Iran's neighbors, of course, have everything to lose if the current regime is nuclear-clad. The tiny rich Gulf oil states would have to cut their cloth to measure as they did in former Persian imperial times. The Saudi family, with its own rebellious Sh'ia minority, would face an even greater challenge. Israel would face annihilation. Turkey would face dismemberment by Iranian support of Kurdish nationalists. India [and "brotherly" Moslem Pakistan], whose economic future depends on access to Iranian oil and gas, would lose bargaining position. Any hope the U.S. has for leaving behind a democratic, pro-American Iraq as a Mideast wedge for modernization goes out the window.

But the regional stakes, however important, is only one consideration for the major powers. High oil prices have given the Kremlin delusions of grandeur. President Vladimir Putin's dreams of glory may lie in the outcome of the Iran crisis. That bid for renewed superpower status — encumbered as it is by an accelerating demographic catastrophe, a stalled armed forces modernization, unresolved internal political problems, not excluding Chechnya and the huge Moslem minority — has been built on manipulating its role as the world's number two oil exporter. What happens to Iran's oil — as well as its markets for nuclear technology and arms — is crucial to Putin's dreams.

The Chinese, too, have an equally high stake. They look to Iran as a future source to feed their growing energy deficit. But they would not like to see Iran [as many in the oil industry have suggested is "natural"] as the route to market for Central Asian oil and gas. The Chinese play against Russian efforts to reassert hegemony in those former Soviet areas. At the same time, Washington's not unsuccessful efforts to reroute Caspian oil and gas around existing Russian pipelines, also plays against the Chinese. Vice President Richard Cheney was in Kazakhstan in early May to reinforce the $12 billion American bet on its oil and gas by continuing to urge its dictator to use the Caspian producers' American-backed route to Turkey and world markets as it doubles production. Beijing has managed to line up overland direct access to Kazakh gas and oil, transit of Russian oil, and even bought into local oil production Not least in Beijing considerations is its watchful eye on Islamic fundamentalism, a possible ally of the long simmering Uighur revolt in its westernmost Singkiang province.

There may be an even more important stake in the UN maneuvering. The British, the Germans [playing a lesser subsidiary role as Iran's principal supplier], and the French [who seem curiously steadfast] are in and out on any major formal UN action. But it is Russia and China who with their Security Council veto could halt any stamp of approval for action. An economic blockade, for example, with Iran heavily dependent on imported refined gasoline and food, could bring its faltering economy to its knees, increase internal tensions, and force concessions by the mullahs. The U.S. unilateral long-time embargo and untested threats to those who invest there has had its impact despite continued commerce by our allies.

Both Moscow and Beijing have announced their opposition to economic weaponry — with even more loud denunciations of any threat of force. The Russians have tried — as suppliers of nuclear technology to Iran — to worm their way out of a difficult position, proposing a "solution" [which Tehran has refused] of processing nuclear fuel in Russia in order to prohibit weapons grade uranium being produced under that subterfuge inside Iran. The Chinese have kept their heads down.

But in the larger arena, Beijing and Moscow have tried to form the nucleus of an anti-US multi-polar alliance. It's been reinforced with Russia's highly profitable arms and oil sales to China. The two have even held minor joint military exercises. They theoretically cooperate in the so-called Shanghai group with some Central Asian states against Islamic terrorism. And, despite the old sores [and Beijing's alliance with Pakistan] they occasionally try to bring India along for the ride.

What happens at the UN — whether Moscow blinks or Beijing ducks — could be a test of that long-term Russian-Chinese effort to build a worldwide anti-American association.

Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@cox.net), is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International. He writes weekly for World Tribune.com and East-Asia-Intel.com.