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GAO: U.S. ships vulnerable to cruise missile attacks

Christopher Holton
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Friday, July 21, 2000

On July 11, the General Accounting Office released a report that surely came as no surprise to anyone familiar with defense and maritime issues. It's title: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defenses.

The report concluded that our Navy was growing more vulnerable every day to anti-ship cruise missile attacks. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand this and the GAO's 58-page report ( http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00149.pdf ) could probably have been written in 5 pages or less by anyone who has served in the U.S. Navy over the past decade.

During the years of the Clinton administration, the U.S. fleet's ability to defend itself against anti-ship cruise missiles has been frozen in time in some aspects and degraded in other aspects. During this 7-year period, not one new weapon system has been added to the inventory to defend against cruise missile attack. Sure, a few systems that were developed and ordered during the Reagan and Bush administrations came on line during the early Clinton years (AEGIS Vertical Launch System, Rolling Airframe Missile, or RAM), but no new items have been added in 7 years. Meanwhile, the threat has been growing.

Cruise Missiles: The forgotten threat

When the Royal Navy's HMS Sheffield and the U.S. Navy's U.S.S. Stark were struck with Exocet cruise missiles in the 1980s, there was a high degree of awareness of the anti-ship missile threat. Today, the focus has shifted to the dangerous ballistic missile threat. But proliferation of cruise missiles is a serious threat also. Here is a list of some of the countries who have armed themselves with modern anti-ship missiles:

  • Iran
  • Iraq
  • Red China
  • North Korea
  • Russia
  • Libya
  • Cuba

And the cruise missiles are getting faster and harder to hit. According to Great Britain's authoritative Center for Defense and International Security Studies (CDISS http://www.cdiss.org ) Russia, Red China and Iran are all believed to possess Russia's Sunburn anti-ship missile, with its large payload (1000 pounds or more) and Mach 2.5 speed (1,650mph) at just above sea level. This threat is in another world from the Exocet that struck the Sheffield in 1983, which carried a 250 pound warhead at a speed of 500 miles per hour. With these 3 countries in possession of such a weapon, you can be sure that countries like North Korea, Iraq and Libya will start asking for the same thing. All they need to get the Sunburn is money.

There are more countries with more anti-ship cruise missiles around the world in 2000. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy's ability to defend itself against this threat was arguably greater back in 1991, before Bill Clinton got elected, than it is today.

Defense in depth

The U.S. Navy's strategy for defense against anti-ship missiles has always been based on "defense in depth." That defense in depth was comprised of 5 rings:

The first ring was manned by the E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft operating in tandem with the F-14 Tomcat armed with AIM-54C Phoenix air-to-air missiles. The E-2C, operating 100 miles or so from the carrier battle group can detect threats out another 200-300 miles at altitudes from near sea level all the way to 100,000 feet. The E-2 can detect aircraft and ships long before they get close enough to the carrier to launch a missile (anti-ship missiles have ranges up to about 185 miles). It can also detect missiles launched from submerged submarines (after the missile breaks the surface). This information is transferred to the F-14 Tomcat. The Tomcat's powerful radar can track 24 targets simultaneously and guide Phoenix missiles to six of them (the last 10 miles or so, the Phoenix guides itself with its own radar). The Phoenix is big enough to knock a strategic bomber out of the sky and smart enough and fast enough to knock a Sunburn down.

The first ring is aging and very close to becoming extinct. The E-2C has been around since the early 1980s. It has received some upgrades but its radar and systems are still basically the same. Potential adversaries have had 20 years to study the E-2C and develop ways to get around it. The F-14 Tomcat is one of the tragic stories of naval aviation. It's latest version, the F-14D, is arguably the worlds best fighter, but budget considerations and politics ensured that few of these were built. The majority of Tomcats in service are carrying the same radar and missiles they carried 20 years ago. Worse yet, the Tomcat's numbers are shrinking. Fifteen years ago, each carrier air wing included 24 F-14s. Today's carrier air wing has just 10. And those 10 are overworked on other tasks, namely night attack and photo- reconnaissance. The Tomcat has to perform in the attack role because the Navy gave up their only dedicated all-weather, night attack aircraft, the A-6 Intruder several years ago, without a replacement. The Fleet Air Defense role has been handed over to the F/A-18 Hornet, a great dogfighter with VERY limited range and no long range missile like the Phoenix. (The F-18 enjoys the unique advantage of being built in Congressman Richard Gephardt's district. The F-14 could not compete with that.) Speaking of the Phoenix, its numbers are also dwindling. The decision was made a few years back to stop production and cancel upgrades. Once again, our naval aviators are tasked with defending themselves against emerging threats using decade-old technology.

The second ring consists of the very capable AEGIS missile defense system on board the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. First envisioned during the Ford administration, the AEGIS can protect a task force for hundreds of miles from the center of the group. This ring is the only ring still intact, but AEGIS ships are expensive and thus not numerous. Should a submarine sink an AEGIS-armed escort, the task force that escort is supposed to protect will suddenly be very naked. The Navy has a lot of eggs in one basket here.

The third ring consists of the surface ships' own self defense missiles, usually the NATO Sea Sparrow, sometimes called the Improved Basic Point Defense Missile System (IBPDMS). The Sea Sparrow has a range of up to six miles, but, as the GAO points out, its operational readiness is poor. In other words, the IBPDMS doesn't work about as much as it works. It is a relatively old system, designed in the late 1970s. Budgetary considerations have delayed upgrades and extended deployments have overtaxed maintenance schedules.

The fourth ring is made up of different electronic countermeasures, such as the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system and the Super RBOC (Rapid Bloom Onboard Chaff). The SLQ-32 is designed to confuse incoming missiles, but, once again, as the GAO reports, its operational availability is low. Once again, it is a 20 year old system that has not been upgraded and deployment schedules during the Clinton administration that have gone far beyond anyone's wildest imagination have resulted in maintenance shortfalls. The Super RBOC is a system that shoots "chaff" (metal strips) into the sky to decoy missile radar. It's been around since the 1980s also.

The fifth and final ring consists of the "last ditch" weapons: the Vulcan/Phalanx Close In Weapon System (CIWS) and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). The CIWS is a radar-directed, 6-barrel 20mm gun with a rate of fire of 4,000 rounds per minute. It is an effective weapon, but, once again, it is a 20-year old design and it too has suffered from the Navy's high operational tempo and resulting maintenance problems. The RAM is the newest defensive weapon in the arsenal. Developed in cooperation with the West German Navy in the 1980s, the RAM entered production in early 1993 and has performed brilliantly in tests. However, its 21-tube launcher has only been installed on a small number (27) of the Navy's ships.

Conclusion: Our sailors and marines are in danger

Today, various rogue nations, including Red China, possess anti-ship missile capabilities that far exceed the threat that existed in the late 1980s. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy's ability to defend itself against these threats is less today than it was in 1990. The Clinton-Gore administration has been asleep at the wheel. Not only have potential adversaries like China benefited from technology transfers from the U.S., they have enjoyed a "grace" period during which they were able to exponentially increase their capabilities with no corresponding increases in the U.S. The Navy is almost totally dependent on the AEGIS defense system. Defense in depth has become eroded. One of the five rings of defense has been allowed to die on the vine. Three of the others are now withering. Those who will pay the price for this neglect do not reside in Washington, D.C. They live and work on board our Navy's ships. They are the young men and women we ask to do that which no one else is willing to do: defend our country and our way of life.

Christopher Holton is the president of Blanchard and Company and has been writing about geo-political issues, economics, and defense topics for more than 10 years. He can be reached at theholtons@bellsouth.net.


Friday, July 21, 2000


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