 Balkan ghosts haunt Dutch politicos
UNITED NATIONS — Seven years ago, seven thousand Bosnian Muslims were systematically slaughtered by Bosnian Serb forces in the so-called United Nations "Safe Enclave" of Srebrenica. What became the most visable case of ethnic cleansing in Europe since WWII, happened as their protectors, a Dutch batallion serving as part of the United Nation's UNPROFOR force, literally handed them over to a fate which meant near certain death. Seven years later, the Dutch government stands squarely accused by an official report of "sending ill-prepared troops on a mission impossible." Now the entire Netherlands center-left coalition has resigned over this lingering shame from the shadow of Srebrenica. The report commissioned by the Dutch themselves, namely the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation and issued in The Hague, relates a sordid saga which hardly evokes what American wartime President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the "indomidable Dutch." Quite the opposite, the official inquiry concluded that the Netherlands military had betrayed the refugees handing them over in "full awareness that the fate of the men was uncertain." The Report added, "Humanitarian motivation and political ambitions drove the Netherlands to undertake an ill-conceived and virtually impossible peace mission." The setting; Bosnia, torn by ethnic conflict; Thousands of Muslim refugees in the "safe haven of " Srebrenica, one of a number of encalves set up by the UN. The Defenders, a lightly armed 200-man Dutch unit with unclear rules of engagement. The opposition--a tough Bosnain Serb army which had surrounded the town and would squeeze the defenders to surrender. General Ratko Mladic, indicted of war crimes and genocide, was a key player on the Serbian side. According to the Director of the Invesitigation, Prof. J.C. H. Blom, the Dutchbat was dispatched "on a mission with a very unclear mandate to a zone described as a safe haven although there was no clear distinction of what that meant." The lightly armed unit was going into a cauldron where "to keep peace where there was no peace and without obtaining knowledge of in depth information from the Canadian predecessors in the enclave." The ill-fated deployment came amid "Wide political and media support and without a proper analysis of the far-reaching consequences beforehand." The Report adds scathingly, "The Cabinet, the Ministry of Defense, and the Dutch Parliament adopted an anti-intelligence attitude." Help that could have been provided by the United States, was scoffed at as "the lack of interest and the negative attitude of the military and political leadership stood in the way." The Dutch were sitting ducks waiting to be overrun along with the people being protected. "The Dutchbat expectation that help would come from outside the morning of 11 July in the form of massive air strikes was misguided. The UNPROFOR command had completely ruled out airstikes. It hearby crushed the Dutchbat's illusion" and the enclave became an easy target for the Bosnian Serbs. Britian's Daily Telegraph adds, "The French General in charge of UN forces in the region, Bernard Janvier, more or less rubber stamped the fate of the refugees on the eve of the massacre by refusing a Dutch request for air strikes against Bosnain Serb positions....there have been repeated allegations that Gen. Janvier agreed to a deal with Gen. Mladic to withhold air support in exchange for the release of UN peacekeepers being held hostage." Significantly, the Dutch inquiry states, "There was no evidence to support such claims." The Dutch unit was not acting under NATO rules but those of the much maligned UNPROFOR. Still the report gave too much credit to the power and prowess of the Bosnian Serbs. Yes, a tough force but one which was assembled out in the open and was very vulnerable to devastating surgical airstrikes. As the noose tightened on the enclave, the Dutch were in no position to mount a counterattack. Still the Serbs were not trying to cause any UNPROFOR casualties but rather separate these UN forces from the refugees. Clearly, a few well placed hits on the exposed Serb positions would have dampened General Mladic's enthusiasm for an offensive; Gen. Mladic was pressing on because the road seemed clear with token opposition. One can think aloud if an American, British, or Turkish unit was in the position of the Dutch what may have transpired? Prof. Blom concedes that while the Dutch forces could not anticipate the scale of slaughter, their act of collusion in handing over the refugees was "tantamount to collaborating with ethnic cleansing." This turned into an organized mass killing in which 7,000 Muslims perished over a few days in July 1995. Still the inquiry stresses the atrocity did not take "place under the eyes of the Dutchbat." Though Srebrenica remains a singular disgrace, let it not be said that the West did not help the Muslims of Bosnia or Kosovo for that matter against Milosevics' military minions. Far from it, the United Nations, NATO, and Western countries finally stopped Serbian aggression and restored a semblance of calm and security in the war torn former Yugoslavia. Fast forward to 2002. Gen. Mladic is an indicted war criminal as is Belgrade's political leader Slobodan Milosevic. These men represented misguided Yugoslav nationalism through a uniquely twisted psychological culture of death not only against Mulsims and Croatians but many fellow Serbs as well. The UN's Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague remains a very necessary first step for justice, but genuine justice may have eluded the victims of Srebrenica
John J. Metzler is a U.N. correspondent covering diplomatic and defense issues. He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.
See current edition
of
   |
