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A SENSE OF ASIA

Brinksmanship with a ticking clock: The case for waiting out the Korean crisis


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By Sol Sanders
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

Sol W. Sanders

May 18, 2005

There is little disguising the fact Washington has reached an impasse in the effort to remove the threat of a rogue state in North Korea armed with weapons of mass destruction.

That strategy depended upon the cooperation of Pyongyang’s neighbors. They had a common interest, or so it seemed, in preventing that development. Keeping the Korean peninsular nuclear-free was also important in keeping the neighbors, Japan and Taiwan, from also going to nukes.

But for the moment, at least, that strategy has failed for lack of collaboration from the interested parties — South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia — with the U.S.

Despite the conflicting claims of North Korean propaganda and leaks from U.S. and South Korean intelligence, it does appear clear Pyongyang is proceeding to develop nuclear weapons. It may well be on its way to miniaturizing them for missile warheads. Pyongyang has proved competence in developing missiles, having sold them and their technology to other states.

That raises the possibility of an effective weapon capable of striking South Korea, Japan and American military installations in the Pacific. But it also suggests the possibility Pyongyang could threaten the American homeland in Hawaii and Alaska, and perhaps the U.S. Mainland itself.

Pyongyang’s regime armed with these weapons is worry enough. It could use such weaponry for blackmail to maintain its typically distorted Communist economy, capable of such weapons but also starving its people. Washington must also consider the possibility Pyongyang would [and in fact, might have to do so to maintain its precarious economy] sell weaponry to other outlaws.

There is no denying the depth of the crisis. In some measure, if only because Washington has seemingly more reliable partners in that other parallel crisis, that is, the Western Big Three, the Korean crisis dwarfs the growing threat of a similar proliferation breakthough by Iran. There, at least, not only Israel but increasingly America’s European allies realize they could come under Iranian menace. However ineffectual their efforts to restrain Iran have so far been, they are increasingly brought to the realization of the threat.

But in East Asia, China, despite continuing wishful reassurances from American spokesmen, has rejected Washington entreaties to threaten to withdraw North Korea’s overwhelming reliance on China as a provider. Beijing’s lack of transparency and speculation based on its long history of close relations with Pyongyang suggest there is conflict within the leadership. That such disagreements can get out of hand leading to contradictory policy has recently been demonstrated in the anti-Japanese campaign.

South Korea is equally schizoid about its ultimate dependence on its military alliance with the U.S. Because its domestic economy is stagnating, it is now heavily dependent on exports, particularly to China.

Seoul’s present venturesome leadership has said it hopes to use Beijing’s rise as a world power to achieve a position of “balance” in the region, always cognizant of its bitter colonial history under Japan and its continuing dependence on Japanese economic relationships.

Out of this comes Seoul’s strategy to buy off North Korea. Some Koreans go so far as to say — looking at the troubled incorporation of a bankrupted East Germany — Pyongyang with nuclear arms are less a threat to South Korean security than a sudden implosion. Through aid and trade, the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration believes North Korean can be defanged, were it not for the U.S.’hostile attitude. ignoring the regime’s long history of attacks on South Korea and violation of international agreements.

Thus Washington is blocked from pursuing the only non-military option: an economic blockade. And a military “solution” is limited by America’s existing worldwide military deployment as well as the havoc Pyongyang could wreak on Seoul within artillery range of the border.

Democrat critics of the Bush strategy, including those who authored the failed 1997 effort to negotiate a compromise with North Korea, have attacked the Administration. But they offer no real alternatives. In their most recent pronouncement, they have rejected — as has the Bush Administration — direct bilateral negotiations as an alternative to what is in reality a two-track negotiation in which the U.S. does talk directly to the North Koreans but drags the other interested parties along in parallel. This public carping only contributes to North Korea’s rather effective propaganda, makes liaison with the negotiating partners more difficult, and perhaps confuses the North Koreans about American intentions.

Even with this ticking bomb, Washington may have no option but to wait it out. Unforseen events are the essence of international scenarios. In recent by-elections Roh’s supporters lost their majority in parliament. China’s economy is overheated, perhaps headed for a hard landing. Beijing’s recent missteps on Taiwan, Japan, and the EU arms embargo all hint at future incompetent decision-making. This may be a moment when “patience and tenacity of purpose are worth more than twice their weight of cleverness”.

Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@comcast.net), is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International. He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.

May 18, 2005

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