The Joint Research Center's simulation was based on the assumption that
Iran's centrifuges were fully operating. Under such a scenario, Iran would
produce 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, sufficient for a nuclear
warhead, by the end of 2008.
In another scenario, Iran's centrifuge fleet was assessed to have
reached 25
percent operational capability. Under this model, Iran would produce
sufficient HEU for a weapon by the end of 2010.
The center also conducted simulations of Iranian centrifuge cascades.
Another scenario was that Iran would operate the improved IR-2 carbon-fiber
centrifuge, said to be 2.5 times more effective than the Pakistan-origin
P-1 aluminum centrifuge.
JRC director-general Roland Schenkel called on the EU to reevaluate its
assessments of Iran's nuclear program. Schenkel told the American
Association for the Advancement of Science in Boston in mid-February that
the International Atomic Energy Agency must bolster its capabilities to
determine secret nuclear weapons programs.
"The IAEA needs a real weapons control program," Schenkel told the
German weekly Der Spiegel. "As it stands now, the IAEA must focus solely on
fissile material and on nuclear facilities. The goal should be checks in the
service of non-proliferation. The checks need to have more bite."
