Officials said the greatest success of the Iraq Army has been its rapid
growth. They said nine out of 10 army division headquarters and 31 of 36
brigade headquarters have been established. In all, 95 out of 112 battalions
were granted security responsibilities.
The report was based on visits by House members and staffers to
Iraq as well as testimony from consultants. Anthony Cordesman, senior fellow
at the Center for Strategic and International Relations, has maintained that
Pentagon data on Iraqi security forces was highly exaggerated and
misleading.
Entitled "The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security
Forces," the report, released on June 27, marked the most comprehensive
effort by Congress to examine the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.
The investigation determined that four years of U.S. efforts to organize,
train and equip Iraq's military and police forces have "yielded mixed
results."
"The Iraqi NCO [non-commissioned officer] corps is growing, but there is
a shortage of NCOs in the training establishment because every soldier is
needed at the front — this has a detrimental effect on the security force's
ability to sustain improvements in training and development," the report
said.
The congressional study, in a conclusion similar to the quarterly
reports issued by the Defense Department, found lack of uniformity within
the Iraqi security forces. The House investigation determined that some
military units were capable of independent operations. Most of the units,
particularly those in the Iraqi police,
remained ineffective.
"Despite coalition efforts, many IAF [Iraqi armed forces] units still
lack the equipment
needed for a counterinsurgency mission," the report said. "Though the IAF
and U.S. forces in Iraq are roughly the same size, there is a great
disparity in the amount and types of their equipment. For example, the U.S.
force has more than 20,000 armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicles but the IAF have only 2,647 and their current goal is only 3,609."
In testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 27,
Cordesman reviewed the current U.S.-Iraqi counter-insurgency campaign in
Baghdad and the surrounding region. Cordesman praised the combat ability of
U.S. forces, but said this has resulted in tactical victories rather than
strategic change.
"Limited tactical successes really doesn't matter unless such casualties
include substantial cadres of leaders and experts that cannot be easily and
rapidly replaced," Cordesman said. "The insurgents can simply disperse,
stand down, and regroup."
Cordesman said the Iraq Army must take over operations without U.S.
participation and support. He said Iraqi police and security forces —
hampered by corruption and equipment shortages — must also be capable of
holding areas cleared of Al Qaida and other insurgents.
"Iraqi army forces must begin to take over meaning operations without
U.S. embeds and U.S. partner units, and dependence on U.S. reinforcement and
support," Cordesman said. "There does seem to be increasing Iraqi army
capability here, but coalition reporting does not provide a meaningful
picture of progress — merely grossly inflated figures on areas of
responsibility and total numbers of battalions in the lead."
The House report agreed. The subcommittee's investigation determined
that the Pentagon was withholding information from Congress, particularly
regarding progress of the Iraqi security forces and a current plan to make
them self-sufficient.
"The Iraqi Armed Forces have seen a dramatic increase in size since
their inception and have shown some improvement in operational effectiveness
since the nadir of Faluja in April 2004," the report said. "However, it is
difficult to assess the competence of the IAF as a result of imprecise and
unclear reporting by the Department of Defense."
