Sol Sanders Archive

Granted that in a failing globalized world economy, saddled with a corrupt United Nations secretariat responding largely to the worldÕs most incompetent and corrupt regimes, and the ominous threatening cloud of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, managing to keep the foreign policy of a U.S. with so many conflicting domestic interests is more than a task for Solomon.

The ObamaitesÕ mantra is that the Bush Administration, by emphasizing the use of force, abandoned ÒdiplomacyÓ. Atlas did not move the world with a lever but with sweet talk. The corollary is that the U.S. has lost its ÒshineÓ by taking unilateral action to the consternation of gallant allies. Historians many years hence will be arguing the merits of these charges. But there may be a little immediate correction for some of these advocates of ÒdiplomacyÓ at the upcoming summits in Europe, where, whatever else is in abundance, European support for the common chores in ameliorating the world economic problem and the problem of mutual defense [as in Afghanistan] will not be in full abundance. And that is with or without ObamaÕs rock star appeal to cheering crowds.

But ObamaÕs claque, sometimes dragging his professional foreign policy advisors along against what should be their better judgment, believes in something called magically ÒdiplomacyÓ. The axiom seems to be if Washington talks to enough people enough of the time enough of the problems of the world will be solved.

ThatÕs why it was somewhat reassuring to hear Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates ø although himself falling for the trifurcation of ÒdiplomacyÓ, economic warfare, and military forced ø tell a television interviewer that ÒdiplomacyÓ would not curb the maniacal ambitions of the North Korean regime. He gently acknowledged that the so-called Six Power Talks had produced nothing. So much for ÒdiplomacyÓ. Force? He corrected himself and his interlocutor in that the U.S. could do nothing to halt a test of an ICBM missile by Pyongyang; he emphasized that the U.S. was not prepared to do anything. No one seems to remember that even President Bill ClintonÕs Secretary of Defense William Perry had proposed bombing an aggressive weapon of this sort on its North Korean launching pad. But only the Israelis do something like that [when they finally get WashingtonÕs permission] in their national interest.

Still, GatesÕ important contribution to the debate over what to do about North Korea [and he threw in Iran] is to hit them where they are most vulnerable. That is to screw down the sanctions which earlier brought the North Koreans back to the negotiating table ø in a productive if momentary interlude ø with concessions. Of course, they welched on those as they have on every other international commitment the regime has ever made.

The sanctions worked, however, while they were briefly in place, because it must be remembered that if Washington is of a mind, it can use the powerful clout of doing business with the U.S. and American companies for third parties who might want to outflank them. While bilateral sanctions on Iran have had their effect, one of the reasons they have not been more effective is that they have not been applied, for the most part, to third party offenders, for example, the German banks and companies which have kept TehranÕs economy going with highly leverage lending [now a scalded chicken coming home to roost].

But it was that great exponent of ÒdiplomacyÓ, Special Negotiator Christopher Hill, who pulled the plug when Pyongyang began to squeal, offering up the U.S.Õ own concessions including quickly removing the sanctions and removing the pariah regime from the international terroristsÕ list which by law requires certain other actions by the U.S. government. That he should be rewarded for total failure of the Six Party negotiations with appointment to Iraq speaks loudly of the new robust State Department which was to come into being with Secretary Hillary Clinton.

The question is, of course, is anyone listening at 1600 Pennsylvania and is Gates ø the only holdover from the Bush Administration ø long for this world of incredibly complicated turf entanglements that the Obama Administration has already created in its first weeks in office.

Of course, there is the argument ø well taken ø that China is not likely for the same reasons as during the whole course of these multilateral negotiations to end its flow of food and other necessities that keeps a near-starving North Korea afloat. Even though the worldwide recession has begun to torpedo the illusion that China would somehow avoid its worst consequences, Beijing probably would come to North KoreaÕs aid.

It is then that we get to the nitty gritty. The U.S. Treasury in the waning days of the Bush Administration had finally got down to forging an expert and highly professional sanctions team. That team not only sanctioned the various fronts of the North Koreans but threatened Hong Kong and Chinese banks which would play their game. The warning was clear and understood and caused great distress in Pyongyong. North KoreaÕs total dependence on China is something that North KoreaÕs brutal Mao imitation, Kim Jong Il, does not want. The small but tactically important sources of income beyond BeijingÕs control are critical. ThatÕs why he reacted to the American sanctions regime and why he would again.

Already some of the most important members of this non-political Treasury group have apparently been dispatched in the usual landrush for appointments that accompanies a new administration. Hopefully, it is not an indication that Obama is giving in to those advocates ø many of them outside the official confines of the Administration but apparently influentialø who have already disassembled, at least in part, sanctions against Syria even before Damascus had made more than the perfunctory statements it wanted to talk compromise over a host of issues not excluding aid to anti-American forces killing Americans in Iraq, murder of leading Lebanese politicians, support for Hizbollah and Hamas, permitting Damascus to be the terrorist headquarters capital of the world, etc., etc..

In the midst at the moment of sorting out so many economic problems, it may be asking too much that the Obama team turn its hand to reimposing the kinds of economic prohibitions on North Korea ø many of them sanctioned in law but not enforced in an atmosphere of ÒdiplomacyÓ. It would have the support of Japan whose imposition of restraints ø with so many difficult political ties to domestic Japanese politicians and the Korean ethnic constituency ø has been exceedingly effective. And for the first time in a decade, Washington has a government in Seoul which wants to deal with its North Korean brothers with all fairness but demands that each concession in terms of food and other aid be met with reciprocity.

It is revealing that in the extensive coverage of the current North Korean crisis, few if any of the TV talking heads have acknowledged the special aspects of this crisis which relate to Japan. Remembering that a perhaps wayward ø their guidance systems seem much to be desired ø that a North Korean missile overflew Japan into the Pacific in 1989. Tokyo has not forgotten. It has speeded Japanese sentiment and movement toward heightened integration in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty and particularly its collaboration in the development of anti-missile defense. There can be little doubt there are misgivings in Japan, listening to the complaints of Polish and Czech politicians who committed their governments to deployment of an anti-missile shield in Europe, that the Obama Administration is wavering on antimissile defense in its attempt to ÒresetÓ ÒdiplomacyÓ with Moscow. Were these divergences to grow, North Korea could well set off a heightened arms race in Asia with Japan ÒforcedÓ toward nuclear weapons.

Somehow the idea of a cruel dictatorship willing to see literally millions of its own people die of starvation in order to siphon off resources for weapons of mass destruction is more apparent if you are separated only by a relatively small sea. ThatÕs why the flaunting of international opinion and demonstration of power by North Korea with a missile flight ø if it comes ø may produce more reaction in Tokyo than in Washington. That such a missile might one day be able to carry a nuclear weapon, and already may have the capacity to reach Hawaii and Alaska, is not yet a wakeup call in Washington.

It should be. And Gates has the appropriate remedy for the moment: slap on the sanctions, and sanctions on those who deal with North Korea.