A year later in Asia

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See the Sol Sanders Archive By Sol Sanders SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

Just as during the Cold War when analysts tended to cast all Asian trends into that worldwide mould, since 9/11 the temptation is to treat AsiaÕs lingering problems as a reflection of those horrific events. This is all the more true since, unlike those long Cold War decades, the world scene is dominated by the power and prestige of the wounded giant, the U.S.A.

Still, the 9/11 repercussions have heavily nuanced old problems, often in still unknowable ways because of the rapidity of events. A thumbnail sketch:

Afghanistan The Islamic terroristsÕ sanctuary ø the Taleban regime represented Osama Ben LadinÕs paradigm ø was smashed. What was never a nation-state is struggling with postwar debris. And the possibility of remnants, sometimes with help from government agencies in Iran, perhaps Saudi Arabia, some Pakistan intelligence renegades, and private backers in the Gulf emirates, is growing. The inevitable call for Ònation buildingÓ from Europe and some U.S. circles is anathema to American military planners who know their networks would have to bear the burden.

Indo-Pakistan American efforts to cool the perennial quarrel, now a world concern because of nuclear armaments. has, contrary to earlier indications, been exacerbated. Each side uses ÒterrorismÓ as a weapon in the 50-year feud. Musharraf is tries to return Pakistan [in the face of its traditional feudal obstacles] to its ambiguous but secular origins against a small hut fanatical Islamacist opposition, compromised by IslamabadÕs support of Kashmir separatists now probably penetrated by Al Qaida. New DelhiÕs defense of its Kashmir occupation as essential proof of IndiaÕs secularismis compromised by the increasing ÒHindutuvaÓ trends in the ruling BJP party, presiding shakily over a disunited coalition. Washington staked U.S. activism on the concept that free and fair and violence free elections in Kashmir would be an opening ploy toward settlement ø now increasingly revealed as an unrealistic possibility, at best.

China/Taiwan BeijingÕs rhetorical enthusiasm for the war against terrorism turns out to have been just that. It has been used as cover for increased repression in Moslem Singkiang and Tibet. Whether affiliation to the World Trade Organization and a new restatement of adherence to anti-missiles proliferation will bear fruit remains to be seen. Not encouraging is the growing intensity of the succession struggle, whether President Jiang Zemin retires to permit a hoped for fourth generation professional bureaucratic mop up of old problems. The Taiwan problem continues to drift into dangerous waters with pressure by a representative government pushing leadership toward independence, while investment and growing trade with the Mainland lend weight to the argument that other than military or political factors could decide the future of this major Asian threat to peace.

The Koreas President BushÕs identification of North Korea as a part of the axis of evil ø suggesting the growing threat of an alliance, if it does not already exist, between the non-national terrorists such as Al Qaida and the state terrorist organizations in the pariah states ø dramatized the disarray among South Korea, Japanese, and U.S. leaders dealing with Pyongyang. In the new concern with terrorism, North KoreaÕs weapons proliferation becomes an even more important concern for Washington policymakers. Personal ambition [lame duck President Kim Dae Jung]and growing Korean nationalism in Seoul increasingly push for concessions to the North, sensing perhaps that a small but serious refugee flow into China and beyond signals the coming implosion of the super-Stalinist state. Japanese policy, again pushed by flagging popularity of the Koizumi administration, at the same time was smashing North KoreaÕs old infrastructure [extortion, gangster ties and drugs] in Japan among its 1.5 ethnic Koreans but offering massive economic aid to a bankrupt economy if Pyongyang would play ÒniceÕ. Washington could only see this as indirect support for the all powerful military.

Japan The worldÕs second largest economy continued to idle, with occasional hints that Koizumi might seize the skunk by the neck and use public funds to restructure the banks, bitterly opposed by the Japanese public in a rare expression of public outrage over longtime abuse. The Japanese, with their own intense experience with domestic/international terrorism in the 60s and again in the 90s, may have felt removed from U.S. and Midest events. But the collaboration of Japanese military forces in noncombative roles in the Indian Ocean during the U.S. Afghanistan campaign moved Tokyo one more step toward collective security and reaffirmation of expanded interpretations of the U.S.-Japan alliance. At the same time, KoizumiÕs initiate with the North Koreans, Japanese moves to launch their own intelligence satellites, and Japanese opposition ø at least for the moment ø to American military action in Iraq, its determination to lift sunken North Korean Òghost shipsÓ in what Beijing claimed as Chinese Òeconomic de3velopmentÓ waters, suggested Tokyo was moving, even at a glacial pace, toward a more independent foreign policy.