Special to WorldTribune.com

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs

By whatever name, the unilaterally-imposed no-fly zone over an area of Syria, proposed by the U.S. and Turkey on July 27, is not an element of a supposed entry by Turkey into the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (asad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-‘Iraq wash-Sham: DI’ISH).

It is solely about reigniting Turkey’s war to overthrow the Syrian government and to expand its war against Kurdish groups living — and also fighting the ISIL — inside Syria.

The proposed no-fly zone, dismissed several times by U.S. and international defense officials, does not assist in the coalition’s prosecution of its war against DI’ISH, but actually brings the U.S. and other states into what could now be a protracted conflict inside Syria. It also, once again, places the U.S. and Turkey intractably into opposition with Iran — Syria’s main ally — only weeks after the U.S. Obama Administration (as part of the P5+1 states) signed an accord with Iran to start normalization of relations.

The U.S.-Turkey move on the no-fly zone is the Obama Administration’s attempt to win back the confidence of Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which are all anti-Iranian proponents of the overthrow of the Syrian Government, following the Obama-led deal with Iran to curb Iranian nuclear weapons production. One of the great elements of ongoing mutual distrust between the U.S. and Iran, which delayed any agreement on nuclear weapons until this point, was the fact that the U.S. consistently gave to Teheran with one hand and took with the other.

The latest gesture on the no-fly zone in Syria, ostensibly in exchange for Turkish air power support in the “war” — essentially a phony war — against DI’ISH, however, threatens to widen the Syrian war and coalition involvement in it, without actually addressing the Islamic Caliphate itself.

Indeed, the action actually strengthens ISIL by helping to remove Syrian forces from the equation in key areas. Moreover, the imposition of the no-fly zone and Turkish involvement against Syrian and Kurdish fighters invites what will almost certainly be a strong but discreet response from Iran and Russia. They should be expected to help bolster Syrian air defenses against Turkey on the one hand, and Iranian support for Kurdish groups in and around Turkey on the other.

Certainly Iran always remains cautious about how much leeway to give the anti-Turkish Kurdish forces, given the reality that Iran has its own significant Kurdish minority which it does not wish to encourage into separatist tendencies. But Teheran now sees the P5+1 Accords as merely an event which it must treat with caution, rather than as a new and real opening to the West. Once again, as far as Tehran is concerned, the U.S. has spoken out of both sides of its mouth.

The transformed U.S.-Turkish strategic policy became apparent when three Turkish Air Force (Türk Hava Kuvvetleri) F-16C combat aircraft from the 2nd Tactical Air Force Command (2nci Taktik Hava Kuvveti Komutanligi), stationed in the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakir dropped four precision- guided bombs on an ISIL (DI’ISH) headquarters and an assembly point near Havar village in Syria, near the Turkish border and across from the Turkish city of Kilis, on July 24.

The air strikes, which were said to have delivered the ordnance without the F-16s crossing into Syrian airspace, came a day after a gunfight with ISIL militants across the border in Syria, which left a Turkish soldier dead, and after a suicide bombing in Suruç, on July 20, killed 32 people.

Turkish Prime Minister Dr Ahmet Davutoglu said that a total of 590 suspected members of ISIL, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and other militant groups, were arrested in raids across Turkey which began on the morning of July 24. Ankara also gave permission for U.S. forces to use its Inçirlik base for Coalition air strikes against ISIL positions and personnel in Syria and Iraq.

The deal included a partial no-fly zone covering a 90km strip between the Syrian towns of Marea and Jarabulus which would extend approximately 50km deep. Syrian combat aircraft would be prohibited from entering the no-fly zone and attacked if they did. As a result, the Turkish government was able to win U.S. support for its long-held desire to have a no-fly zone declared for Syrian aircraft in Syrian airspace.

On July 26, Prime Minister Davutoglu confirmed that Turkish combat aircraft had struck five camps of PKK militants on Kandil Mountain in northern Iraq, where the group’s military forces were based. The PKK responded by saying that the truce with Turkey, largely an effective ceasefire since 2013, had no more meaning after the intense air strikes by the Turkish Army on PKK sites.

The proposed (and now de facto) no-fly zone is likely to be expanded now that the principle has been established, but it also highlighted the reality that the Turkish Air Force is still exceptionally cautious about Syrian Air Force and Syrian Air Defense capabilities. Moreover, it is clear that the no-fly zone has nothing whatsoever to do with ISIL, given that its combatants do not have any combat aircraft.

Turkish Air Force aircraft have, on two occasions (one in 2014, one in 2015) shot down Syrian aircraft, believed to have been an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (UAV) and a helicopter, all with actions initiated by Turkey inside Turkish airspace, firing into Syrian airspace. But when Turkey attempted in 2012 to violate Syrian airspace with a McDonnell RF-4E Phantom II high-speed reconnaissance aircraft near Lattakia, in Western Syria, in 2012, it was clear that the Turkish Air Force was unprepared for the level of capability of the Syrians. Syrian Air Defense Forces in March 2015 also brought down a UAV, possibly a U.S. system.

It is uncertain whether Syria has acquired, or may soon acquire, Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. It already has several (possibly five) major S-200 (NATO codename: SA-5 Gammon) SAM sites, but it has also added hardware hardware including unspecified numbers of Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound), 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly), and Pechora-2M (SA-3 Goa) systems.

As a result, the no-fly zone is an attempt by Turkey to have the U.S. clear the area of Syrian air and air defense forces, giving Turkey a clear run against Kurdish and Syrian targets.

The Turkish agreement to allow U.S. combat aircraft to fly missions against ISIL from the Turkish base at Inçirlik was certainly not meant by Ankara to further the coalition war against DI’ISH, but to provide U.S. cover for Turkish offensive operations against Syria and the Kurds.

Meanwhile, as well, the Turkish Air Force has stepped up its penetration of Greek airspace over the Aegean Sea, largely in an effort to drain off still more of Greece’s dwindling defense budget.

Hellenic Air Force F-16 responses to Turkish Air Force penetrations cost Greece some $10,000 per flying hour, and penetrations have come, recently, at as many as 10 times a day. Ankara has now committed to reviving its offensive in the face of recent isolation, but, equally, Iran — possibly with discreet support — will now move against Turkey.

  Incirlik air base, Kurdish militia, PKK, Syria, Turkey wins U.S. re-engagement against Syria in potentially fatal blow to Iran rapproachement