Projecting western logic on the Beijing regime

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

In the late James Jesus AngletonÕs "wilderness of mirrors" ø geopolitical intelligence ø nothing is so tempting but fraught with what Cold War Warriors used to call mirror-imaging than projecting your own logic and motivations. Nor is there a more likely object for such misperception than the Beijing regime.

In a world of logic, China would have fairly clear goals. Economic development for the worldÕs largest and one of the poorest populations. Preserving markets and technological transfer from the U.S. ø the largest role in recent rapid development of littoral China. Access for increasing raw materials. Contributing to an environment of international collaboration ø at least until Beijing commands real world power. A gradual liberalization of internal controlsø if for not other reason than to permit rational economic decision-making.

But that is our logic. Is it the Chinese leadersÕ?

The continuing problem in trying to answer, of course,is the lack of transparency. That not only includes government but the rigidly controlled media and divining so-called nonofficial spokesmen. If it were not difficult enough, analysis now must include growing competition among ChinaÕs three principle leaders and their claques. In summer 2004, an additional hazard is whether ø like so many inside and outside the U.S. ø Beijing is waiting for the November U.S. political decision. Or whether they might indeed believe [from their orthodox Marxist past] there is inevitability about American policy.

The world does not stand still for the American elections, however. Nor has Chinese leadership been able to stop taking positions in the maelstrom of world events.

North Korea: Beijing professes to want a nuclear weapons free peninsula. It convoked the interested parties, a gesture to U.S. policy to avoid bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. Yet China has simply endorsed PyongyangÕs positions. Furthermore, ChinaÕs continued support of North KoreaÕs economy permits Pyongyang to refuse compromise. That includes American offers of aid for if the bankrupt regime submits to verifiable destruction of its nuclear weapons.

Taiwan: A public rebuke by President Bush for TaiwanÕs President Chen seems only to have encouraged a harder line by Beijing. It continues to tweak its military buildup toward Taiwan ø expensive purchases of Russian aircraft [rather the longer route of domestic development] and a continuing missiles buildup. Yet, the huge Taiwan investment in China and accompanying technical transfer is integral to the relationship. Granted Taiwan may constitute a ÒdomesticÓ issue for Beijing [its hint of provincial autonomy], the growing economic relationship would be portent of a closer relationship achieved peacefully. The threat of force may eventually intimidate the Taiwanese [and even Washington]. But the evidence so far is the exact opposite effect in Taiwan and aggravation of U.S.-China relations.

Hong Kong: Reversing the policy of keeping the Chinese military garrison in the closet with a show of strength for Army Day July 31 was a clumsy attempt to intimidate the democrats. Rather than permit modification of his stumbling administration, Beijing has endorsed the failed tactics of Governor Tung. Again, perhaps repression will be effective. But it risks eroding a regime of law and minimum corruption from which China has long profited. Surely it suggested itself as a model for growing complexity in the Mainland political-economy. Perhaps destroying the identity of Hong Kong is seen as necessary in Beijing, but it risks killing the goose that still plays a powerful role in ChinaÕs economic wellbeing.

Oil: With her crude imports climbing more than 20 percent and refined product 40 percent this year, China has been scurrying around looking to tie down new sources. That has included President Hu visiting otherwise insignificant African states. But Beijing has thrown its weight against U.S. efforts to step up security in the Straits of Malacca, the chokepoint through which most of ChinaÕs imports flow. [And party hacks descended on Singapore for its increasingly close relations with Washington -- and a recent visit by its prime minister-designate to Taiwan.]

Human Rights: Not only has Beijing refused to make any amends for Tiananmen ø demanded by some of the regimeÕs most loyal adherents ø but its crackdowns on the Internet, haphazardly at minor critics, repression of religious groups, and helter-skelter media repression, is a crazy quilt of repression. How to halt the increasing corruption ø some like the Bank of China in the highest places ø threatening to twist economic development out of shape? How to ameliorate growing peasant and worker protests, some of them to the streets of Beijing, despite draconian controls? The argument most Chinese simply want stability at any cost notwithstanding, can any society remain stable without safety valves for conflict and dissent?

Those are only some of the contradictions.

How much is this confusion in the ranks of a lackluster leadership increasingly beset with myriad problems? How much is it feuding leaders in search of issues to hammer each other? And how much is it a conviction among paranoid Chinese Communist leadership that its real priority is to meet attack in a hostile world?