The Cheney mission

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

American pilgrimages to China have a long history ø not the least the secret 1973 Beijing visit of Henry Kissinger. That mission widened the fissures within the Communist Bloc, adding to the miseries of stand-pat Moscow Kremlin leadership.

But there is also a lamentable long record of visits by U.S. diplomats, generals, and public spirited citizens succumbing to the Chinese art of hospitality, the likes of which do not exist elsewhere. Therein lies the danger.

Kissinger went to play Òthe China cardÓ, to shift the balance toward Washington in the Cold War. We know now Mao Zedong had long anticipated the possibility of reversing his public positions on American imperialism to defend China against Soviet efforts to bring him to heel.

In mid-April, Vice President Cheney will be making a China trip [and to Japan and South Korea]. Given his role, greater by far than any other American stand-in chief executive, the Vice PresidentÕs trip could be as critical.

For today we stand on the threshold of a new international shuffle of world power. Its shape is camouflaged by at least three overwhelming worldwide convulsions:

The first, of course, is the U.S. war against terrorism. Whatever the import of the Iraq drama, we are not likely to avoid President BushÕs conclusion in the aftermath of 9/11. It would be long, difficult, a war like none other against a fanatical, non-government entity, using asymmetrical strategies. ÒAsymetricalÓ for the terrorists would employ attacks against civilian rather than military targets, weapons as varied as electronic devices and suicide bombers, exploiting the weakest, most isolated countries as sanctuaries. Critics have argued Òthe warÓ is misdirected; only an attack at fundamentals will remove the threat. That argument is misconstrued: even were the psychopathology of these individuals not at issue, centuries of poverty, bad governance, repression, demagoguery, which afflict the areas from whence the terrorists are recruited, are not to be ameliorated short term.

The second phenomenon which obscures the shuffling of world power is the overwhelming nature ø economic as well as military ø of the U.S. This has to be contrasted with the retreat of the ÒOld EuropeÓ. This withdrawal is excused by a revulsion to force which was the bane of European civilization for so long, by the good life of welfare societies in a 50-year cocoon comforted by a false sense of security [insured by U.S. power], and economic stagnation from which it might be extremely difficult to emerge. This diminution of Europe has to be placed against former backward states Ñ on a narrow industrial base Ñ catapulting into world politics. If for no other reason, their ability to produce weapons of mass destruction gives them new disproportionate roles.

The third element in the new world disorder is the explosion of a convoluted international economy. Yes, it is true that the search for spices around an Arab blockade set the Europeans on their travels into Asia, the Americas, and Africa. But today with instantaneous communications and sophisticated economic investment, the ÒglobalizationÓ clichŽs are true. Take the contemporary enormous U.S. trade deficit with China [$124 billion in 2003 and growing]. That ÒdebtÓ, which turns up as U.S. paper credits accumulated by the central banks of Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea [keeping American inflation low] is largely funding the China export boom. And that in turn, has racked up the world commodity markets, revived the still largely ÒunreformedÓ [after the collapse of ÒCrony CapitalismÓ in the East Asian 1997 financial crisis] economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia with their sales to China.

At the center of much of this world turmoil is China. One assumes Cheney will be listening more than talking when he meets Chinese leadership. He carries a sheaf of questions: Is this leadership capable of meeting challenges of rapid Chinese development? Or are they the issue-dodgers their personal histories indicate? Do they really appreciate their stake in a stable world ø for example, in a peaceful Mideast now that they are the worldÕs No. 2 oil importer? Can they toss over old prejudices and bring an unpredictable North Korean despotism to heel before it brings on war by developing weapons of mass destruction? Will they accept a rearmed Japan [incited in no small part by their North Korean ally and their own military modernization] as part of a realistic power balance in Asia? Are they willing to wait out a Taiwan [essential to their own economic development with transfers of capital, technology, and management]? Can they use Hong Kong as a model for political reform, rather than insist it mimic BeijingÕs own repression?

The answers Cheney carries back wonÕt contribute to any campaign bumper stickers. They arenÕt even likely to redefine U.S. policy soon. But they could lay groundwork for important strategies in a second Bush Administration, even contribute to U.S. long-term policy if others have to make those decisions.