GAO: U.S. ships vulnerable to cruise missile attacks
On July 11, the General Accounting Office released a report that surely came as no surprise to anyone familiar with defense and maritime issues. It's title: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defenses.
The report concluded that our Navy was growing more vulnerable every day to
anti-ship cruise missile attacks. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to
understand this and the GAO's 58-page report (
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00149.pdf
During the years of the Clinton administration, the U.S. fleet's ability to
defend itself against anti-ship cruise missiles has been frozen in time in
some aspects and degraded in other aspects. During this 7-year period, not
one new weapon system has been added to the inventory to defend against
cruise missile attack. Sure, a few systems that were developed and ordered
during the Reagan and Bush administrations came on line during the early
Clinton years (AEGIS Vertical Launch System, Rolling Airframe Missile, or
RAM), but no new items have been added in 7 years. Meanwhile, the threat has
been growing.
When the Royal Navy's HMS Sheffield and the U.S. Navy's U.S.S. Stark were
struck with Exocet cruise missiles in the 1980s, there was a high degree of
awareness of the anti-ship missile threat. Today, the focus has shifted to
the dangerous ballistic missile threat. But proliferation of cruise missiles
is a serious threat also. Here is a list of some of the countries who have
armed themselves with modern anti-ship missiles:
And the cruise missiles are getting faster and harder to hit. According to
Great Britain's authoritative Center for Defense and International Security
Studies (CDISS http://www.cdiss.org
There are more countries with more anti-ship cruise missiles around the
world in 2000. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy's ability to defend itself against
this threat was arguably greater back in 1991, before Bill Clinton got
elected, than it is today.
The U.S. Navy's strategy for defense against anti-ship missiles has always
been based on "defense in depth." That defense in depth was comprised of 5
rings:
The first ring was manned by the E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and
Control (AEW&C) aircraft operating in tandem with the F-14 Tomcat armed with
AIM-54C Phoenix air-to-air missiles. The E-2C, operating 100 miles or so
from the carrier battle group can detect threats out another 200-300 miles
at altitudes from near sea level all the way to 100,000 feet. The E-2 can
detect aircraft and ships long before they get close enough to the carrier
to launch a missile (anti-ship missiles have ranges up to about 185 miles).
It can also detect missiles launched from submerged submarines (after the
missile breaks the surface). This information is transferred to the F-14
Tomcat. The Tomcat's powerful radar can track 24 targets simultaneously and
guide Phoenix missiles to six of them (the last 10 miles or so, the Phoenix
guides itself with its own radar). The Phoenix is big enough to knock a
strategic bomber out of the sky and smart enough and fast enough to knock a
Sunburn down.
The first ring is aging and very close to becoming extinct. The E-2C has
been around since the early 1980s. It has received some upgrades but its
radar and systems are still basically the same. Potential adversaries have
had 20 years to study the E-2C and develop ways to get around it. The F-14
Tomcat is one of the tragic stories of naval aviation. It's latest version,
the F-14D, is arguably the worlds best fighter, but budget considerations
and politics ensured that few of these were built. The majority of Tomcats
in service are carrying the same radar and missiles they carried 20 years
ago. Worse yet, the Tomcat's numbers are shrinking. Fifteen years ago, each
carrier air wing included 24 F-14s. Today's carrier air wing has just 10.
And those 10 are overworked on other tasks, namely night attack and photo-
reconnaissance. The Tomcat has to perform in the attack role because the
Navy gave up their only dedicated all-weather, night attack aircraft, the
A-6 Intruder several years ago, without a replacement. The Fleet Air Defense
role has been handed over to the F/A-18 Hornet, a great dogfighter with VERY
limited range and no long range missile like the Phoenix. (The F-18 enjoys
the unique advantage of being built in Congressman Richard Gephardt's
district. The F-14 could not compete with that.) Speaking of the Phoenix,
its numbers are also dwindling. The decision was made a few years back to
stop production and cancel upgrades. Once again, our naval aviators are
tasked with defending themselves against emerging threats using decade-old
technology.
The second ring consists of the very capable AEGIS missile defense system on
board the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
First envisioned during the Ford administration, the AEGIS can protect a
task force for hundreds of miles from the center of the group. This ring is
the only ring still intact, but AEGIS ships are expensive and thus not
numerous. Should a submarine sink an AEGIS-armed escort, the task force that
escort is supposed to protect will suddenly be very naked. The Navy has a
lot of eggs in one basket here.
The third ring consists of the surface ships' own self defense missiles,
usually the NATO Sea Sparrow, sometimes called the Improved Basic Point
Defense Missile System (IBPDMS). The Sea Sparrow has a range of up to six
miles, but, as the GAO points out, its operational readiness is poor. In
other words, the IBPDMS doesn't work about as much as it works. It is a
relatively old system, designed in the late 1970s. Budgetary considerations
have delayed upgrades and extended deployments have overtaxed maintenance
schedules.
The fourth ring is made up of different electronic countermeasures, such as
the SLQ-32 electronic warfare system and the Super RBOC (Rapid Bloom Onboard
Chaff). The SLQ-32 is designed to confuse incoming missiles, but, once
again, as the GAO reports, its operational availability is low. Once again,
it is a 20 year old system that has not been upgraded and deployment
schedules during the Clinton administration that have gone far beyond
anyone's wildest imagination have resulted in maintenance shortfalls. The
Super RBOC is a system that shoots "chaff" (metal strips) into the sky to
decoy missile radar. It's been around since the 1980s also.
The fifth and final ring consists of the "last ditch" weapons: the
Vulcan/Phalanx Close In Weapon System (CIWS) and the Rolling Airframe
Missile (RAM). The CIWS is a radar-directed, 6-barrel 20mm gun with a rate
of fire of 4,000 rounds per minute. It is an effective weapon, but, once
again, it is a 20-year old design and it too has suffered from the Navy's
high operational tempo and resulting maintenance problems. The RAM is the
newest defensive weapon in the arsenal. Developed in cooperation with the
West German Navy in the 1980s, the RAM entered production in early 1993 and
has performed brilliantly in tests. However, its 21-tube launcher has only
been installed on a small number (27) of the Navy's ships.
Today, various rogue nations, including Red China, possess anti-ship missile
capabilities that far exceed the threat that existed in the late 1980s.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy's ability to defend itself against these threats is
less today than it was in 1990. The Clinton-Gore administration has been
asleep at the wheel. Not only have potential adversaries like
China benefited from technology transfers from the U.S., they have enjoyed a
"grace" period during which they were able to exponentially increase their
capabilities with no corresponding increases in the
U.S. The Navy is almost totally dependent on the AEGIS defense system.
Defense in depth has become eroded. One of the five rings of defense has
been allowed to die on the vine. Three of the others are now withering.
Those who will pay the price for this neglect do not reside in Washington,
D.C. They live and work on board our Navy's ships. They are the young men
and women we ask to do that which no one else is willing to do: defend our
country and our way of life.
Christopher Holton is the president of Blanchard and Company and has been
writing about geo-political issues, economics, and defense topics for more than
10 years. He can be reached at theholtons@bellsouth.net.
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