The unexpectedly large tote of Hezbullah missiles and rockets can only be another warning of the depth of the North Korean problem. Apparently most were Iranian and Syrian, if Chinese and Russian knockoffs, and some recent Russian deliveries to Syria of a very effective anti-tank missile. But eventually confirmation is likely some were either North Korean manufacture or design.
The whole Lebanon scene is confirmation for Western strategists’ worst fears: the increasingly hi-tech arming of non-state terrorists. Despite China’s violations of its obligations. against missile proliferation, the threat of missiles and eventually nuclear and chemical and biological weapons reaching terrorists from Pyongyang becomes even more real.
Washington’s concern festers despite considerable diplomatic activity – including a U.N. resolution condemning North Korea’s missile launches. Nor is there much reassurance because North Korea’s longer-range missile — which might have a range to hit the U.S. – shed on the launching pad and imploded a few minutes on track. There is general agreement North Korean missiles, already reaching Mideast customers such as Iran, are increasingly sophisticated.
As this is written, the wily and eccentric Kim Il Jong may be in Beijing or enroute in his luxury train [he doesn’t fly, thank you.] Optimists, and they bloom among our China scholars, hope it is a visit to the emperor for a dressing down. Again there are optimistic reports Beijing is tightening the screws on North Korea’s supply of energy and, perhaps, food, since it is again on the verge of famine. Their intention, it is hoped, is to bring young Kim to heel to abandon plans for testing his nukes – the latest threat in his bombastic responses to entreaties from all his neighbors and the U.S..
Whether, indeed, the Chinese are prepared to force Kim to settle for a package of goodies to halt his weapons program remains to be seen. They may not, as is so often argued in Washington, want a nuclear-clad North Korea on their doorstep, inviting a formidable escalation of an already growing arms race in northeast Asia including the possibility of a nuclear Japan. But equally obvious is their fear of an implosion of Kim’s regime with unknown consequences. Besides, some Chinese military close to Pyongyang may see it as not be a bad thing to keep both the U.S. and Japan occupied with a troubling little ally.
Atmospherics do seem to have changed in Beijing. The obvious possibility sugar rather than the stick might be a better strategy with both Japan and Taiwan seems to have won out in the politburo. Beijing is courting the Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang Party for all it is worth, at a time when President Chen Shui-bian is a lameduck with family scandals.
Toward Japan, Beijing has begun serious negotiations on disputed gas in the East China Sea. Beijing has turned down the flame under its highly organized campaign on outgoing Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine to Japan’s war dead. Finally, Beijing has noticed the polls show whatever Japanese opposition there is, Chinese interference is not appreciated. They may have noticed, too, polls are showing young people are taking a nationalist line.
Meanwhile, the Japanese have made concessions on continuing concessional aid, now totaling $30 billion over two decades. Japanese companies, some of whom joined the criticism of Yasukuni visits, are continuing to invest in China [although at a falling rate after the semi-official 2005 anti-Japanese riots]. Tokyo’s trade surplus with Beijing is dwindling, appreciated by mercantilists in the Forbidden City who see huge American surpluses only covering their growing imports of components and raw materials – and high priced oil.
Beijing has an “out” as well. They had leaked far and wide hopes with Kozimui’s imminent departure, a new era would begin. It’s a good alibi for a failed policy. The all but anointed successor, the youngest prime minister in postwar Japan, Koizumi’s cabinet secretary, Shinzo Abe, shows no signs of moderating Kozimuii’s foreign policy line. In fact, Abe owes his rise to his thumping the issue of the North Korean kidnappings of Japanese citizens. It was he, who publicly suggested when Kim let some of them out of the box, they not return to Pyongyang’s sequestration. Probably no political postwar issue has excited more genuine emotion from the public.
Japanese rearmament continues apace – with or without the i’s dotted and the t’s crossed in amending the MacArthur Constitution which demanded permanent non-negotiable pacifism. Again, it was China’s Little Brother’s 1998 unannounced missile flight over Japan which sealed the fate of that issue. Incremental Japanese contributions to Washington’s anti-missile defense strategy are going as fast [or faster] than the U.S. effort itself. [Tokyo just launched its sixth Aegis destroyer, part of a more than a 50 percent rise in its missile defense budget for the fiscal year to March 2008.]
However deep Kim’s kowtow to President Hu Jintao, it seems unlikely fundamentals of the Chinese-Japanese relationship would change dramatically under Abe. Only a complete overhaul of North Korean policy with China self-evidently pushing it would change the current pattern of economic collaboration but growing distrust between Asia’s two giants and old enemies.
Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@cox.net),
is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent
for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.
He writes weekly for World Tribune.com and East-Asia-Intel.com.
