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The announcement on June 24, 2012, of the election to the Egyptian presidency of the pro-Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) (Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-’Adala) candidate Mohammed Mursi, began to hint at the impact of the United States’ effective withdrawal in the past three years from its earlier preeminent position in the Middle East, and the subsequent support by the U.S. Obama White House for Islamist politicians.

The shape of potential strategic consequences for U.S., Western, and regional interests is now beginning to show.

The most immediate major negative impact on the U.S., Europe, and global traders will almost certainly be the the start of a trend — among other trends — toward the loss of predictability for the major global trading nations over the Suez Canal and Red Sea sealanes of communications (SLOCs).

It is now difficult to see how the six decades of military dominance of Egypt can now be sustained in the wake of the election of Mohammed Mursi, despite the sweeping decree made by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) on June 17, 2012, dissolving the Parliament and giving the Armed Forces substantial new, and overarching powers.

It is unlikely that the Islamist groups — or the incoming president — will accept this, and it is equally unlikely that the Egyptian Armed Forces would allow themselves to be used to fire on Egyptians to suppress any new rebellion.

It is now likely, then, that Egypt would, at its most stable, emulate a Turkish-style Islamist governmental pattern, perhaps even — as Ankara has been promoting — in concert with a Turkish-led bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean. This may not, in the short term, lead to any major disruptions in the management of the Suez Canal Authority, although the present Chairman of the Authority, VADM (rtd.) Ahmed Aly Faddel, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, is coming up for retirement, after seeing the Canal through a major period of improvements. His replacement, and the entire Egyptian policy toward the Canal and traditional alliance structures, will likely be increasingly beyond the influence of the SCAF.

But more important than this, given the reality that even an Islamist Government of Egypt would wish to sustain the Canal revenues, is the fact that Egyptian policy toward the Red Sea and Horn of Africa (as well as the Arabian Peninsula) seem set to change.

There have been no indications as to what this might mean, but it is clear that even Saudi Arabia, with its strongly religious governmental character, is concerned. Indeed, Saudi King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz reportedly made it clear to Egyptian SCAF head — and de facto Egyptian leader until the installation of the new president — Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, when they met at the funeral on June 17, 2012, in Jeddah of Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister Nayif bin ‘Abd al-’Aziz al Sa’ud, that Saudi Arabia would support the SCAF in taking a strong line to retain control and stability in Egypt. But this may not be enough, particularly if — as threatened — the Islamists insist on widespread rioting and armed confrontation if the SCAF does not relinquish control of the Government.

It remained to be seen by June 24, 2012, whether President Mursi would be able to sustain a good working relationship with the SCAF and its new “governmental” arm, the National Defense Council. The new president may be seen as the “moderate face” of the Muslim Brothers, but there was little doubt that a profound process of change had begun with his election.

What is significant is that the changes would, possibly for as long as a year or more, take the form of “disguised change”, with President Mursi gradually attempting to achieve a dominance over the Armed Forces which the Turkish Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party: AKP) achieved under Prime Minister Recep Erdogan. Indeed, at the very least, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan would be expected to attempt to take advantage of the Mursi election to develop an alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly geared against Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. This would be particularly important as those three Eastern Mediterranean states work together — in many areas with Egypt — to develop contiguous or neighboring offshore gas fields to provide a base of exports to the European Union (EU).

There is no indication that President Mursi would work to limit Egypt’s interests merely to accommodate Turkey, or even the Palestinian Authority, but there can be no doubt that the mood has changed in Egypt, and with it much of the secular nature of Egyptian society.

The influence and flexibility of the Egyptian Coptic Christian community is officially put at just under 10 percent of the population (although some estimates claim a higher percentage). Equally, the new Islamist/Islamic nature of the Egyptian presidency will impact to some degree how Cairo deals with the delicate situation in neighboring Libya, where Ikhwani influence on the Chairman of the Interim Transitional National Council (NLC), Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, is already profound. This comes at a time when equally-profoundly anti-Ikhwani sentiments are being demonstrated by the Senussiyah Muslim society of the Libyan region of Cyrenaica, which abuts the Egyptian border.

By early June, there were already reports of a massive inflow of small arms and medium weapons to Egypt from the Libyan caches built up by the late Moammar Gadhafi. Numerous Egyptian Islamists who received asylum in Sudan but were prevented from returning to Egypt under an agreement originally reached between Mubarak and Hassan al-Turabi are now being permitted to return and bolster the ranks of the jihadist movements.

At the same time, as noted, the Egyptian Armed Forces are reluctant to suppress the Egyptian population, while, indeed, there is an unknown Islamist-supporting group of personnel within the Armed Forces. The repeated “we are brothers” celebrations conducted for Egyptian troops, NCOs and junior officers in Cairo and other major mosques since early 2011, in which the attending military personnel vowed not to shoot on their brethren civilians under any circumstances, should — and do — unnerve the SCAF.

There are many potential ramifications from the trend which now sees the Armed Forces “giving ground” to the Islamists. But for the time being, the Armed Forces, during June 24, in particular, began quietly moving into positions to constrain any possible eruptions of unrest. Port Said, for example, a key location at the Mediterranean end of the Suez Canal, was under lockdown.

One, for example, could impact the cooperative architecture which has been developed between Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus on the exploitation of the Eastern Mediterranean gas fields, which are the key to South Eastern Europe’s economic recovery. Any cooperation between an Islamist Government in Egypt and an Islamist Government in Turkey would — and with Washington’s support — put significant limitations on Greece and Cyprus, as well as on Israel (which hopes to link its gas fields into an export chain to Europe).

The other is Egyptian policy toward the Red Sea littoral states, including the Horn of Africa. This would, under an FJP government, be more ideologically than strategically motivated, and could well include renewed support for destabilization activities against Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia. Equally, the potential exists for a worsening of relations between Egypt and Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia — which could set the stage for long-term security issues. These, too, would have ramifications for the safety and viability of the Suez Canal.

Certainly, although some in Washington believe that an Islamist government in Egypt would be favorably accepted by the Iranian government, it is more likely that Teheran would view an Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers)-leaning Egyptian government as merely an extension of the anti-Iranian/anti-Shi’ite bloc built around Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which aims to contain Iran’s dominance of the Persian Gulf and its overland reach to the Mediterranean. [There are ongoing discussions between the Ikhwani leadership and Tehran on the joint formation of an anti-Western/anti-Zionist Islamic bloc, and while Tehran is not happy about some of the anti-Shi’ite positions of the Ikhwani, the Iranian clerics view the overall situation positively.]

One factor cannot yet be determined, however: the experience and maneuvering ability of Field Marshal Tantawi. His role in the past two years has been to manage the departure of former President Hosni Mubarak and to attempt to salvage what could be saved of the military’s management of Egypt.

No one has been more angered by the Mubarak excesses than Field Marshal Tantawi over the years, and it was he who ultimately forced Mubarak to resign before full-scale civil war erupted. But Tantawi now finds himself ostracized by the U.S., which has placed all its hopes on building a relationship with the Muslim Brothers and their allies, not just in Egypt, but also in Libya, Syria, and Turkey.

The question is whether a more pragmatic administration may take over in the U.S. with the November 2012 elections, and whether Washington would then try to recover its prestige and influence in the Middle East, as President Ronald Reagan did after President Jimmy Carter?

  Coptic Christians, Election of an Islamist in Egypt shows strategic impact of weak U.S. posture under Obama, Field Marshal Mohammed Hussen Tantawi, Freedom and Justice Party, Hosni Mubarak, Mohammed Mursi, Mulim Brotherhood, Recep Erdogan, Suez Canal