Pyongyang monte
UNITED NATIONS Ñ The alarming admission that North KoreaÕs reclusive communist regime possesses a nuclear arms program should really come as no surprise. Pyongyang was on the verge of such a potential in the early 1990Õs, only to be deterred by dithering diplomacy which delayed and, some would assert, gave cover for the covert development. But the fact that North Korea concedes the secret program should raise questions given the curious timing.
In 1994 after a stream of intelligence data that the North Koreans were aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program at a dozen sites including the infamous Yongbyon, the Clinton Administration confronted Pyongyang over nuclear inspections. When the case came to the UN Security Council, Ambassador Madeleine Albright pressed for a resolution which would bring International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into North Korea.
During a particularly dangerous June 1994 showdown concerning IAEA inspections at the Yongbyon site, the US proposed a weak economic sanctions package which North Korea threatened would be a Òdeclaration of war.Ó Washington, lacking the support of communist China and Russia in the Security Council for even a mild draft resolution, allowed the move to wilt on the diplomatic vine. In parallel, a curious peace mission to Pyongyang by former President Jimmy Carter during the height of the crisis defused the immediate symptoms and, as importantly, saved face for Bill ClintonÕs stillborn sanctions initiative.
A false down in DPRK/US relations followed as American and North Korean negotiators later hammered out the controversial Framework agreement in Geneva.
Fully aware that North Korea was playing a shell-game with nuclear inspections and likely hiding key data, the Clinton Administration still signed off on a Joint Framework which would theoretically stop the clock on the nuclear programs.
ÒThis agreement will help achieve a longstanding American objective Ñ an end to the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula,Ó exclaimed Bill Clinton announcing the deal with the Democratic PeopleÕs Republic of Korea.
Given the ClintonÕs AdministrationÕs clumsy mishandling of the nuclear crisis, and the dangerous drift to possible military confrontation with the DPRK, the Framework was viewed as a political panacea; in fact emerged as a fatally flawed deal.
The Joint Framework envisaged that the US and its regional allies would invest $4 billion to construct two civilian nuclear reactors which would provide future electric supplies as well as provide the DPRK with fuel oil supplies to help them though each winter. The logic was that the light water reactors could not produce weapons grade plutonium as did the older graphite reactors then in use.
A visit by then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000, viewed as a sounding board to diplomatic ties, was as monumental as it was ill timed. Albright, along with dictator Kim Jong-il, participated in a grandiose celebration commemorating the 55th anniversary of the founding of communist rule in North Korea!
Fast forward to 2002. When President George Bush placed the Democratic PeopleÕs Republic of Korea in the Axis of Evil, along with Iraq and Islamic Iran, the usual smirks emerged from those who instinctively know better. How could a crumpling and moribund Marxist regime be a threat? Now, the Bush AdministrationÕs misgivings about the nature of North Korea are confirmed. However, thereÕs still a troubling aspect. Despite North KoreaÕs powerful conventional military capability threatening South Korea and American forces stationed on the peninsula, why does Pyongyang admit the secretive program now?
ItÕs generally acknowledged that North Korea had one or two crude nuclear devices at least five years ago; its missile delivery systems are already proven. Does the DPRK wish to divert American attention off Iraq? More likely, knowing its dire situation, Pyongyang wishes to use this nuclear trump card for unambiguous blackmail.
North Korea relishes the role of the rogue regime Ñ moreover it wants political talks with Washington (to cause splits against rival South Korea), and seeks additional aid and trade with Japan (still a hated former enemy) to gain concessions. Though Pyongyang has made a diplomatic opening to the world, especially with the European Union states last year, the DPRK evokes China in the late 1970Õs after Mao Ñ in shambles, but stumbling awkwardly in seeking new options.
Yet this startling admission from Pyongyang could well presage a brewing storm in East Asia. And imagine what such an announcement from Baghdad Ñ say six months from now Ñ would produce?
John J. Metzler is a U.N. correspondent covering diplomatic and defense
issues. He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.
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