At least half of the Iraqi security forces stood their ground against Shi'ite fighters during the uprising earlier this month, the United States reported. But overall they were outgunned by the insurgents.
U.S. officials said that in several cases Shi'ite insurgents employed
heavier and more effective weapons than Iraqi security forces and military
troops. They
said this was one of the key findings from the Shi'ite revolt in central and
southern Iraq earlier this month.
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Services
Committee on Tuesday that the Mahdi Army loyal to Iranian-backed Shi'ite
cleric Moqtada Sadr deployed more powerful weapons than the Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps, the main U.S.-trained Iraqi security force.
"We had not planned for them to be fully-equipped at this point, but
some of our ICDC units were outgunned in recent action, so we are re-looking
the equipment requirements," Wolfowitz said. "We have also incurred some
delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has been
caused by challenges in the contracting process and we hope those problems
have been fixed."
The deputy secretary did not detail the weapons of the Shi'ite
insurgents. Earlier, U.S. officials said the Mahdi Army employed light
weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and light anti-tank weapons in
clashes with U.S. and coalition troops.
Wolfowitz said the performance of the Iraqi security forces was mixed.
He said that in some cases Iraqi troops fought well and in other cases the
Iraqi security forces performed poorly. He cited fear as the main reason for
the flight of Iraqi troops.
"At least half of the security forces stood their ground and in Falujah
some ICDC units fought bravely and well," Wolfowitz said. "Other units did
not face the enemy, avoided contact altogether, and a small proportion
cooperated with the enemy."
[In Basra, at least 70 people were killed in a series of car bombings on
Wednesday. The car bombs exploded almost simultaneously outside three police
stations in the southern Iraqi city.]
Among the lessons drawn by the Defense Department from the Shi'ite
revolt was that the United States must revise its training methods and
selection of commanders. Other lessons included the need for greater liasion
between the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces, improved equipment and
additional advisers, and an effort to bolster Iraqi morale. Wolfowitz said
the Iraqi security forces also have a critical need for weapons, ammunition,
vehicles and radios.
"We will build on the leaders whose units fought and we will replace
those whose units did not," Wolfowitz said. "We will integrate Iraqi
officers with coalition forces and we will embed coalition officers with the
Iraqi security forces. They need to understand they operate under an Iraqi
chain of command, and that at the top of that chain of command is a lawfully
constituted Iraqi government."
U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy director of coalition
operations, said the ICDC performed well in fighting Sunni insurgents in
Faluja. Kimmitt said the ICDC battalion ø composed of former Kurdish
militia combatants ø would serve as a model for other units.
"The performance of the 36th Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Battalion during
recent combat operations in Falujah is worthy of note," Kimmitt said. "In
the view of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the battalion distinguished
itself as a trustworthy and capable Iraqi security force and will serve as a
benchmark for ICDC performance in the future."
Officials said Central Command, under Gen. David Petraeus, will assume
full responsibility for the development of Iraqi security forces and army.
The decision removed such responsibility from the Coalition Provisional
Authority and the
State Department.
"It will be General Petraeus's responsibility to work with all the
coalition countries and all of those involved in training, and mentoring,
and equipping these forces," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said.