Who's Hu?

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

The invitation to China to this yearÕs meeting of the G7 with the worldÕs other economic leaders was recognition of BeijingÕs growing role as a maw for raw materials [and its neighborsÕ hi tech components] and as a lode of cheap but increasingly sophisticated manufactured exports. It coincided with an equally important shift in ChinaÕs leadership, the handing on of power from the so-called third generation of the Communist revolution to its fourth.

It is a bit too early for the accolades coming from all sides for a peaceful transfer of power for the first time in Communist history [in China as elsewhere]. Jiang Zemin who refused to go last year from chairmanship of the central military commissions, has now relinquished his role as guardian of Mao ZedungÕs dictum Òall power comes out of the barrel of a gunÓ. It remains to be seen if Jiang will try to repeat his mentor Deng XiaopingÕs control from beyond officialdom. But we knew Deng and Jiang is no DXp!

Hu tiptoes into the leaderÕs role as a virtual unknown at a time of great decision-making for ChinaÕs 1.3 billion people. Even Jiang, a pinch hitter after the collapse of the Party structure in the Tien An Mien catastrophe when Deng ordered the massacre of protesting students and workers on the doorstep of Party headquarters, was better known. He was, after all, a leader of the Shanghai clique of arrivistes under DengÕs ÒGet richÓ mantra.

Hu, and his ally Prime Minister Wen Jinbao only slightly less so, are the quintessential Party hacks who reached eminence by going along at the proper moment with the twisting Party line.

Lightning has a way, sometimes, of striking opportunist politicians and transforming them into statesmen. It could happen to Hu. Certainly there is no limit to opportunities for demonstrating ingenuity and leadership. For while the G7 coronation ø and the arrival of supplicants on the doorstep of the emperor such as FranceÕs President Jacques Chirac ø recognizes BeijingÕs successes, it only dramatizes the challenges: Economic.

ChinaÕs rapid growth has unleashed unknown forces. An overheated economy is threatened with inflation. Communist leadership remembers, if the world has forgotten, they came to power in the late 40s more through ShanghaiÕs counting rooms than on the battlefields. A fragile, politically compromised, overextended banking structure, skyrocketing regional and class disparities, overdependence on exports, mushrooming import bills for energy and raw materials, rising speculation against an undervalued and inflexibly managed currency ø all require adjustments, ÒA soft landingÓ to the current boom is required to maintain political stability and a continuing flow of foreign investment and technology transfer. Earlier crises were surmounted with skill by former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji. But the stakes were much smaller and the whole apparatus of control was much more in command. One has only to look at an energy import bill which has risen almost 40 percent in the first six months of 2004 and the hysteria it has produced among the leadership; ChinaÕs Mercantilists see their trade balances turning red.

Political. Despite the best efforts of Washington, Tokyo, the ASEAN and EU diplomats to put the best face on relations with China, the rhetoric of confrontation is growing louder.

And in no small part it arises from BeijingÕs own intractability. Chinese leadership apparently believes huge and growing investment and trade will inevitably lead to basic compromises in othersÕ political agendas. [No matter how many times economist determinists get proved wrong, the heresy continues.] In fact, for example, BeijingÕs maladroit tactics on the Taiwan issue has only stiffened the IslandÕs resolve to maintain its separation, even encouraged radical independence elements ø all this despite its enormous investments and growing trade with the Mainland.

Treading water with [or actively encouraging?] North KoreaÕs intransigence over its nuclear weapons and missiles programs has spurred JapanÕs rearmament and U.S.-Japanese military integration, with Beijing as well as Pyongyang in mind. [BeijingÕs alternately turning on and off government-inspired anti-Japanese propaganda has now taken root among younger Chinese.] Despite Secretary of State Colin PowellÕs clucking noises, the next American administration will be faced with tough decisions about ChinaÕs flouting missiles and nuclear anti-proliferation even as Washington sanctions individual Chinese government firms. [Of course, these conflicting signals and actions by Washington only add to HuÕs problems.]

HuÕs record ø clouded by the miasma of Party propaganda ø gives foreign observers no real clue to his values. The ÒoptimistsÓ remember he suffered in The Great Cultural Revolution, learning by bitter exposure the realities of life of the peasantry; his recent world travels after decades of isolation must have opened his eyes. [But what to make of his participation in the Tibetan 1994-5 repression?]

All this could mean HuÕs new found authority and power will introduce a new superior level of Chinese governance, even if changes are more likely to be slow and minimal in the daedal Chinese environment. But the question remains.