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There were too many ironies in President Chen Shui-bian’s new “peace proposal” to count:
It was extended on the Double Ten, the old Kuomintang Republic of China national day, anathema to Chen’s partisans. But it was meant to further undercut Chen’s tattered KMT domestic opposition in December parliamentary elections. He hopes to win an outright majority by cultivating Taiwan “nationalism” but placating the Island’s Mainlander minority with overtures to China.
Chen’s proposal called for picking up negotiations, looking back to a 1992 Hong Kong meeting when the two Chinas had their first formal contact. If observers were confused, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu immediately straightened them out: Chen's reference to Hong Kong only meant Taiwan wanted to shelve differences to focus on practical issues. Some [mostly pro-KMT] observers hoped Chen meant the 1992 understanding each side could agree there is only "one China" but is still permitted to have their own interpretation of "one China". That nostrum, sometimes referred to as “the '92 consensus”, paved the way for later negotiations before cross-Straits talks broke down in 1999 creating a five-year freeze.
But Chen’s predecessor, then a KMT leader but a “Taiwanese”, Lee Teng-hui , threw over the whole concept. Lee argued for Taiwan “sovereignty” and so has Chen, calling for negotiations between two equals. Nothing more infuriates the Mainland propagandists than this renunciation of their claims Taiwan is just a “renegade province”.
The interpretation is crucial, vague and contradictory as it seems, since Beijing has said it will not resume negotiations – for example, on such dollars-and-cents issues as direct transport and communications – until Taipei accepts “one China”. "It's like sticking a warm face against cold buttocks," said Tung Li-wen of Taiwan's private Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies, quoting the Chinese saying to illustrate Beijing's response: "As far as China is concerned, Chen Shui-bian is either a hardline provocateur or a hypocritical liar."
But optimists interpret Chen’s remarks as an attempt to quiet the recent inflammatory cross-Straits rhetoric. For example, facing growing missiles aimed at the Island, Taiwan’s defense minister recently warned of the possibility of a second strike against Shanghai. He explained he was talking about a cross-Straits version of the Cold War’s MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction].
The threat would be only partly bluff [Beijing has nukes, Taipei doesn’t] if Chen is able to get legislative approval for a proposed $18 billion bond issue to reequip Taiwan’s military. The U.S., which had a hand in designing the package, has called approval [opposed even by some of Chen’s following as cutting into the Island’s meat and potatoes] as evidence the Taiwanese mean to defend themselves. Dedicated deterrence here as elsewhere might be the best peacekeeper [and let the U.S. off the hook, committed as it is to Taiwan’s defense if Beijing should use force].
Chen’s “peace proposal” was also an attempt to mend fences with Washington after President George W. Bush publicly scolded Chen for “provocations”. And it was an effort to counter continuing pressure from Beijing on Washington for redefining “one China” which both Secretary State Colin Powell and the President have reaffirmed repeatedly recently. Still China’s President Hu Jiabiao recently telephoned Bush calling on him to halt U.S.arms sales to Taipei. That issue is all the more critical with the French initiative, reinforced by President Jacques Chirac’s recent Beijing visit, to lift the EU’s arms embargo lowered after the Tien An Mien massacre. Although not part of the visit’s successful $2 billion sales campaign, aircraft/avionics sales to Beijing would be seen in both Taipei and Washington as upsetting the critical Straits balance.
Beijing’s bitter media denunciations labeled Chen’s offer as just more of the same: his maneuvering for Taiwan “independence”. They coupled it with Taipei’s continuing effort to break out of Beijing’s-sponsored international boycott, trying to enter such organizations as the UN World Health Organization during the recent SAAR pandemic scare, or joining the UN itself. And a new passport emphasizes “Taiwan” over the old KMT Republic of China. Ironically the fact Taiwan has given up the old KMT claim to represent all China is lost in the shuffle.
The optimists hope Beijing will match Chen’s gambit with their own “peace” initiative – propaganda if nothing more – after the U.S. elections. Beijing has carefully only made formal independence its red line. Nor can Beijing ignore increasing economic interdependence. Taiwan hi tech imports registered a 35 percent growth in the first seven months of 2004 to a total trade of $35 billion; Taipei businessmen have invested more than $70 billion in Mainland plants; and a half million Taiwanese expatriates man China’s most successful export operations accounting for a big part of the present boom.
Furthermore, with the likelihood Chen will get his parliamentary majority [and his bond issue], either Beijing will have to stop playing the Big Bad Wolfe and accept incremental progress toward a settlement, move militarily soon — or have its bluff called.
Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@comcast.net),
is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent
for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.
He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.