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Back in the 1960s infancy of contemporary terrorism, the sarcastic alibi for avoiding painful solutions was “our terrorists are your national liberationists.”
Nowhere, of course, has that contradiction between legitimate aspirations for national self-identity and barbarism been starker than in Asia — from the Palestinians in west Asia to Moslems in the southern Philippines.
It is a non sequitur to point out that these histories beg their legitimacy. “Palestine”, for example, as a concept applied to Arabs is recent. Only yesteryear the World War II the British Eighth Army’s Palestinian Brigade, were Jews. The first president of the Algerian Republic, Ferhat Abbas, in the 1930s questioned whether there was such a thing as an Algerian nation.
Ethnic, cultural, national, religious identity take on a legitimacy all their own when they accumulate supporters, as often as not fanatics who may not, initially at least, represent the majority.
That’s why America’s war on terrorism, as far as can be foretold, will have to go through three stages if it is to be successful in cutting through this miasma. Like autonomous terrorist cells’ concentric circles that must be neutralized, these phases must be pursued concurrently but will have to be dealt with using different weapons.
Phase 1, of course, is the elimination of Osama Ben Ladin’s apparatus which represents an immediate target because he brilliantly recruited fanatics on a transnational scale. And because he has announced that Americans, civilian and military, are his targets, a challenge that cannot be denied. Growing evidence connects him to earlier incidents if that is yet to be fully established in New York. This will be a military operation, however different it may be from such conventional campaigns such as The Gulf War.
Phase 2 will be the search for those who lent aid and comfort to Ben Ladin, and who Pres. Bush has promised will not escape the U.S.’ wrath. Increasingly, the speculation by those who know terrorism’s secrets is that an act of this sophistication needed assistance from one or more of the state terrorist organizations in pariah states like Syria, Libya, Iraq, Iran and Cuba, with tentacles into the moderate Moslem states.
It is here that efficacy runs into political considerations. Pakistan’s intelligence organization, for example, the ISI, has direct connections to the “Afghan Arabs” — Moslem recruits trained in Afghanistan, perhaps by Osama Ben Ladin’s organization, and dispatched to “liberate” Kashmir. This has already resulted in a bitter dispute between them and the more moderate Kashmiri Moslem organizations which could turn into further internecine warfare already claiming a dozen lives daily.
Cleaning up these government ties to violence, whatever their political rationalization, has to be high on Washington’s agenda, whether they be among our present allies against Ben Ladin or belong to governments that choose not to collaborate.
Phase 3, is the much more nebulous world of political camouflage. Too often governments in the Western alliance devoted to peaceful pursuit of political conflict, have permitted “cheating” by above ground political organizations. It is no secret that London has long felt U.S. authorities have not pursued with sufficient vigor supposedly legitimate fundraising organizations for Irish unification, but which are in reality logistics networks for the IRA. The explanation lies in American domestic politics and sympathy of Irish Americans. While New Delhi is eager to produce evidence of the Pakistan government’s involvement in Kashmir violence, only a few hours after the New York explosions another suicide bomber in Sri Lanka killed 29 civilians adding to a total of 70,000 lives over 18 years. These Tamil Tigers [ITTE], fighting against ethnic and religious discrimination, survives because of logistics ties to south India where New Delhi has been paralyzed by support among its own 65 million Tamils.
Yet, any successful long-term campaign against terrorism must deal with these issues. In the worldwide terrorist underworld the interconnections of groups, seemingly politically unrelated, is systemic. Only recently IRA activists were found courting Colombian narcoterrorists. Indian authorities found Tamil Tigers, originally trained under by the PLO, shared arms smuggling operations with Sikh terrorists who blew up a transAtlantic airliner. Qadaffi’s aid to the IRA has been established. Iranian aid to Hizb’allah in southern Lebanon against civilians in northern Israel is publicized. The Palestinian Abdul Nidal [famous as the author of the Achilles Lauro cruiseliner hijacking] works closely with ETA, Basque terrorists in Spain. Manila governments have endorsed Qadaffi’s “mediation” of terror episodes with Abu Sayyaf, offshoot of the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front of the southern Philippines, where the concept of using airplane-bombs may have originated.
The long list goes on.
It is this third circle of permissiveness by legitimate governments of terrorists’ above-ground operations which will be the hardest to crack, but must be on the agenda if peace is to be restored.
Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@abac.com), is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.
He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.