Legalistic Iran accord missed the whole point of the diplomatic exercise

Special to WorldTribune.com

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs

The interim accord between the P5+1 states (the P5 or five permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely United States, Russia, People’s Republic of China, United Kingdom, and France, plus Germany) and Iran, signed in Geneva on Nov. 24, to constrain Iranian production of weapons-grade fissile material, was a modest diplomatic success for its participants, but it still failed to address the underlying problem.

The negotiations, and the accord, focus on what could be termed a “legalistic” issue: the constraint of Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

September talks included Secretary of State John Kerry, left, and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, second from right and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, right.  /European External Action Service/Flickr
September talks included U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, left, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, second from right, and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, right. /European External Action Service/Flickr

The real challenge, however, is not Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons, but the intent of its national leadership. The real cause for concern by regional and international players is less that Iran would have nuclear weapons than the perception that it was hostile enough, and perhaps unstable enough, to use those weapons, particularly against Israel or Saudi Arabia. If the potential threat of the use of nuclear weapons, or force, by Iran against Israel and Saudi Arabia disappeared, then so, too, would much of the concern in Jerusalem and Riyadh about Iran.

That underlying issue has not even begun to be addressed by the principal negotiators, because their driving force is the legalism of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has assumed quasi-religious proportions, overriding considerations of underlying geostrategic concerns, either of Iran or of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Part of the challenge in this arena, however, is that both Iran and Israel have painted themselves into rhetorical corners since the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, but particularly since the U.S.-led Gulf War I, in 1990-91.

If this dialectical/philosophical stance — so critical to the credibility of the respective leaderships of the three main regional powers involved — was overcome, then the results would, indeed, be a strategic breakthrough of a scale not seen since the Camp David Accords following the October 1973 War.

A return to a Western (and particularly Israeli) zone of comfort with Iran would also be of profound implication to Russia and Saudi Arabia, however: it may be that something similar to the status quo ante would uncomfortable for Moscow and Riyadh. But not necessarily so.

It is significant that no nuclear weapons state has operationally employed (detonated) nuclear weapons since the “demonstration” use of atomic bombs against Nagasaki and Hiroshima in the closing stages of World War II. But that is not to say that nuclear weapons have not been used in the interim. They have provided deterrence against incoming attacks against the nuclear states; they have provided an impression of great power status and prestige. But at a great cost to the nuclear powers.

Only South Africa has surrendered its possession of nuclear weapons. But only South Africa, among the nuclear weapon states, faced no threat which required a big kinetic deterrent. South Africa transformed, as most states do, from within; there was no viable target to repel or attack with its nuclear weapons.

The Nov. 24, interim agreement with Iran promises immediate reduction in Iran’s production of nuclear materials which could be made weaponizable in exchange for some economic relief, including the release of embargoed (retained) Iranian funds in offshore banks. Domestically, it gave the leaders of the U.S. and Iran a notional success. For U.S. President Barack Obama, it was a small gain, but one which he ensured could be handled without reference to the U.S. Congress, which would be unlikely to ratify a suspension of the U.S. trade quarantine of Iran at this point. For Iranian President Hassan Rowhani and Supreme Leader “Ayatollah” Ali Khamenei, the deal promised some immediate economic relief which vindicated a break with the strong rhetorical position of no-negotiation on sovereign issues.

The unspoken reality is that Iran already has some fielded, but imported, nuclear weapons, and a strategic command and control capability to sustain them. Equally, Iran would reasonably be expected in the future to continue to pursue a strategic weapons capability. Indeed, quite apart from its nuclear program, it is already doing so with its cyber capabilities, offensive and defensive. These, in fact, may be more critical than the nuclear weapons in all respects other than political and perceptional deterrence.

Perhaps the most significant fundamental which has to be addressed, then, is how to achieve what the singular act of Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat achieved with his breakthrough and unilateral initiative to seek an end to hostilities between Egypt and Israel, which culminated in the Camp David Accords. It is the equivalent of “Nixon in China”. Of course, U.S. President Barack Obama would move heaven and earth to be seen as the broker for such a transformative move, but it may not be up to him. It may be up to President Rowhani, or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The question, then, would become how such a move could be undertaken.

Such a diplomatic breakthrough would profoundly affect the strategic interests not only of Iran and Israel, but also Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Turkey, as well as the EU and the U.S. This would entail carefully planned diplomacy of a profound and nuanced nature.

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