It’s a frightening new world we’re
talking about, and it’s hoped that the
PSI remains an umbrella that’s good
for exercises and sharing of information
– and little else. But make no mistake:
the PSI may come to have far
greater significance as North Korea
was first to recognise in frequent
statements that South Korea’s decision
to join the PSI is “an act of war”.
North Korean rhetoric may be sabrerattling,
as the White House says, but
the real test will come if and when PSI
members actually stop a vessel or
force a plane to land, whether from
North Korea or some other nation
suspected of selling or buying nuclear
components and missiles.
That day may come in the near
future, and not just because of North
Korea’s shrill outbursts against South
Korea. The problem goes much further,
to the horrifying prospect of terrorist
organizations more determined
than North Korea to destroy
their enemies and less inhibited by
the niceties of international diplomacy.
The struggle for Afghanistan, the
Swat Valley and the security of Pakistan
come at once to mind.
Quite soon, Obama and other
world leaders may have to move beyond
paying lip service to the PSI and
get to the point of what it is all about:
blockading shipments of nuclear
weapons. The risks, though, are so
enormous that it’s hard to blame
them for hesitating in the face of
warnings from North Korea and
those with whom North Korean leaders
would love to do business.
The consequences of such an escalation,
however, go beyond stopping
terrorists and rogue nations
from nuclear proliferation. They also
portend a nuclear arms race in which
PSI core members vie to produce
their own means of annihilating their
enemies. Japan ranks as an enthusiastic
member of the PSI; so far, it is
not believed to have developed nuclear
warheads, but no one doubts
that it has the basic know-how and
would welcome the chance to use
that knowledge.
A nuclear arms race in Asia would
pit the U.S., Japan and possibly Taiwan
against the mainland, a nuclear
power that is not a member of the
PSI. Optimistically, it’s possible to
imagine Beijing agreeing that cooperation
against proliferation is a
fine idea. Pessimistically, Beijing
might well view Japan and Taiwan as
enemies against which it would need
to build its defenses in league with
North Korea. In such a scenario,
South Korea would be dangerously
exposed, regardless of its alliance
with the U.S., and a second Korean
war would be easy to imagine.
It’s also possible that the two
Koreas will go on confronting one another
as diplomats scurry about looking
for solutions. Still, the PSI raises
scary issues that Obama, like
Bush, has learned he cannot avoid.
