The collapse of the Indo-American alliance dream

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

IndiaÕs decision not to send a division to Iraq is one more sign prospects for a close U.S.-Indian strategic alliance in South Asia are dim, at best.

After almost half a century of IndiaÕs Cold War alliance with the Soviet Union, the Clinton Administration believed it had a breakthrough. The Bush Administration picked up on a warming relationship.

In Washington, the assumptions were three: India, with its vast manpower reserves and strong British Indian Army traditions, could be a stabilizing factor if New DelhiÕs regional hegemonic power were recognized. Although it was carefully never said publicly, India seemed a counter to ChinaÕs growing military and economic weight. A second factor was willingness to move away from 35 years of Soviet planning. India, with its mushrooming information technology cadre and expanding trade with the U.S. finally seemed to be shaking off its ÒEast India CompanyÓ syndrome, and like China, welcoming foreign investment. A third prop was the growing weight of American Indian immigrants, most highly educated, part and parcel of the dot.com boom of the 90s, reinforcing the argument the two countries shared representative government and its benefits.

It was 9/11 which shattered this euphoric view. For the India-Pakistan feud dictates foreign ø and one might argue, even their domestic ø agendas. The division of old British India into two independent countries, one based on Islam even though, its leadership was secularist, and the other on a new, single successor state, multicultural and secularist, was a trauma from which neither recovered. A half century later, the issue of a contested Kashmir, simply encapsulates larger issues.

Discovery that the U.S. was at war globally with Islamicist terrorists forced Washington into a reexamination of Pakistan. It had almost been written off as a failed state, endorsing unacceptable Islamic fanaticism in sponsoring the Taliban in Afghanistan [its lunatic fringe military and political theorists said, to get Òstrategic depthÓ against India]. But emergence of a secularist Pakistan military which was willing, publicly, to throw its weight into the anti-terrorist campaign, redressed the balance. Washington hoped, of course, to have it both ways: Pakistan would continue to help defeat the Islamicists and progress would go ahead on an India-U.S. strategic alliance. But in more dramatic forms, perhaps, Washington returned to its old policies to find a way to heal the Indo-Pakistan rift through a warmer relationship with both sides. Gen. Musharraf has been given as much support as Washington could muster in his struggle to disentangle his intelligence and other cadre from their flirtation with fundamentalism. IndiaÕs leaders of a fragile coalition government, the advertised moderate Prime Minister Vajpayee, and his hard-line collaborator/rival Deputy Prime Minister Advani, have been given extraordinarily hearty welcomes in Washington [as has Musharraf].

But basic problems remained. For example, India wants relaxation of dual use technology restraints. [It pushed and got U.S. lifting of a veto of Israeli military sales Ñ denied the Chinese]. But the U.S.Õ multibillion dollar bet on IndiaÕs electricity infrastructure [unfortunately through Enron] collapsed in a not atypical example of foreign investorsÕ old problems. The Indian parliament formally voted against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. And India complains the U.S. had two standards for terrorism ø one for itself, another for Pakistan aid to insurgency in Kashmir.

In the past few weeks, Indian media reported an elaborate campaign to get India to commit troops. IndiansÕ squeamishness over no UN backing was to be compensated by flying an Indian flag [much as the Indian navy earlier joined collaborative anti-piracy operations]. The Indians would go into the Kurdish area, the most stable in Iraq. There were hints of contracts. There were nostalgic references to the British Indian ArmyÕs role in the installation of the first Iraqi government in the 1920s.

All to no avail. The ruling Ñ and shaky Ñ coalitionÕs principle opposition, Sonia GandhiÕs Congress Party took a flat-out stand ø as it has on few other issues ø against. A series of state elections are already testing internal coalition cohesion, heating up leadership rivalry in the lead party, the BJP. National elections come next year. IndiaÕs volatile Defense Minister Fernandes was reported against ø even though the Indian military appeared to welcome the opportunity to grow their forces. The media recalled IndiaÕs disastrous intervention in Sri Lanka in the mid-80s and the growing apparent guerrilla operations against Coalition forces.

So the answer is ÒnoÓ. It comes on the heels of a much heralded visit by Vajpayee to China where he swapped BeijingÕs grudging acceptance of the Indian takeover of the Himalayan state of Sikhim against new restrictions on the Dalai LamaÕs India-based efforts to get real autonomy for Tibet.

With New Delhi, as with so much in the new multipolar world, albeit with U.S. paramountcy, WashingtonÕs efforts at collaboration for peace and stability in Asia are likely to be piecemeal with no overarching grand strategy.