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That wonderful savant, Sir George Samson, tried his hand at defining “Asia” without much success. The process hasn’t got any easier — as the Bush II Administration is finding. There’s talk of juggling bureaus at State again. But it will take more than that old bureaucratic dodge.
One would have hoped that a new “Asia policy” would have come into focus. Granted that Bush’s plate is very full elsewhere, not to mention domestic concerns. Granted that none of the problems are easy. Granted that we are dealing with a stacked deck — not only the Clinton accretions, but basic problems of traditional societies entering the modern world.
But it might be time for a tally sheet:
China. It had become apparent even before Clinton’s departure that “strategic alliance had failed. In trade, burgeoning U.S. imports were not matched by amelioration of violations of intellectual property, opening, markets, etc. The Bush team pushed China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. But one must ask if Beijing has violated almost every other international undertaking, why assume it would adhere to painful WTO requirements?
Furthermore, the mantra that growing trade with China will solve all problems has become as much of a recititive with this opera company. It certainly will not solve the problem of transfer of warmaking potentital [proved already in missile development]. In other words, we are continuing the Clinton regime’s strategy in all but name.
Taiwan. It is a cliché this is the flash point of Asia. I doubt the Chinese will have the ability in near future to take the island. Nor do I believe that acquiring Taiwan is their highest priority. What is increasingly evident is Beijing means to use the same methodology, which won the Communists the Mainland — intimidation, exploitation divisions, and seduction with economic incentives. What does Washington do? Bush initially did the only thing one could: reaffirm, dramatically and with precision, America’s commitment so that U.S. policy was not in play. Unfortunately, despite the lukewarm decision to send additional weapons, Washington has been backing off ever since.
Japan. One never knows when he is standing in the middle of the floodtide of history where the markers are. But there is every reason to believe the Japanese are going through as revolutionary a change, perhaps greater, than at the end of World War II— the demographic disaster, new attitudes toward Japanese cultural icons, personalities replacing institutions in Japanese politics, etc. The Bush-Koizumi meeting was “aisatsu” [protocol]. There is little initiative from the American side and Koizumi is foundering in a sea of cheap popularity.
Korea. Again, Bush initially rejected what had been a typical Clinton coverup of North Korean intentions. But a combination of hesitancy and lack of resolve in Seoul has left the policy on hold.
South Asia. The Bush team jumped on the Clinton Indian Express with gusto. They ignored inherent weaknesses of New Delhi, its vulnerability to the Chinese should we try to use them as a foil, and the danger of further alienating a nuclear-armed Pakistan near the end of its tether. The fantasy of sanctions, already long bypassed, still dangles, further jeopardizing fragile economies in both countries. Apparently, on the very cusp of the decision, sanity is returning — probably with resulting bitterness that has dogged U.S.-India relations.
Southeast Asia. In the old sore, the Bush Administration salted on the Clinton design [assisted by such worthies as Sen. McCain] in pretending that that we can do business with Hanoi, that by extending a helping hand [first recognition, and now a trade agreement] we can nurse a moribund, incredibly corrupt regime toward effectiveness much less moderation and liberalization.
In Indonesia, Bush moved further away from the policy of no-talk with the military, the only “national” institution in the Islands, however much it needs reform. Now hopefully Megawatti knows her severe limitations. There is a chance for American initiatives.that ought to come fast and furious because a fragmenting Indonesia creates new problems, not least its central role in once promising ASEAN.
Central Asia: American domestic politics — the Armenian/Greek lobby — has stalled the only real promise the U.S. had for barring Russian suzerainty reestablished over the oil rich region. P utin is making some progress at re-Rusifying the area, if only because in its present chaos the former Communist apparatchiks are returning to the devil they know. But the inability nge of getting Congress to come to the aid of Azerbaijan because of its enmity with Armenia, Moscow’s main ally, has demonstrated to the other former Soviet republics there is no surcease in Washington.
Perhaps it was always clear major changes in Asian policy were not to be had given the nature of American policymaking. But when Deputy Secretary of State Armacost makes a total ass of himself in Australia, one of the pieces in the Asian puzzle, by gross oversimplications in public statements, it is time to put a warning bell on the bull in the China shop.
Sol W. Sanders, (solsanders@abac.com), is an Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.
He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.