, the Syrian forces can focus on national-level and transnational jihadist forces (that is, Jabhat al-Nusra and its affiliates) and on blocking roads leading from northern Jordan). Throughout the rest of western and northern Syria, the military launched a multitude of localized raids and sweeps; again, with growing support from, and even participation of, Sunni Arab local self-defense militias. These localized military operations aim to destroy national-level and transnational jihadist forces and the storage sites of the heavy weapons recently pushed into Syria from across the Turkish border.

Localized and nationalist rebel forces largely stay out of the fighting in part because of the sweeping despair in their ranks.

By now, the impact of the legacy of the CW interlude is palpable. Since early summer, the opposition had great hopes and expectations that a U.S.-led military intervention was imminent and would turn things around dramatically. The opposition was genuinely convinced that the defeat of early summer would, by the magic of U.S. and NATO bombing, transform into a strategic victory before winter, and that the largesse and generosity of the affluent West would resolve all the endemic shortages so that winter would not be horrendous.

The U.S. needed an excuse, and the opposition provided it. But no intervention happened and, in the aftermath of U.S.-RF agreement, none will happen. Hence, the grassroots know miracles won’t happen, and that Assad’s patron, Russia, won’t permit them to happen. Opposition commanders believe that there is no longer any point in holding on against the superior Syrian military now that it is clear that the U.S. will not intervene militarily and turn around the otherwise lost war.

Consequently, the slide into the fold of Assad’s Damascus is accelerating and expanding if only because the alternative — accepting the Islamist-jihadist reign during the harsh winter — is unthinkable.

The slowing down of the war in Syria is already having a devastating effect on neighboring Iraq.

The main jihadist forces in the area — particularly the Al Qaida-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and Sham — are emerging from the Syrian chaos and can afford to allocate resources (fighters, funds, weapons and bombs) to fighting the Shi’ite Arabs for the dismemberment of Iraq. The jihadist objective is to effect the de facto joining of Sunni western Iraq to the functioning jihadist al-Jazira with its bastion in the central Euphrates valley.

Petrified about their ability to hold onto power in a region falling apart, Iraq’s Shi’ites — both the security forces and militias — are escalating their own war against the Sunni Arabs. Moreover, adamant on securing on-land lines of communications to Syria, the Iranians are deploying their own Shi’ite proxies (loosely organized under the banner of the Iraqi Hizbullah) to also fight Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Hence the slew of car bombs by both sides and the overall fratricidal carnage should be expected to keep escalating in order to force Baghdad and Teheran into decisions they don’t want to make about the long-term Sunni-Shi’ite balance of power.

The main unresolved issue hanging over the emerging greater Middle East is the role of Iran in lieu of the perplexing policy of the Obama White House. Presently, President Obama is more desperate than ever before to attain a grand rapprochement with Iran and make a triumphant Nixon-style visit to Teheran. However, Obama also seems convinced that the only thing that matters to everybody all over the world are his words and not his actions.

Since July, once then-President-elect Hassan Rouhani started his transition to the Iranian Presidency, Obama reached out in order to revive the [Valerie] Jarrett-Velayati venue of direct negotiations. The Obama White House sent letters, messages and emissaries to several leaders in Tehran.

In late August, Obama sent a personal letter to Rouhani. In it, Obama proposed to “turn a new page” in bilateral relations and promised loosening of the economic sanctions. U.S. emissaries also made all the usual promises: to prevent Israel from striking Iran; to accept a de facto nuclear Iran; to permit Iranian hegemony over the Persian Gulf and the regional energy economy; to permit the spread of Iranian influence into Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, etc.

Initially, Obama seemed to be following through on his promises.

The semi-public pressure on Israel has been incessant, the disengagement from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States has been humiliating, the acceptance of Iranian domination over Iraq has been unconditional, and the protection of Egypt’s Islamists genuine if futile. Finally, Obama had the financial sanctions on Iran unilaterally undermined (ostensibly in support of humanitarian causes).

But Tehran’s profound mistrust of Washington endures.

The sustenance of the on-land Shi’ite-dominated access to the shores of the Mediterranean is the greatest achievement of the mullahs’ rule, apart from the mere survival of the Islamic Republic. In preparations for the anticipated intervention in Syria, Washington started assuring Teheran that the [Muslim Brotherhood] Ikhwan-dominated administration which Obama’s Washington was planning to install in Damascus would not be anti-Iran and would guarantee all of Teheran’s strategic and economic interests.

Obama failed to realize, however, the depth of hatred and mistrust between the Persian Shi’ites and the Arab Ikhwan. (That Iranian Intelligence and the IRGC were sponsoring Sunni jihadist entities, including Ikhwan-affiliated, against the West or Israel does not mean Iran trusts them.)

Teheran cannot fathom that Obama does not comprehend the essence of Shi’ite-Ikhwan relations, and therefore interprets the Obama White House’s plans to empower Sunni Islamists in Damascus as a manifestation of Washington’s hidden agenda against the mullahs’ Teheran and Shi’ite Islam.

Even Obama’s Washington could not ignore the adversarial impact that a U.S.-led intervention in the Syrian war and the planned toppling of the Assad administration would have on the nascent negotiations with Teheran. Realizing that a crisis which might affect the entire grand rapprochement was brewing, Obama dispatched his confidant Jeffrey Feltman (the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs under Hillary Clinton) and the Sultan of Oman to meet with Iranian Supreme Leader “Ayatollah” Ali Khamenei just a day before the chemical attack in Damascus.

Both delivered Khamenei and the Iranian upper-most leadership guarantees of Obama’s enduring commitment to a grand rapprochement which would include the sustenance, and even increase, of Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon, as well as the Persian Gulf.

Teheran was noncommittal and reluctant to accept any dependence on the goodwill of U.S.-empowered Sunni Islamists in Damascus. Khamenei warned Sultan Qabus that Teheran would reexamine the trust in the U.S. sincerity on nuclear and all other pertinent issues should Iran’s posture in Syria and Lebanon be undermined. (The timing of Feltman’s and Qabus’ trips to Khamene’i suggests that Obama knew that a major provocation was coming. There is no indication whether Obama knew it would be a chemical strike.)

And then the Syrian CW crisis erupted.

While Tehran would hear nothing about compromise over access to the shores of the Mediterranean, Teheran grasped the extent of the desperation of Obama’s Washington. If anything, Teheran’s resolve to triumph only strengthened in the aftermath of the chemical strike. Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani briefed Iran’s Assembly of Experts that Iran “will support Syria to the end”.

Iranian propaganda became virulent and threatened a regional war should the U.S. strike Syria. Moreover, Iranian proxy militia groups in Iraq threatened that they would attack the oilfields of Saudi Arabia and cut off the “economic jugular” of the West if the U.S. attacked Syria. At the same time, Iranian propaganda kept reiterating Teheran’s desire for the resumption of nuclear and other negotiations, even though Rouhani vowed Iran would not abandon or compromise over its nuclear program.

Hence, the moment the threat of a U.S.-led military intervention in Syria was removed, there began more intense direct negotiations.

Teheran is both relieved and emboldened by Obama’s decision not launch strikes against Syria. Iran is determined to do its utmost to squeeze the best possible deal from the desperate Obama. In early September 2013, the Obama White House started boasting about “a possible thaw in long-frozen relations” with Iran. The Obama White House claimed to be “communicating with Tehran” and “moving behind the scenes toward direct talks” on reducing tensions, resolving outstanding problems and disputes, and normalizing relations.

Obama hopes to revive direct negotiations and even potential face-to-face talks during Rouhani’s visit to UN General Assembly in late September. Ultimately, Teheran seems convinced that President Obama would not dare to confront Assad’s Damascus for fear of disrupting the fledgling U.S.-Iranian bilateral negotiations, and Teheran intended to exploit this to the fullest.

Teheran’s priorities are clear.

In mid-September 2013, Gen. Soleimani addressed a closed forum in Teheran about the crucial importance to Iran of victory in Syria. He stressed that “Syria’s pivotal role in defending the anti-U.S. and anti-Israel resistance front [Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Hizbullah] in the region and its continued victories over the terrorists in the last one year are the cause of increased foreign pressures against Damascus.”

He further elaborated that “the Syrian army’s continued victories against the rebel and terrorist groups in recent months have angered the enemies and increased their threats and attacks against the country”. It is therefore imperative for Teheran’s own vital interests to secure the ultimate victory of Syria.

Meanwhile, official Teheran considers the U.S.-RF agreement the official removal of the threat of U.S.-led Western intervention in Syria.

“The new situation means in fact that any pretext for the United States and certain countries to engage in military action against Syria has been removed,” Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian stated. With the threat of a U.S. intervention effectively gone and with Obama focused on the grand rapprochement, Iran and its proxies can increase their support for the Syrian war effort.

The real fun has just begun.

  Ali Khamenei, Bashar Assad, Bodansky: As Syria’s CW crisis ends, Eid-al-Adha, Free Syrian Army, Hassan Rouhani, the U.S.-Iran rapprochement begins, Valerie Jarrett