Special to WorldTribune.com

Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, Global Information System / Defense & Foreign Affairs

Crisis and violence linger in South Sudan more than two months after Riek Machar’s failed coup attempt.

Fighting continues at varying levels of intensity and geographic spread. Fratricidal violence refuses to die down. Surges of tribal and clan clashes continue to the detriment of the civilian population caught in the crossfire.

The destruction is damaging to a country still at the beginning of a recovery process from a generation-long bitter and destructive independence war. While rebel forces have been responsible for the majority of these clashes, government forces are not blame-free as evidenced by arrest of officers and soldiers who allowed themselves to be caught up in excesses.

The political process and negotiations are going nowhere. The opposition is irreconcilably divided between Machar’s camp, which insists on seizing power, and the former prisoners’ bloc qguxg only wants profound reforms in Juba. The main problem, however, is the rebels’ inability to deliver on the most basic issue: a viable ceasefire. On the one hand, rebel leaders insist that they represent the people of South Sudan and that it is in their name, and in support for their leaders, that people took up arms. Commanders, soldiers, and units defected, and took on their erstwhile comrades and wreaked havoc in numerous townships.

On the other hand, the moment the African Union (AU) and the regional Inter-Governmental Authoruity on Development (IGAD) mediators demand cessation of hostilities as part of the start of negotiations in Addis Ababa, the same rebel leaders disavow responsibility, insist that they are not in control of the various armed factions and forces, and therefore cannot order them to cease the carnage and fighting. Simply put, if the negotiators in Addis Ababa and their bosses cannot deliver most of the fighting forces, whose leaders are they? In whose name and mandate do they negotiate?

The situation is further complicated by growing pressure from the U.S.-led West. Western officials now threaten sanctions and the withdrawal of badly needed humanitarian and financial aid. The U.S. and other Western governments have demanded reforms in governance and human rights which are out of touch with reality on the ground, but clearly endorse and reinforce the rhetoric of the Machar rebel camp. As well, the U.S. is encouraging and pressuring both the United Nations (UN) and the AU to deploy predominantly African international forces, ostensibly to support the UN forces in South Sudan and in reality assume responsibility for the security in, and control over, South Sudan. The Western beating of the drums cannot be ignored by official Juba as it is desperately trying to resolve the crisis with the least possible harm to the people and the land.

However, it is the emerging long-term patterns which raise the overall threat in the lingering crisis. The greatest danger is the growing loss of commitment to the State among the rebels.

Despite the repeated claims to patriotism by Machar and coterie, there is clear evidence to the contrary. The repeated attacks on, and growing damage to, oil facilities, as well as the cycles of violence and carnage in and around Malakal, testify to this trend. Most disturbing are the damage to the oil fields in Paloch, particularly the nearby crude oil processing facilities, and the destruction of large numbers of huts and houses in Malakal in mid-February 2014 by various opposition forces including elements of the White Army. If Machar really cared about his country as he insists, he should have restrained his followers and forces, and prevented damage to strategic infrastructure which serves all South Sudanese irrespective of who’s the leader.

Hence, the escalating violence in and around Malakal suggests that either Machar does not care about South Sudan’s vital oil infrastructure, or he is not in control of the fighting forces, which raises questions about his claim to leadership of the opposition.

No less telling is the dramatic change in Sudan’s involvement in the crisis in South Sudan.

Initially, Khartoum provided extensive military and logistical support to Riek Machar and the various opposition forces operating in the northern and northeastern parts of South Sudan. However, Khartoum soon became increasingly apprehensive about the impact of a possible collapse of South Sudan, and President Omar al-Bashir hurried in early January 2014 to Juba to express support for South Sudan and offer help in mediating an end to the conflict. However, as the conflict lingers on, Khartoum reverted since mid-February its policy in South Sudan and the adjacent southern parts of Sudan. Sudan is once again sponsoring anti-Juba forces in order to expedite the subversion of South Sudan.

The various rebel forces could not have persevered and even expand operations without the Sudanese military supplies. Concurrently, Sudanese forces resumed the escalation of offensive operations and bombing throughout South Kordofan and Blue Nile States. There has been a discernable increase in the use of cluster munitions (aka parachute bombs) in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan State. There is an overall escalation in the fighting near, and pushing by Sudanese large forces toward, the border of South Sudan. As well, Sudanese jihadist groups once again have been raiding northern border areas of South Sudan while also providing, on behalf of Khartoum, military support to the various opposition forces in the northern parts of South Sudan.

Meanwhile, Sudanese state media resumed accusations that SPLM-N forces operating in southern Sudan were being sheltered in, and helped by, South Sudan.

The regional character and spillover of the fighting in South Sudan affect a growing number of states.

Sudan resumed helping the rebel forces with weapons and supplies as part of Khartoum’s reassessment of Sudan’s own regional strategy.

Iran and Sudan are back, ready to resume their strategic surge westwards into the heart of Africa. The surge was originally planned to being in the Summer of 2013 but was neutralized when then-President Djotodia changed sides and prevented the Sudanese and their allies from using the CAR as a springboard westwards. In early 2014, several Iranian intelligence and IRGC experts arrived in Port Sudan and Khartoum. They began providing their Sudanese counterparts with help vis-à-vis Egypt, as well as in the fratricidal fighting throughout Sudan, and in the crackdown and coercion of the domestic opposition, and planning the resumption of the geographic surge.

The worldwide Islamist media is already raising the alarm about the West-sanctioned persecution of brethren Muslims in the Central African Republic and is urging jihadists to come to Sudan to join the jihad across the border. Meanwhile, operating out of Port Sudan, the 29th Fleet of the Iranian Navy has intensified operations and patrols in the Red Sea between the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandeb.

To highlight the intensified strategic cooperation, Bashir on January 20, 2014, dispatched the Speaker of Parliament Al-Fatih Izz al-Din to Tehran for a high-visibility visit. In their meeting, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated that Iran’s “strategic policy is to strengthen ties with African countries” and emphasized that “Sudan has special status in this regard”. Rouhani noted that Iranian-Sudanese relations were “excellent” because the two countries were “close culturally and revolutionarily”. In his response, Al-Fatih Izz al-Din reiterated Sudan’s eagerness “to harness [its] resources and facilities [in order] to develop bilateral ties”.

The key to resolving the crisis in South Sudan, as well as most other African states, is in longterm development and reforms focused on the betterment of security, stability, good governance, and overall quality of life and future prospects. If the state and local sub-state authorities were recognized as the purveyors of these needs, then the grassroots communities would support and legitimize the State. The instant-gratification providing of humanitarian aid by international bodies — important and well-meaning as it might be — contributes nothing to long-term solutions because aid does not influence the commitment to the State.

Moreover, foreign military often intervention aggravates the situation because foreign forces have proven incapable of stopping the carnage and have had negligible impact on fratricidal fighting while eroding the authority and prestige of the state as the key to security and stability.

The U.S. and French emasculation of the CAR’s security forces and their replacement with French and Francophone African forces has already had this effect. As well, fratricidal violence resumes in both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo Brazzaville (RC) despite repeated intervention by UN and AU forces. These bouts of fratricidal violence and spreading insurrection are all part of the same pattern: namely, the collapse of the African state due to grassroots disenchantment and loss of faith. Overbearing presence of international forces — UN and AU affiliated — only aggravates the situation.

The only way out of this growing quagmire is by applying African solutions to African problems.

Reversal of these trends goes beyond the capabilities of the African state.

Hence, viable long-term solutions need to be sought in regional context. Western experts have long considered the band/strip comprised of the Republic of South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Cameroon to be both a viable region for accelerated development in the near future and the core of a wider regional alliance.

The proven and estimated energy and mineral reserves and resources in both the Republic of South Sudan and the Central African Republic make the entire region an ideal location for long-term development and strategic cooperation. The West needs the region’s energy and mineral (including diamond) reserves and resources, particularly as Nigeria has been undergoing considerable security stress, and the availability of its energy reserves has been regarded as perhaps coming into question if the present round of political and security concerns is not rectified quickly.

Cameroon’s sea ports are the key to safe shipping to the West around West Africa and into the northern Atlantic and away from threatened choke-points.

These characteristics make the three countries an ideal location for long-term development and strategic cooperation that might further evolve and expand to the entire region. Moreover, the three-state regional cooperation can expand to oil-rich Gabon and Equatorial Guinea because of the newly-discovered extensive off-shore oil and gas fields, as well as to Uganda (with untapped oil and mineral reserves), and Kenya (should an access to the Indian Ocean be also sought). While the progress toward implementation was recently slowed down due to the crises and violence, the revival of such long-term development can help ameliorate the violence and crisis by attracting the local population with security, stability and employment.

Western leaders and senior officials remain encouraged since both President Salva Kiir Mayardit and President Catherine Samba-Panza expressed interest in principle in the regional development programs. The interest of Juba and Bangui is crucial given the centrality of the natural resources in their soil and the expediency in developing a common transportation infrastructure to the Atlantic coast.

Juba is considered the key regional capital because of President Kiir’s involvement in other regional political dynamics and expressed commitment to long-term national and economic development. However, official Juba is yet to undertake concrete steps much to the chagrin of the key interested and committed foci of power in official Berlin, Moscow, London, Brussels, and other capitals. Because of the escalating crisis in Nigeria, the expectations keep growing among Western leaders and senior officials that both Juba and Bangui will commit and start implementation. The Republic of South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and any other country joining this bloc would benefit immensely from the West’s growing interest in expediting the development of oil and mineral resources, as well as regional infrastructure.

Western senior officials and experts with whom I have spoken have expressed the hope that President Kiir would start implementing long-term development programs despite, and because of, the lingering crisis in South Sudan. Any such development in Juba would reverberate throughout the region. Although President Samba-Panza is also committed to national and regional development, the extent of the chaos and uncertainty in Bangui makes it impossible for her to lead any regional undertaking.

Instead, Bangui would gladly follow the example set by others: that is, Juba. The West needs the energy and mineral (including diamond) reserves and resources in both countries. Cameroon’s sea ports are one key to safe shipping to the West around West Africa and into the northern Atlantic. These characteristics make the three countries an ideal location for long-term development and strategic cooperation which might further evolve and expand to the entire region.

The West is waiting for President Kiir and his colleagues to reiterate that they are cognizant of the new sense of urgency in the West, and that they are ready to help the West help them turn around the heart of Africa.

  Chaos in the heart of Africa: Time for S. Sudan to act and for U.S.-enabled rebels, Juba, Riek Machar, Salva Kiir, Sudan and Iran to back off