TOKYO — The 50-year-old "dirty little secret" of United States policy on
the Korean Peninsula is the intense rivalry and competition between the
State Department and the U.S. Department of Defense.
"The high degree of differences‹sometimes animosity — is seldom mentioned
in polite
Washington D.C. government society because it often takes some ugly twists,"
said a former
State Department (Foreign Service) officer based in Seoul.
It is more often discussed — sometimes gleefully‹by Asian "friends" of
the U.S. in Seoul coffee shops and Pusan bars and in Tokyo at diplomatic
receptions and on the golf course.
"Simply put, from the Korean War through at least the mid-1980s, the
Pentagon acted as if it were in charge in Korea," said a retired U.S. Army
colonel now working in Japan. He spoke frankly, on the grounds of anonymity.
"The Eighth Army commander had more clout than the U.S. Ambassador to Korea.
This was particularly the case during the regime of General-then-President
Park Chung-hee.
"After all, Park and his relative Kim Jong-pil and later Lee Hu-rak
fashioned the Korean CIA on the U.S. model."
It is widely known that Embassy operatives generally think the
military lacks tact and finesse. Military officers think most State types
are shy of "field smarts."
Some analysts believe North Korea¹s leader Kim Jong-il has correctly
read the extent of differences on the U.S. side and exploited them.
In some ways, though an oversimplification, Kim Dae-jung has been
State¹s "baby." Put another way, his policies have gained more State
support than than that accorded South Korea¹s string of military leaders.
Kim Dae-jung was kidnapped from Japan and nearly killed by Park
Chung-hee¹s KCIA. U.S. intervention saved his life. Later under death
sentence from strongman President Chun Doo-hwan, the U.S. again intervened.
Kim was spared and Chun visited the White House as part of the deal.
The military-civilian rivalry and controversy in Korea goes back at
least as far as the April 11,1951 firing by President Harry Truman of
General Douglas MacArthur who wanted to carry the Korean War fighting to
China.
The current State vs. Pentagon rivalry doesn¹t go that distance. Most
Americans accept the principle of civilian control over the military.
Or do they?
A recent example, not in Korea but in Indonesia, illuminates the
question.
Admiral Dennis Blair, head of the U.S.Pacific Command, wanted to repair
military ties with the world¹s fourth-largest country. But the
U.S.ambassador to Indonesia, Robert Gelbard, had opposed the trip, as had
some at State and in Congress.
They believed a mission by the admiral would run counter to the goal of
punishing the military¹s rampage in East Timor. The aim was to pressure the
Indonesian Army into adopting reforms demanded by the country¹s first
democratically elected president in 31 years.
As Dana Priest wrote in the International Herald Tribune Oct.2,
"Admiral Blair persuaded the National Security Council to let him visit
Jakarta over Ambassador Gelbard¹s objections. It was a diplomatic triumph
that underscored the growing policy clout of the regional commandersŠ who
oversee global Defense Deparment operations.
"But their philosophies of building alliances abroad sometimes clash
with civilian views."
Secretary of State Madeline Albright on Sept. 30 expressed her
willingness to visit North Korea before leaving office in January, officials
said. Mrs. Albright has had very little to do with the Korean question.
Aides to U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen may have winced at
the announcement because they are known to have hoped their boss would be
the first high-ranking U.S.official to visit the North, which has long been
the battlefield enemy.
Edward Neilan (eneilan@crisscross.com) is a veteran journalist, based in Tokyo, who covers East Asia and writes weekly for World Tribune.com.