A leading Western think tank has played down a U.S.
program to seize shipments of weapons of mass destruction.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was instituted by the Bush administration and promoted by
Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who has been nominated as U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations. The program has called on U.S. allies to track and interdict
suspected WMD shipments.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace asserted that PSI would not significantly reduce
nonconventional weapons proliferation, Middle East Newsline reported. In a study by Joseph Cirincione and
Joshua Williams, the Washington-based institute said the U.S.-led program,
although playing a role in Libya, has failed to stop nuclear programs in
Iran and North Korea.
"Though it did play a minor role, complementing years of negotiations,
in ending the Libyan nuclear and chemical weapons programs, it has had no
impact on North Korea, Iran, or the threat of terrorist acquisition of
nuclear materials," the report said. "Most importantly, it is not a
replacement for negotiated agreements and international law."
The report was released on the eve of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review, scheduled to begin on Monday in New York and attended by more
than 180 countries. The United States, in a warning of the nuclear programs
of Iran and North Korea, was expected to press for tougher regulations that
would reduce proliferation as well as the prospect that a civilian nuclear
program could be converted into a weapons project.
"PSI provides needed cooperation for interdicting the illegal transfers
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons-related technology," the
report, entitled "Putting PSI into Perspective," said. "It is particularly
useful for stopping large, observable shipments, such as a boatload of
centrifuges, but does little to catch small but deadly transfers, like a
suitcase of plutonium. It is restricted, moreover, by its limited geographic
reach and legal scope."
The administration said PSI has been supported by more than 60
countries. Eighteen countries have been designated "core participants" and
pledged to halt shipments of materials related to nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons on ships or airplanes in their territorial
waters or air space.
But Carnegie said that under PSI the only ships that could be stopped
would be from the 18 core participants or Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and
Panama, which have reached bilateral shipboarding agreements with the United
States. These agreements enable the United States to board any ship sailing
under the flags of Liberia, the Marshall Islands or Panama, even in
international waters.
"Consider the possibility, for example, that a clandestine nuclear
network chose to ship centrifuge components from Malaysia to Dubai to Iran
on a ship flying under a Colombian flag," the analysis said. "Since none of
these states are 'core participants' in PSI and since none of them have
signed shipboarding agreements with the United States, the initiative could
not legally stop the shipment even if we knew about it."
Carnegie advised that PSI be regarded as a "final line of defense" to
stop WMD. The institute said PSI must be teamed with a strengthened NPT and
export control agreements to halt WMD proliferators.
