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 Lev Navrozov emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1972 He settled in New York City where he quickly learned that there was no market for his eloquent and powerful English language attacks on the Soviet Union. To this day, he writes without fear or favor or the conventions of polite society. He chaired the "Alternative to the New York Times Committee" in 1980, challenged the editors of the New York Times to a debate (which they declined) and became a columnist for the New York City Tribune. His columns are today read in both English and Russian.
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As a result of the Allied victory over Hitler's Germany and the Allied agreements at the end of the victorious war, Stalin seized Eastern Europe, but his subjugation of it by his police was misinterpreted in the democratic West as the beginning of Stalin's war for HIS Òworld domination,Ó the phrase that had originally been correctly applied to Hitler, but that JFK misapplied to Soviet Russia up to 1962.
Yet Stalin had not seized Eastern Europe by war: Roosevelt and Churchill had given it to him in the expectation that their dear friend Stalin would let the countries of Eastern Europe be independent and choose the form of government the majority of their population wanted. Alas, ÒMarshall StalinÓ did not prove to be that paragon of ÒhonorÓ and Ògood faithÓ that Churchill described in the House of Commons in 1945. But this did not mean that Soviet Russia could or would attack the United States. In fact, in the 1960s, neither Soviet Russia could attack the United States, nor vice versa, because of Mutual Assured Destruction Ñ no nuclear weapons could destroy the other side's means of nuclear retaliation, such as submarines deep under water with nuclear missiles aboard.
Yet the fear of Soviet subjugation (similar to that of Eastern Europe) as a result of a Soviet attack was ubiquitous in the United States throughout the second half of the 40s, the 50s, the 60s, and even in the late 70s, a film was shown by mainstream U.S. television about how Soviet Russia attacked and subjugated the United States. In one scene, the burly Soviet soldiers machine-gunned all members of the U.S. Congress.
It is easy to machine-gun several hundred unarmed civilians. But how had Soviet Russia overcome Mutual Assured Destruction? Those who made and showed the film possibly knew nothing about Mutual Assured Destruction.
Subjected for decades to the fictitious danger of a Soviet invasion and subjugation, many Americans became acutely sensitized to the ÒSoviet threat.Ó Remember those huge, ugly Soviet soldiers machine-gunning the Congress of the United States!
But China? What has China done? Seized Tibet and is threatening to seize Taiwan? Well, this has been regarded by many in the democratic West as Nazi Germany's seizure of areas populated by Germans was regarded by many in the democratic West in 1938 Ñ as a sign of German patriotism and national concern for all members of the German nation.
While the creators of the U.S. film, featuring in particular, the Soviet shooting of the U.S. Congress, seemed to have known nothing about Mutual Assured Destruction, the Soviet strategists realized in the 1960s that their nuclear-missile arsenal was sufficient for Mutual Assured Destruction. At the same time, nuclear weapons were outdated as offensive weapons against a nuclear country. Hence the Soviet dictators launched in the early 70s the development of post-nuclear superweapons that would be able to circumvent Mutual Assured Destruction by destroying the Western means of nuclear retaliation. This is when the danger of a Soviet attack on the West began.
No matter how big the nuclear arsenal is, how powerful its weapons are, and how precise are means of their delivery, they cannot destroy the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean in order to destroy a submarine deep under water with nuclear missiles aboard. But, for example, molecular nano assemblers are expected to be able to pass through any ocean, find the submarines with nuclear weapons aboard and reduce both submarines and missiles to dust.
True, some American (not Chinese) nanotechnologists proclaim that molecular nano weapons would never exist. Well, eight years before the fist aircraft flew, the ÒNew York TimesÓ declared through some of its experts that aircraft would never exist or would exist no sooner than in 1 million or 10 million years. Well, the 20th-century wars proved to be impossible without aircraft.
Soviet Russia exploded successfully its first nuclear bomb in 1949, and about 20 years later the Soviet dictators realized that nuclear weapons were all over as offensive weapons against nuclear countries. Communist China exploded successfully its first nuclear bomb in 1964 and about 20 years later the dictators of China had a sufficient nuclear-missile arsenal for Mutual Assured Destruction, and realized that nuclear weapons were all over as offensive weapons against nuclear countries. Hence in 1986 they founded Project 863, which has been developing post-nuclear superweapons in eight fields, from genetic engineering to molecular nano technology.
Russia ceased to be a democracy soon after Putin became president. But there are many complex and ambivalent intermediate authoritarian states or stages between the absence of democracy and totalitarian dictatorship. The form of government of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century was Òsemi-constitutional monarchy.Ó It was a far cry from dictatorship as Lenin defined his dictatorship to justify his unlimited ruthless reprisals. Only when Putin establishes Òtotalitarian dictatorshipÓ that he will resume the Soviet (pre-1991) development of post-nuclear superweapons. After his Òtotalitarian dictatorshipÓ has been established, he will be able to afford the luxury of his quest for his world domination or at least for the annihilation of the West (Òin partnershipÓ with the dictatorship of China?) in order to suppress all subversion of his Òtotalitarian dictatorshipÓ from without.
Dictatorship is vulnerable. Kings under absolutism drew their legitimacy from their royal birth, and modern heads of state and government draw it from a majority vote. There is nothing a dictator can draw his legitimacy from. Thus Mao became the dictator because Stalin helped him to rout the Kuomintang in 1949. But what is legitimate about it? For his part, Stalin had become the dictator by killing all of Lenin's other associates, such as Trotsky.
A dictator can make his legitimacy less vulnerable to subversion, which the democratic West emanates by the very fact of its existence. For that purpose, a dictator has only to annihilate (by post-nuclear superweapons) the democratic West, subverting his dictatorship by its very existence.
Most Americans had been prepared from the mid-1940s to the 1970s for the belief that Soviet Russia was going to attack the United States (and shoot the United States Congress). Yet when I brought the news to the United States in 1972 that the Soviet dictators were developing post-nuclear superweapons, I could not make it a general American truth though President Reagan supported publicly my view after he had read my Commentary article and met with me. If such was a general American disbelief with respect to Soviet Russia despite decades of a general American belief in the ÒSoviet threat,Ó it is no wonder that most Americans have not even ever heard of Project 863, though its foundation in 1986 was described in the Chinese press, available to any American tourist, and in the Internet available in New York.
Yet the development of post-nuclear superweapons in China is much more dangerous than it will be in Putin's Russia when Putin resumes the Soviet (pre-1991) development of post-nuclear superweapons.
(1) After 1991 the project of development of post-nuclear superweapons in Russia crumbled and lost its scientists and engineers Ñ in particular, to China. On the other hand, the project in China has been collecting the best scientists and engineers from all over the world, including Russia.
(2) Dictatorships can mobilize human and other resources without any war. Four times more scientists and engineers graduate every year in China than in the United States. But the population of Russia has decreased, as a result of the disintegration, by half and is now one-eighth of that of China.
(3) The development of post-nuclear superweapons in Russia was purely Soviet, parochial, isolated from the world. The relevant project in China is truly international. A Western top scientist or engineer considers it an honor to work in such a peaceful and progressive country, loved by both U.S. Republicans and U.S. Democrats.
(4) The trade surplus of Sino-American trade exceeds $100 billion a year Ñ the Chinese dictators' pocket money to attract the world's best scientists and engineers.
(5) Chinese giant scientific-technological conferences (for example, in nano technology) attract great numbers of scientists and engineers and make it possible to invite the very best for work in China.
(6) Western universities and laboratories are open to those Chinese who are to work in the development of post-nuclear superweapons in China.
(7) Chinese Òprivate capitalist corporations,Ó actually controlled by the dictatorship, convince U.S. corporations of unique geostrategic value to move to China to employ cheap labor and sell their products or services to the Ògovernment of China.Ó
(8) The combination of modern development (2000 skyscrapers in Shanghai alone as against 20 such buildings in the whole of Japan) and exquisite traditional culture (the Chinese cuisine second to none in the world) makes the sojourn of a foreign scientist or engineer in China pleasant and interesting.
Lev Navrozov's (navlev@cloud9.net] new book is available on-line at www.levnavrozov.com. To request an outline of the book, send an e-mail to webmaster@levnavrozov.com.