Special Report: One on one with Vladimir Orlov

Vladimir A. Orlov is one Russia's leading strategic analysts. In an era of politically-correct rhetoric, Orlov's analysis stands out as objective and direct. He looks at developments coldly and does not insert his personal or political positions. Orlov's focus is Russian strategy, which combines Moscow's foreign policy and defense policy. He is regarded as extremely close to the defense establishment.

Orlov's Center for Policy Studies has offices in Moscow and San Francisco. He travels often to the United States and has close relations with members of Congress and the U.S. strategic community. He also has close ties to the Jaffee Center of Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Orlov is pessimistic about Russia's future. The country is leaderless, he says, and its defense industries are falling apart. As he sees it, Moscow might not be a factor in international politics for decades.

The strategist was interviewed in Moscow by Steve Rodan

Q. How do you see the outcome of the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia?

A. The good news is that the Russians are there, the first to be there. The real aim of the operation was to destroy the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The task hasn't been completed yet.

Q. Is the United States ready to grant Kosovo independence, despite its statements to the contrary?

A. Definitely yes. This is a fact.

Q. Can Russia delay Kosovo indefinitely?

A. Russian diplomacy is an important factor in Yugoslavia. It is not the key factor. The Russian general staff did the maximum to send troops from Bosnia to Kosovo -- even without asking the Defense Ministry. This is the maximum. To be a weak state is a very unpleasant thing. To negotiate loans with the International Monetary Fund and to negotiate nuclear issues and the reduction of fissile material does not leave you with wide room to maneuver.

Q. What are the U.S. goals in Kosovo?

A. I really don't know. I spoke to members in both houses in Congress. They don't see long-term goals. I can't see logical reasons by U.S. policy makers and analysts. This is very strange.

Q. How dangerous is the Islamic fundamentalist element in Kosovo in creating a state aligned to such countries as Iran and Pakistan?

A. Kosovo is a heartland. If one penetrates there, then you have control over an entire region. This is very important for geographical control. The strategy is in the direction of a greater Albania with Muslim control. It is unclear what is the European strategy. What the Russians face in Chechnya is only a small reminder what we have in Kosovo. We certainly have information that Iran is very interested in what is going on in Kosovo.

Q. How strong will the Turkish component be in the Kosovo issue?

A. Turkey plays a critical role in policy-making. We are amazed by how powerful the Turkish lobby is in the United States. It is extremely succesful. They are contesting areas in central Asia and in the Caucuses, where Russia is facing Turkish aggressiveness. In some areas, Russian diplomacy wasn't prepared to counteract this pressure.

Q. Does Russia have enough clout to build a lobby in eastern Europe to stop an independent Kosovo?

A. Unfortunately not. Many links have been destroyed. There are weak links but I haven't seen any great use of it. The Poles are concerned when you discuss the issue. They understand it quite well.

Q. Does Russia have a coherent foreign policy under President Boris Yeltsin?

A. I think Russian foreign policy and security is suffering from this. The president should take the lead in these issues but Yeltsin is dying and the question is how long will it take until a successor arrives. It's not a question of whether he is inadequate. He is inadequate. He cannot concentrate on problems. He does not recognize people.

Q. How does this affect U.S. efforts to win Russian cooperation on nonproliferation?

A. There is no doubt an effect. I start with the lack of political will and lack of an efficient decision-making process. I am happy to see that most groups in that game are interested in preventing proliferation, not because of the United States, but because proliferation is what Russia wants.

Under [then-Prime Minister Yevgeny] Primakov there were certain steps that saw activity in this area. I don't know what the situation is now. Now, it's a mess.

Q. What is the problem in enforcing proliferation?

A. The biggest gap is between legislation and intentions on one side and implementation on the other side. The attempts at law enforcement have taken a turn for the better. There have been arrests of smugglers of sensitive technology. But the closer we are to parliamentary and presidential elections, the issue of proliferation is pushed aside.

Q. The Clinton administration has set a cap of 16 space launches with Russia. Do you expect Washington to approve more launches unless there is significant cooperation on proliferation?

A. I do see such a possibility. I see a positive decision by the United States. I know what people in Congress think. From what I understand, there is some modest satisfaction of the work of the bilateral groups. They are acting step-by-step.

Q. What about Israeli efforts to work with Russia to stop the transfer of missile technology to Iran?

A. I don't know anything about a Russian-Israel group on this issue. I heard there was no decision on an Israeli offer to establish such a panel.

I tell the Americans not to be too optimistic on the issue of proliferation. Russia has done much to stop any smuggling of fissile material. If you speak of missile and bio-chemical technology, I hardly believe it is impossible by some prosecutions or threats or educational efforts to improve this overnight. The companies are interested in increasing profits.

Q. What are the prospects of Russian-Israeli strategic and defense cooperation?

A. For Russian industry, the question is not more profits. It's a question of survival. I see a really big potential in Russian-Israeli strategic partnership in commercial areas such as aviation and electronics. I hear a lot more willingness of Russian defense companies to cooperate with Israel.

In the Middle East context, the situation is very favorable because Russia does not feel any obligation toward Iraq, Iran and Syria regarding Israel. If Israel doesn't link its cooperation to conventional arms sales, there are many areas of interest. General [outgoing Foreign Minister] Ariel Sharon was very interested but my feeling here is that not too many people took him seriously. People understood here that [Prime Minister Binyamin] Netanyahu would not be the next prime minister.

Q. Are there obstacles to defense ties?

A. There are no political obstacles. There might be bureaucratic obstacles because it's not clear who is making the decisions.

Q. Will Russia sell advanced weapons to Syria?

A. It's not clear whether there will be a sale. It is clear that even for big deals the Russians want cash and won't accept Syrian conditions. I haven't heard of a compromise. What I have heard is that there are small sales of Russian equipment to Syria. But these are through third parties and through private channels. Here, the Syrians pay accordingly. This tells the Russians that the Syrians have money.

Q. How competitive is Russian defense industry?

A. The Russian industry is selling everything it has to offer. It can offer good old stuff. What is good enough now for the Chinese will soon not be good enough for the Indians. The Russians have a huge stock of weapons but they are not completing development of new systems. There is some panic about this."