The order of the day in Korea is still brinkmanship and nerves of steel

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

It is too early to know just how much a meeting of minds there was in the first encounter between President Bush and South Korean President Roh. ÒMr. NoÓ certainly hadnÕt encouraged optimism in his contradictory pre-arrival statements. The meeting was to lay the foundations for a renewed joint effort to halt PyongyangÕs nuclear weapons and creation of an international weapons of mass destruction arms bazaar. That could lead to more lethal arming of international terrorists, and almost inevitably, to a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia.

It was inevitable that differences would be papered over. And this is not the first time that U.S. and South Korean interests have seemingly diverged. Harking back to the Eisenhower Administration, Washington wanted a Korean War armistice, negotiations for which had dragged on so long that there were more causalities after they began. Sec. of State Dulles ø what a reversal of positions from now! ø threatened nuclear weapons to halt the conflict. Eisenhower was seen as the moderating influence. [The former commander in Europe had successfully campaigned on a slogan ÒI will go to KoreaÓ to halt the conflict]. On the South Korean side, President Rhee pushed to unite the peninsular at whatever price, the culmination of a lifetimeÕs dedication to keeping Korean nationalism alive during the half-century of Japanese Occupation. Dulles had plans drawn for overthrowing the Rhee regime if the old man persisted.

Historical analogies are odious, a French philosopher has said. But the problems are somewhat similar in that there is a basic agreement, not only between the U.S. and South Korea, but probably with all North KoreaÕs neighbors, that a nuclear-clad Pyongyang would be a threat and must be disarmed. The question is how.

North Korea is peddling its old line, that if economic assistance and assurances for the preservation of the regime are given, it will disarm. But the history of North Korean state terrorism, its refusal to abide by international agreements, and the fragile nature of a regime bankrupt in ideology as well as economics, makes that an unlikely bet. Mr. Clinton bought the package in 1995 and now even his former national security adviser admits it was a failure.

Bush has said he wants a negotiated settlement. If for no other reason, there is the conventional arms threat that Pyongyang poses for a quarter of South KoreaÕs population in Greater Seoul, under North KoreaÕs artillery range. But a strategy to force PyongyangÕs compliance must have the approval of all PyongyangÕs interlocutors ø including Japan, Russia, and most of all, China. That would be an economic blockade to starve North KoreaÕs economy into submission. Japan, now announcing a cut off of PyongyangÕs hard currency receipts from more than two million ethnic Koreans, organized crime, and drug peddling, is in line. Russia, which plays a relatively minor role, could probably be brought into line, too.

But the problem is Roh who still persists, apparently, in believing an understanding with Pyongyang must be sugar-coated with continued economic assistance. Whether he has had a change of heart will be revealed in bilateral negotiations now starting up. If Roh does reverse policy, he is in domestic difficulty. Roh has renounced his earlier call for U.S. troop withdrawal. But his agitation brought forward WashingtonÕs plans to restructure American Korean-based forces. Moving the 37,000 troops on the DMZ into a defensible rear area is bound to give his organized leftwing supporters opportunities to demagogue landownersÕ claims, a scenario all too well known in South Korea.

It was these young, leftwing voters who brought Roh his narrow victory over South Korean conservatives earlier this year. If he abandons them ø as he has in recent speeches ø he will kiss goodbye to overcoming the present anti-Roh majority in next yearÕs parliamentary elections. ThatÕs a difficult problem for even the most consummate politician, and Roh is very much a lucky amateur who inched to victory because of a major blowup over an incident involving American soldiers.

Getting China, on which North Korea relies for most of its energy and spare parts, in line is equally daunting. Preoccupied in pinning the tail on the donkey inside the Communist hierarchy for the botched effort to handle the SARS pandemicø probably only just beginning in rural China despite optimistic statements ø Beijing leadership will be reluctant to take on a U.S.-inspired effort to blockade North Korea. That cauterization would be aimed at forcing North KoreaÕs enigmatic Kim Il Jong into halting his drive for nuclear weapons. But, in the long run, it would aim at transformation of the regime if not its demise. And no one in Beijing could believe otherwise, with all its implications for ChinaÕs fellow Communists.

That is why the weeks ahead are going to require steel nerves, maybe even an application of DullesÕ old brinksmanship, as well as the most adroit diplomacy.