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A SENSE OF ASIA

'Rumsfeld Doctrine' catches leftist S. Korean government off guard


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By Sol Sanders
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

Sol W. Sanders

June 9, 2004

In Washington, doctrines come and go ø some announced, others kept informally but often critical because they encapsulate a consensus among policymakers. One of these was the Powell Doctrine, the concept after our miseries in Vietnam: the U.S. would never again enter a conflict without overwhelming force. It led to the long buildup that preceded the Gulf War and, admittedly on all sides, accounted for the minimum casualties.

Defense Sec. Rumsfeld has just toured East and South Asia, almost ignored by media preoccupied with Iraq, the prison scandal, the anniversary of D Day, and the death of Ronald Reagan. But RumsfeldÕs trip came amidst a continuing crisis created by the development of weapons of mass destruction by a pariah state in North Korea. Washington, given its enormous Mideast commitment, has sought to defuse the crisis by aligning friends in the area. The logic has been all had an interest in preventing the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. On that basis, the Bush Administration sought ø so far unsuccessfully ø to halt whatever program North Korea has undertaken.

Not the least of WashingtonÕs problems has been a widening gap with its longtime ally South Korea. In part, this is a conflict based on diagnosis of the problem. President Roh believes an accommodation is possible on the basis of Korean solidarity, seduction of the Pyongyang regime through a transfer of investment and technology. But there has been Òattitude." RohÕs ÒTalibanÓ circle, as one old Seoul foreign policy hand called it, has missed no opportunity to move away from what it sees as the unequal relationship which characterized the alliance. Roh sought ø and was successful ø in demagoging anti-American sentiment among KoreaÕs young. Just as GermanyÕs Chancellor Shroeder, quoted as saying the very idea of sending troops to Iraq makes him vomit ø and a similar exploitation of domestic politics ø RohÕs advisers have said they fear a nuclear weapons clad North Korea less than an implosion from its growing economic crisis.

All this has resulted in less than the comity Washington had counted on.

At this juncture, with ChinaÕs sponsorship of meetings among the interested parties still a largely unknown quantity despite the State DepartmentÕs public optimism, the U.S. found itself at odds with its most critical ally. It has announced a transfer of a 3600-man element of its half-century-old garrison to Iraq in its unadmitted manpower crunch. And, according to the South Koreans, privately told Seoul it plans a further draw-down of the 37,000 man ÒtripwireÓ force, for half a century a part of regional Cold War strategy.

The move has shaken the Roh government which reluctantly had committed itself to an unpopular dispatch of troops to Iraq. It has dismayed the [largely older]half of the Korean electorate which had not voted for Roh. It comes at a time when Roh still faces a deflated domestic economy, in further jeopardy with a slowdown in the Chinese economy, and because of unresolved fundamental economic problems resulting from the 1997 East Asia Financial crisis.

What South KoreaÕs policymakers face, in effect, is a new American military strategy, somewhat obscured, hopefully temporarily with the events in Iraq. The Secretary of Defense has never enshrined this strategy. But like the earlier Powell Doctrine, its import is clear. In response to questions on this trip, he laid it out. It consists of three parts:

ÒFirst of all, we would like our forces and our troops to be in places that they are wanted, that are hospitable to them. We care about our forces, and the people we recruit.

ÒSecond, we need to have them in places where they are usable. We canÕt afford to have one defense establishment in one country to defend that country, and a defense establishment in another country to defend that country. We need to have the capability that we can use, depending on the interests of the United States, our friends, and our allies, and our alliances.

ÒThird, we [do not] want to be left in a static defense posture, as we seem[ed] to [have] be[en] at the end of the Cold War. If you know precisely where threats are coming from, as we believed we did with the Soviet Union, you would arrange yourselves to defend or deter that threat. Today, one looks around the world and it is quite difficult to know precisely where threats can come from.

You can tell the kind of a threat it might be, and the kind of capability that might be used against you, but it is not readily apparent. For example, three years ago, four years ago that we would have to deal with something like that problem of Afghanistan; that just wasnÕt clear, and yet we did. So what we need to do is have a degree of agility and deployability; modularity so that we can mix and match, and fashion forces to suit the circumstance.Ó

Mr. Roh, the ball is now in your court.

Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@comcast.net), is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International. He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.

June 9, 2004

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