Decision time for China's leaders

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

Whatever the merit of Bush AdministrationÕs reversal of North Korea strategy, the immediate effect is to put the ball into ChinaÕs court. Washington gave up its demands for a CVID [complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement] commitment from Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons program. It was based on the failure of the unenforceable Clinton Administration line after the mid-90s crisis. It was also based on the the Kim regimeÕs notoriety as a pariah ø a government living off selling missiles and probably nuclear weapons technology, a regime inducing famine by diverting resources to one of the worldÕs bloated military machines, a society of domestic barbarism.

But the Bush AdministrationÕs efforts to achieve a consensus among North KoreaÕs neighbors failed. South Korea, with a new amateurish government, believes reconciliation with the North can be bought.

Japan, in an effort to assuage an exercised public rarely seized of foreign policy issues, is purchasing return of its kidnapped citizens. Russia, at the very moment it was wargaming the possibility of a Far East minorityÕs insurrection [Korean? Chinese?], charges U.S. attitudes inhibit settlement.

It is China, however, which plays the principle role in any effort to rein in North Korea. Though BeijingÕs calls for Pyongyang to follow Òthe Chinese modelÓ toward economic liberalization have been rejected, China remains the pariah regimeÕs lifeline. Chinese food and fuel keeps the bankrupt North Korean economy from collapsing. Furthermore, there is evidence ø movement of PyongyangÕs missile exports through Chinese airspace and longtime technological interchange ø China plays a role in the North Korean weapons development.

The U.S. has now proffered the North Koreans three months to begin to disassemble its nuclear weapons. That begun, South Korea and Japan would come forward with oil to solve PyongyangÕs number one economic problem, energy. A calibrated effort would go forward on eliminating nuclear weapons which the North Koreans say they undertook against an implied U.S threat. The North Korean demand for a non-aggression pledge from the U.S. is apparently part of the deal. Pyongyang may wangle even more concessions through the pressure of the other negotiating partners.

The Bush Administration is taking a great risk. American intelligence appears conflicted about the extent of North KoreaÕs two nuclear weapons programs. [Missiles just tested have the U.S. in range.]

Conflicting statements ø not only by PyongyangÕs propagandists but by the Chinese ø variously describe North Korean weapons progress. But given past performance, there is no reason ø as has been the Bush AdministrationÕs view ø to accept North Korean bonafides. Theoretically, the program would be subject to cancellation if it were violated.

Yet the reason for WashingtonÕs about face is not hard to discern. The U.S. military option which might have pressured North Korea is diminished by the continuing American commitment in Iraq [accompanied by the dissidence among its major NATO allies, save Britain.]. South Korea ø who received a bitter lesson about what the Iraq conflict is all about when one of its innocent civilians was beheaded ø appears determined despite public opposition to send a sizeable force to Iraq as part of its parallel alliance with the U.S. in East Asia. But South Korean President RohÕs advisers see the threat of implosion in the North a greater threat than its development of nuclear weapons.

All that virtually nullifies any use by the U.S. of the military option. Furthermore, the AdministrationÕs position was undercut by Democrat Presidential Candidate Kerry publicly denouncing the CVID strategy and calling for bilateral negotiations.

The Bush AdministrationÕs gamble, that is, hope against history, Pyongyang would enter into serious negotiation under the new formula is almost totally dependent on China. Only Chinese pressure on Pyongyang can force the acceptance of the compromise and assure its efficacy.

It could not be a more critical time for decision-making in Beijing. The triumpherate which now governs ø President Hu, Prime Minister Wen, and Chairman of the Central Military Commissions and ex-President Jiang ø are not noted for audacity, nor for that matter for decision-making at all.

Jiang fell into the leadership chair as a stopgap appointee of former Paramount Leader Deng after the political disaster of the Tien An Mien massacre. Consolidation of his power took place as Deng strayed into dotage. Hu rose to the highest Party ranks by avoiding taking positions , and now tours the world after years of total isolation. Wen, likewise, is a heads-down Party hack.

Nor is it a good time for the Chinese to make difficult decisions. ChinaÕs economy is slowing, heading toward crisis. Collegiate leadership may or may not be working. [Did JiangÕs recent nomination of 15 new generals signal a long goodbye like DengÕs?] Then there is the U.S. election, throwing up endless conjecture of American policy reversal.

But it is coming out time in Beijing with new roles awaiting the leadership. Not only Washington, but the rest of Asia will be waiting for answers.