Delhi's confusion, Washington's loss

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

In the ancient past ø before 9/11 ø Washington dreamed India had escaped its muddled role. The implosion of the Soviet Union, it seemed, had finally ended its 35-year alliance with Communism. New Delhi turned its back on Soviet planning which had produced stagnation and squandered resources, domestic and foreign aid.

The Clinton Administration [which never met a diplomat they didnÕt like] decided time was ripe for a strategic alliance. No one spelled that out, but a new, vigorous India might be a regional antidote to a resurgent ChinaÕs unknown designs.

Almost a decade later, there isnÕt much to show.

It is, granted a mixed bag:

A new Indian government linked to the anti-anti-Communism of the Nehru Era repeats clichŽs of its predecessor about friendship with Washington. But it seems even less likely to cut arms supply from Moscow [despite signs of wilting technology]. Third Worldism still calls, finding the new Indian national security adviser holding hands in Tehran at the moment Washington rather diffidently sanctioned two Indian nuclear scientists for lending a hand to the mullahs. It came just when IranÕs nuclear ambition is a crisis issue. The U.S. has vaguely promised to lift restrictions on Òdual useÓ technologies. Despite screaming headlines [and promises by candidate Kerry], there is no serious effort to halt lucrative mushrooming U.S. outsourcing but economic liberalization is stalled. And despite an occasional Himalayas special forces training exercise, military collaboration is minimal.

True, not a small part of this is the result of the devilÕs bargain the Bush Administration has had to make with Pakistan President Gen. Musharraf. At some level of Washington idiocy, the new dictum is U.S. India and Pakistan policies ø defying half a century of history ø now move on different tracks. Good luck! How does one begin to convince Indians and Pakistanis they should not see the world through their bilateral prism? In any case, Washington must assign MusharrafÕs Pakistan the highest priority as the largest and most important ø if conflicted ø Moslem society in its alliance against Islamicist terror.

These not unsubstantial problems might be overcome were it not for New DelhiÕs strategistsÕ utter confusion. With not much publicity, the Indians are facing an internal security crisis. Five sets of insurgencies simmer ready to boil. Each is so entangled with politics of a multiethnic, multiparty, parliamentary government in a continental setting, only a determined leadership would be able to control them. That seems unlikely. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an economist with long honed bureaucratic instincts, presides over a fractious coalition dependant on only partly reconstructed Communists, and with a gifted amateur [encumbered by her Italian origins], Sonia Gandhi, riding in the backseat.

Time, history, weather, kaleidoscopic relationships, disease, poverty, have a way of mooting all Indian confrontations; what looks like stark crisis has a way of melting away.

But at the moment:

Nepal, a Himalayan kingdom sitting between ChinaÕs Tibet and abutting north IndiaÕs plain, is on its way to falling into the hands of self-proclaimed nihilistic Maoists. Naxallites, a combination of halfbaked Maoists and traditional Indian dacoits ø with a touch of Robin Hood ø are killing, robbing, and pillaging in nine states.

Northeast India, wedged between Bangla Desh, Myanmar [Burma], and Tibet, has a half dozen insurgencies demanding conflicting autonomies.

Neighboring Sri Lanka, after almost 20 years, still faces an insurgency from its Tamil minority with strong ties to south India.

And almost daily terrorist attacks in Kashmir, the source of 3.5 wars between Indian-Pakistan, continue.

The Nepalese government seems too inefficient and corrupt to bring the Maoists to heel despite promises of Indian [and U.S.] aid. These Maoists and the Chinese, continuing to build their missile and other bases in Tibet, publicly dis each other. But if the Maoists reach power? The Maoists have close tactical relations with IndiaÕs Naxallites. The northeastern insurgencies, almost at civil war stage, have sanctuaries in neighboring Bangla Desh and Myanmar [Burma], and may even be getting aid from China. The Sri Lankan Tamils, at the moment butchering each other to the satisfaction of a divided Colombo government and the consternation of meddling Norwegian do-gooders, have close ties to South IndiaÕs 65 million Tamils ø participating in the current federal coalition. Negotiations for India-Pakistan Òconfidence building measuresÓ are inching along. But Musharraf needs a dramatic Kashmir breakthrough to get him off his domestic griddle and permit him to use maximum clout to help the Indians end the insurgency.

New Delhi is moving to repeal its version of the U.S.Õ Patriot Act, lend aid to the Nepalese government, restart negotiations with Beijing for a Tibetan border agreement hanging fire for 35 years. But the federal government ø with wails from the security establishment ø has sanctioned negotiations by the Andhra state government with their still heavily armed Naxallites. The police warn it has encouraged other Naxallites to continue to build their Ò red corridorÓ through the heart of the subcontinent.

India remains India, not the heart of any new American-assisted South Asian alliance for stability.