In a world with too many unresolved issues, no conundrum surpasses the downward spiraling of relations between Beijing and Tokyo.
The latest episode was an uproarious encounter ø by standards of East Asian etiquette ø between ChinaÕs President Hu and JapanÕs Prime Minister Koizumi ø at the APEC summit. The meeting came after a long period when Beijing refused the ritualistic welcome of the Japanese ÒbarbarianÓ to Beijing.
|
Chinese President Hu Jintao has told Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that his visits to a shrine honoring Japan's war dead including war criminals are the 'crux' of the problem in Sino-Japanese ties.
AFP/Jiji Press/File
|
What put the cat among the pigeons was HuÕs upbraiding Koizumi about his visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and, in effect, warning him China-Japan relations would continue moldering if the Japanese didnÕt end them. The issue is as complex as everything else in a post-Cold War Japan searching for identity, and a resurgent China using its victim history as a weapon against its interlocutors.
The Tokyo shrine dates to 1869, originally dedicated to honoring those who fought the then military dictatorship and ÒrestoredÓ the emperor. It was conceived as a part of the official State Shinto religion ø the glorification of the emperorÕs divinity and all that went with the militaristsÕ program leading Japan down the garden path to World War II. Today it is dedicated to 2.5 million who died in all Japan's conflicts [including some 20,000 Koreans and Taiwanese who fought in Japanese armies], venerated as gunshin or war gods.
The U.S. Occupation [and the Japanese constitution it wrote] disestablished State Shinto, a nativist elaboration of ancient animism but nevertheless with imported Chinese and Korean trappings. Yasukuni then, in theory, became another private Shinto temple.
But in 1978 convicted WWII war criminals, including executed wartime prime minister Tojo, were secretly enshrined there. The shrineÕs priests, unlike most Japanese, are not willing to accept the verdict of history. "War is a really tragic thing to happen, but it was necessary in order for us to protect the independence of Japan and to prosper together with Asian neighbors," a shrine pamphlet aimed at children rationalizes.
Koizumi, early on, pointed out Japan had no other war dead memorial. He suggested, as part of his reform program, one ought to be consecrated. But like other parts of his program, delayed by fighting in his own party as well as a strengthened Japanese parliamentary opposition [robust for the first time since early postwar Japan], he has neither prioritized Yasukuni nor has he renamed JapanÕs Òself-defenseÓ forces, as he moves at snail pace with a dozen other issues. In all fairness, getting the economy out of a decade of stagnation, meeting a growing threat of ChinaÕs ally, North Korea, with its missiles and nuclear weapons and as a result, integrating its military alliance more closely with the U.S., were formidable challenges.
There is little evidence Koizumi is a jingoist. But itÔs no secret ÒYasukuniÓ is a political weapon among his fellow politicians. Almost as potent is the small ragtag alliance of Japanese Christians, pacifists, and Communists, who also beat the drums against Koizumi praying at the shrine. And in his effort to use what had been his unprecedented popularity against the mysterious, always corrosive Japanese factional party politics within his own Liberal Democratic Party, he has been stymied.
The mystery is what Hu thought he was doing. Yasukuni has long been a topic for the controlled Chinese press and politicians. But to elevate it to the highest level now throws down the gauntlet to Koizumi.
The Japanese prime minister may find some new dodge to square the circle: go to Yasukuni as a private citizen, announce his visit instead of going there without pre-publicity, initiate the new memorial as he continues to go to Yasukuni, remove the war criminals to a separate altar, etc., etc. But, clearly, to accept HuÕs dicktat would be an enormous loss of face which KoizumiÕs prime ministry probably couldnÕt survive. Nor does it serve Hu to make ultimata he cannot enforce.
Did Hu need to make this macho move in some inner Chinese kingpin maneuvering? Did he think JapanÕs growing economic stake in China ø the cutting edge of its export boom which has brought recovery, the $2.5 billion Japanese companies added to their investment in China in the first five months of 2004, the resurrection of the old Osaka China trade lobby, etc. ø would bring Koizumi around ø or down? Or was it just hubris after a triumphant tour through CastroÕs Cuba and LulaÕs Brazil which preceded Santiago de Chile? Or is it BeijingÕs belief its critical role in disarming North Korea [if and when it chooses actually to use it] can turn other policies around in Tokyo [as well as Washington]? Or is Hu rattling skeletons in his own closet?
Despite always being clasped in a cultural as well as a geographical embrace, Japan and China have often misinterpreted each other throughout history. Are we seeing another misperception with possibly dire consequences?
Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@comcast.net),
is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent
for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.
He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.
