A primer for North Korea anti-proliferation

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

Recent events have demonstrated halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction [WMD}ø nuclear, chemical and biological ø is full of contradictions. They begin with the major powers grandfathered into a nuclear club because they are firmly in control of their weapons and committed to an international regime of law. Then there is the grey zone, new members who could not for various reasons be kept out ø Israel, more recently India and Pakistan. There is even the example of South Africa which voluntarily disarmed.

Now LibyaÕs convicted international terrorist Muammar Qadaffi agrees to abandon his efforts to build WMDs. The Iranian mullahs, state sponsors of terrorism, agree to spot inspections by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Optimists see proof diplomacy rather than military actions is the route to success and speculate the road to North Korea is open.

Alas! We are immediately back to contradictions.

First, there are lessons from the Iraqi, Iranian and Libyan experiences ø beyond the negotiations failure or success.

The most obvious is IAEA inspection leaves a great deal to be desired. In all fairness [leaving aside the oft expressed political judgments of those like Swedish diplomat Hans Blix, always prone to giving the host nations the benefit of the doubt], rogue regimes like those of Sadaam Hussein and Kim Il Jong are ingenious in disguising their efforts. Thus, the IAEA failed to discover IraqÕs program before the Israelis bombed and temporarily halted it in June 1981. Whether efforts were abandoned after the 1991 Gulf war is still open ø although so far there is no evidence except, apparently, elaborate paper trails. [Again it is well to remember that chemical and biological WMD ø which Sadaam had earlier used on his own populationø could be hidden in a tiny space, could have been transferred to neighboring countries, etc., etc.]

Tehran admits it obscured operations from the IAEA for 19 years ø claiming they were not intended for weapons production but only to achieve a full nuclear power fuel cycle! And we have North Korean ÒconfessionsÓ they inaugurated a second nuclear program in the decade after agreeing to halt such efforts.

All this went on during periods when there were IAEA inspections. But as the experts admit on all sides, IAEA can only enforce signed protocols if the host government acquiesces.

Assuming, still just an assumption, that both Iran and Libya have had a change of heart and are willing to abide by their agreements, why have they come to heel? The Iranian case appears more transparent.

U.S. pressure on West European allies and Russia to end sales of technology to the badly strapped Iranian economy was held over the head of the mullahs. Washington pressed, without success, for the issue to go to the UN Security Council for a debate on sanctions.

While negotiations stretch back over months, it seems logical events in Iraq have influenced the erratic Libyan dictator. Certainly the now relaxed UN sanctions [always fudged by Italy and other Europeans] against the Libyan economy [still not abandoned by Washington] as a result of the notorious Lockerbie PanAm bombing had their effect. There are unconfirmed reports U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] operations caught WMD Libyan shipments red-handed. The PSI is the 10-nation effort [led by the U.S. outside the UN] to grab WMD related materials on the high seas and in the air enroute to rogue states.

The most critical point in all this history, however, is that in each instance ø in Iraq earlier, in Iran, in North Korea, and now in Libya ø officials have admitted that the WMD effort was further along than U.S. and allied intelligence had estimated. Time does not appear to be on the side of nonproliferation.

Furthermore, there is growing evidence ø the latest unconfirmed Pakistan reports its scientific community ÒleakedÓ technology to Iran and a ÒswapÓ of IslamabadÕs nuclear technology for PyongyangÕs missiles and technology ø that there is, indeed, a network of rogue collaboration. How far are we from ÒleaksÓ to non-state terrorists?

All of this is relevant to U.S. efforts, with its allies Japan and South Korea, and the Chinese and the Russians, to disarm North Korea.

But Beijing [and South Korea] oppose going to the U.N. for possible sanctions against Pyongyang. China not only is the main prop for the bankrupt North Korean economy but has been a collaborator in PyongyangÕs missile sales. China publicly opposes the PSI.

The recent Òfeel goodÓ Washington visit of Prime Minister Wen Jinabao ø including the public spanking for Taiwan Pres. Chen Shui-bian for aggravating the Taipei-Beijing argument ø and Secretary of State Colin L. PowellÕs call that U.S.-China relations have never been better has reinforced conventional wisdom Beijing, too, wants North KoreaÕs WMD disarmed.

But are Beijing and Washington studying the same lessons from the same WMD primer?