The Bergdahl swap with 5 Taliban prisoners of ‘high intelligence value’ may expedite deal with Boko Haram

Special to WorldTribune.com

GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs

The U.S. Barack Obama Administration was, on June 2, coming under intense domestic and international criticism for violating a fundamental tenet of Western alliance states not to “negotiate with terrorists” or militant groups, or enter into concessions with “terrorist organizations” for the release of its nationals captured by those forces.

The issue was raised over the release of the last remaining U.S. military hostage held by the Afghan Taliban, in exchange for five high-profile Afghan inmates held by the U.S. in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Taliban5-300x225Significantly, the move by the Obama White House could act as a license for the Nigerian government of President Goodluck Jonathan to negotiate an exchange of suspected Boko Haram prisoners for the more than 200 schoolgirls being held for ransom by Boko Haram in or near northeastern Nigeria.

It would be difficult for the U.S. to criticize the Jonathan Administration if it did now negotiate for the release of the schoolgirls.

France has on numerous occasions in recent times already violated the “no payment of ransom to terrorists” by quietly paying heavily for the release of French nationals captured by Boko Haram in Cameroon, and for prisoners held elsewhere.

Taliban fighters on May 31, released the sole remaining U.S. military hostage, Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl, 28, to a team of U.S. troops in Khost Province, in eastern Afghanistan near the Pakistan border. He had been held captive for nearly five years.

In exchange — and as a result of negotiations by the Qatari government — the five influential Taliban commanders, including the former head of the Taliban’s army, were put onto a U.S. military aircraft bound for Qatar after U.S. officials received confirmation that Bergdahl had been freed.

Bergdahl’s “safety and health were both in jeopardy” and officials had to act quickly to obtain his release, according to remarks made by U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on June 1. At the time of his disappearance, Sgt. Bergdahl was off-base and not where he should have been, leading to speculation at the time that he had deserted.

The released Guantanamo inmates included Mullah Mohammad Fazl, a former Taliban deputy Defense Minister. The other four released Guantanamo prisoners were also senior Taliban officials: Khair Ulla Said Wali Khairkhwa, Mullah Norullah Nori, Abdul Haq Wasiq, and Mohammad Nabi Omari.

Khair Ulla Said Wali Khairkhwa was an early member of the Taliban in 1994 and was Interior Minister during the Taliban’s rule. He is from the same tribe as Afghan President Hamid Karzai and was captured in January 2002. Khairkhwa’s most prominent position was as governor of Herat province from 1999 to 2001, and he was alleged to have been “directly associated” with Osama bin Laden.

According to a detainee assessment, Khairkhwa also was probably associated with Al Qaida’s now-deceased leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi. He was described as one of the “major opium drug lords in western Afghanistan” and a “friend” of Karzai. He was arrested in Pakistan and was transferred to Guantanamo in May 2002. During questioning, Khairkhwa denied all knowledge of extremist activities.

Mullah Mohammad Fazl commanded the main force fighting the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance in 2001, and served as Chief of Army Staff under the Taliban. He was accused of war crimes during Afghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s.

Fazl was detained after surrendering to Abdul Rashid Dostam, the leader of Afghanistan’s Uzbek community, in November 2001. He was wanted by the United Nations in connection with the killing of thousands of Afghan Shi’ites during the Taliban era. “When asked about the murders, he did not express any regret,” according to the detainee assessment. He was alleged to have been associated with several militant Islamist groups, including Al Qaida. He was transferred into U.S. custody in December 2001 and was one of the first arrivals at Guantanamo, where he was assessed as having high intelligence value.

Mullah Norullah Noori served as Governor of Balkh province in the Taliban era and played some role in coordinating the fight against the Northern Alliance. Like Fazl, Noori was detained after surrendering to Dostam, the Uzbek leader, in 2001. Noori claimed during interrogation that “he never received any weapons or military training”. According to 2008 detainee assessment, Noori “continues to deny his role, importance, and level of access to Taliban officials.” That same assessment characterized him as high risk and of high intelligence value.

Abdul Haq Wasiq was the deputy chief of the Taliban intelligence service. His cousin was head of the service. An administrative review in 2007 cited a source as saying that Wasiq was also “an Al Qaida intelligence member” and had links with members of another militant Islamist group, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. Wasiq claimed, according to the review, that he was arrested while trying to help the United States locate senior Taliban figures. He denied any links to militant groups.

Mohammad Nabi Omari was a minor Taliban official in Khost Province. According to the first administrative review in 2004, he was a member of the Taliban and associated with both Al Qaida and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. He was the Taliban’s chief of communications and helped Al Qaida members escape from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Omari acknowledged this during hearings.

U.S. officials said on May 31, that under a memorandum of understanding signed by Washington and Doha, the men would be subject to a year-long travel ban in Qatar, in an attempt to ensure that they did not go immediately back to Afghanistan and into combat operations against U.S. forces. However, U.S. Defense Secretary Hagel only informed members of Congress on May 31, about the prisoner swap deal. The Administration was required by law to notify Congress about its intention to release Guantanamo detainees 30 days in advance.

As recently as the last week of May 2014, Nigerian President Jonathan had reportedly refused to consider a deal to exchange some 100 alleged Boko Haram detainees in exchange for the schoolgirls kidnapped by the group from Chibok Government Girls’ Secondary School on April 4. Although public pressure from the international media and international officials may have caused President Jonathan to have made a firm stand against “negotiating with terrorists” when he spoke at the May 17, summit of African leaders in Paris, the U.S. President’s move may make it easier for the Nigerian Government to now consider proceeding with the proposed deal — allegedly negotiated in an outline framework via intermediaries — with Boko Haram.

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