Charles Freeman, 'localitis' and the U.S. foreign service
Monday, March 16, 2009 E-Mail this story Free Headline Alerts
Sol Sanders also writes the "Asia Investor" column weekly for EAST-ASIA-INTEL.com.
One of the more curious aspects of the recent Washington flap over the proposed appointment of Charles W. ÒChasÓ Freeman, Jr., to an important advisory role in the intelligence hierarchy was a widely quoted comment from former Sec. of State, Secretary of Treasury, White House chief of staff, and general Establishment factotum, James. A. Baker.
Baker is alleged to have said Ñ and so far there has been no public refutation Ñ that when Freeman was ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Baker a Washington chief, Freeman suffered from ÒlocalitisÓ. Localitis is Inside-the-Beltway jargon for a tendency, particularly for someone in the diplomatic corps, who begins to advance more the arguments of the country in which he is posted than in the perceived interests of his own country; in effect, as Baker was quoted, he becomes a representative to Washington of the host government rather than an apostle of the U.S. It takes no long argument to present the case for an American representative abroad, however ÒunderstandingÓ of even an allyÕs issues and views, holding U.S. self-interest as his cardinal test for the relationship.
Since Baker is regarded, in many circles, not the least those friends to Israel, as often very sympathetic to the ArabsÕ Ñ and particularly the SaudisÕ Ñ point of view, that really frames the Freeman case in a new light. It also makes even more telling an unexplained criticism of the whole affair: how did such a controversial and, in the end, obviously inappropriate nomination get made in the first place? And, parallel to that, why is the ÒvettingÓ process of the Obama Administration so poor, even compared with the long series of such debacles that plagued the Bush and previous administrations?
BakerÕs reference is crucial. In a representative democracy such as that of the United States, the problem of localitis is a major one. For, in fact, it is one that dogs all appointments in government, particularly the executive, whether they be domestic or overseas. Ultimately the arguments lead back to the basic question of how representative government should function.
The theories surrounding public service enshrined in the American experience are almost endless. But clearly The Founders wanted a citizen-officialdom, especially the Jeffersonians. In the slow moving society of the late 18th century, for example, they thought legislators could be part-time officials, short time servers who would eventually go back to their own professions and business and on which they would draw for their legislative wisdom. Executives would be chosen from the general public as well. Having so recently suffered from British officials, particularly judges, who had career appointments, the ideal was to be that an ordinary citizen would bring the balance of his private experience and common sense to the office he was elected or appointed to serve.
But in the 21st century with its rapidly increasing specialization, the problem of finding someone who has sufficient expertise to understand and fulfill a government positionÕs functions and yet can maintain his independence and neutrality in those duties is increasingly complicated. Were it not self evident, the current continuing difficulty of finding senior figures for President ObamaÕs Treasury who know enough of the financial world to wend through the technicalities of the economic crisis, yet have no direct continuing connections or loyalties to the companies and individuals involved, is becoming classic. One after the other of the intended appointees have dropped by the wayside for whatever reason.
In diplomacy and international intelligence, it is even more pronounced. Years ago I wrote on the problem of American representation in countries with large populations and difficult problems which were certain at some future time to become crisis locales. I took Bangladesh and the then 100 million Bengalis, and the problems they posed for the State Department recruitment and training, as an example. It comes to mind because we appear to be building toward a growing crisis there even though it is squeezed off the front pages by other more immediate concerns.
Most young Americans would not choose to spend years away from their homes, often in countries surrounded by considerable poverty and misery, learning a foreign language and the local customs and way of thinking. Finding high caliber candidates who would stick with the long years required to become a senior official with its rewards [in personal satisfaction as much as monetary compensation] would weed many out. At a critical crisis moment, then, would such an individual be available in the Foreign Service or in the business community to lend the expertise necessary for dealing with the crisis. And if so, would he be a balanced judge of American interest without ÒlocalitisÓ?
There is the argument, and it is often made, that what is really required is a mind with judgment/experience who can command the intellectual heights in any crisis and make decisions in a firm and logical manner. There is an old egotistical French saying, ÒPut me down anywhere, any time, and I can ÒdefogÓ myselfÓ. That argument reached a new and dominant position in the John F. Kennedy Administration when academics with just such claims to decision-making were recruited by the dozens for Washington. The tragic end of the Kennedy years probably makes any evaluation of that whole hypothesis less than complete. But some of us would argue that despite JFKÕs continuing popularity and hallowed role in contemporary history, the concept then proved a disaster.
As it concerns overseas extensions of U.S. power, one could argue the problem is somewhat less than it once was. Most foreign capitals, even in the Third World, offer Ñ for the privileged few at least Ñ creature comforts not that far from those back home in America. Instant communications with the farflung diplomatic posts [for better or for worse], the rapid air travel, the constant arrival and departure of visitors [sometimes of the most high VIPs], and the growing global community of multinational company executives, aid agencies, the proliferation of NGOs pursuing goals of every description, have to some extent transformed the problem. There is, in fact, a growing cohort of Americans with internationalist credentials earned by living and working abroad.
Yet, it is apparent that in our present engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. is paying a price for not having an adequately large cadre of trained linguists and regional experts. Regional studies which became so popular in the immediate post-World War II era have largely been abandoned in the universities [along alas! with the required study of history!] And that means that ultimately Washington is working with those few Americans who are expert and with foreign nationals who may or may not have common goals as part and parcel of the problem
In the new expansion of interest in the world beyond our shores which has been brought on by globalization of the world economy Ñ not likely for all the small current retreats to not go proceed even further with an economic upturn Ñ the need is greater than ever. But as the Freeman case shows, is the intimacy of working for a foreign government Ñ or receiving its bounty through support of think tanks and legitimate lobbying operations Ñ or companies and the expertise it provides, enough of a counterweight to the almost inevitable degree of localitis it also bestows?
Caution and logic quickly indicate that there is never going to be any absolute, unbreakable rules to solve the problem. As in so many things, judgment, veracity, and integrity Ñ and not the least intelligence Ñ are often, as beauty, in the eyes of the beholder. Should a former ambassador be the principal lobbyist for a transfer of nuclear technology, breaking an important decades-long concept of anti-proliferation, and then become a paid agent of that government? ItÕs happened. As in FreemanÕs case, should a paid association with a government-owned company, be considered employment for a foreign government. Should there be a loophole as big as permitting legal counsel for a foreign government not to register as a foreign agent because of the exclusion of lawyers from the law? And to what extent, after examining these relationships, should the views and opinions of the candidate be taken into consideration weighed against these other factors? It was there, rather than in the associations themselves, that often intemperate remarks [or were they really his judgments?] about China and IsraelÕs relations to the U.S. where the Freeman candidacy sank.
The fact that Freeman was an alumnus of a career service Ñ the Foreign Service of the United States Ñ makes this episode all the more poignant. The long and difficult route to career ambassador which he transited should have if nothing else left him with the professional ethics and a relatively comfortable livelihood to avoid localitis. If, indeed, it did not, it is again only one more evidence that there are no hard and fast rules in this as in so many other aspects of life, and that it will remain a continuing problem.